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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE SPECIAL COURT FOR SIERRA LEONE TO THE
LAW ON CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY OF CHILDREN IN INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL LAW
by
Ana Paula von Bochkor Podcameni
Florida International University, 2017
Miami, Florida
Professor Harry Gould, Major Professor
The revision of laws and the application of culpability to those most responsible
for serious humanitarian law violations has functioned as a necessary condition for
achieving peace in most post-war societies. However, there is an embarrassing silence
when it comes to addressing the question of whether children are to be subjected to the
principle of individual criminal responsibility. As morally controversial as it is, the
question remains fundamental. Unfortunately, children have been involved in armed
conflicts, as victims primarily, but not exclusively. Children are among those accused of
having committed brutal and terrible international crimes in times of armed conflict when
part of armed groups or armed forces. And with no consensus within the international
community regarding their status within International Criminal Law — no established
law within International Law and no consistent practice among states on the issue— the
problem of criminal accountability of children accused of international crimes remains
unanswered.

vii

The current work conducts a legal positivist analysis with the focus of
investigating the contribution of the Special Court for Sierra Leone to the current debate
on children’s criminal responsibility under International Criminal Law. Among
significant contributions, the Statute of the Special Court brought one interesting
innovation to the debate on children’s potential criminal responsibility. Juveniles starting
at age fifteen would be considered viable for prosecution if among those most responsible
for the Special Court, as established in Article 7.1. The above innovation translates into
two essential contributions to the debate on children criminal responsibility for
international crimes: first the Special Court was the first international court to elect a
minimum age of criminal responsibility (MACR) at age fifteen to be operational within
the scope of the court. Secondly, and equally important, the court reflected the position
that children, after the stipulated MACR would be considered, at least a priori, viable
subjects of the international criminal system.
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Chapter 1: Introduction

Summary
The present research inquires into the controversial, yet unsettled, legal question of
whether children are potentially subject to individual criminal responsibility under
International Law (IL). As a first step, an analysis of the current state of law to the
problem will be conducted, followed by a deeper look into the relevance of the works of
the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) in determining a possible evolving rule of
child criminality. The theoretical framework will be based on criminal law, international
law and children’s rights. The goal of the research is to show that the SCSL has generated
evidence of law on the issue of children’s potential prosecution which can be used by
other international and non-international courts for future reference.
Are children involved in armed conflict and accused of the commission of war
crimes to be subjected to the international legal rule of individual criminal responsibility?
The present research delineates a legal positivist analysis investigation of
International Criminal Law’s position on the controversial, necessary and unsettled issue
of child criminal responsibility. To date, the problem has remained unanswered by
international law.
The present analysis delineates a positivist legal investigation, therefore, primary
sources of law are given precedence over secondary and non-binding documents. More
specifically, I will be looking into treaty and customary law because these are binding
sources of law.
Next, the work will focus on the jurisdictional contributions coming from the only
court that has included juveniles as viable subjects of international criminal law: The
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Special Court for Sierra Leone. I intend to show the existence of legal precedent created
by the Special Court that can be used by international courts or national courts on the
issue of child criminal responsibility under international law.
The dissertation will conclude with suggestions for future research, in which the
author will explore complementary venues sourced from the minimum age of legal
recruitment as established by International Humanitarian Law, the minimum age of
criminal responsibility as set by the SCSL, as well as the concomitant relationship
between the liberty right of early enlistment, legal competence and individual criminal
responsibility for children lawfully recruited by armed forces. Preliminary theoretical
findings suggest that when legal competence is presumed, it fulfills a priori the criteria
for the exercise of individual criminal responsibility.
Statement of the problem
The existing laws against child soldiers in International Law, more specifically,
International Humanitarian Law, allows the recruitment and use of children by the armed
forces of states starting at age fifteen; however, if the underage recruited is accused of
international crimes while in the line of duty, International Law has no position on
whether these children are criminally responsible for his or her acts.

Explaining the problem
The laws prohibiting states from recruiting and using children under the age of
fifteen in armed conflicts are contained in the Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of
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International Armed Conflicts (Additional Protocol I) of 8 June 1977, more
specifically Article 77, Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August
1949, and relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts
(Protocol II), of 8 June 1977 (Additional Protocol II), specifically part 4 and Article 38
of the Convention of the Rights of the Child (CRC) of 1998 which are deemed to be
customary law and are liable to be used as residual law by international courts. There are
no prohibitions in customary International Humanitarian Law against states recruiting
and using children age fifteen and above. The only rule in the above conventions
protecting the young recruit is circumstantial, expressing that states, when recruiting and
using those between age fifteen and seventeen, are to give priority enlistment to those
who are older. These legal rules have achieved wide support within the international
community, and are currently viewed as reflecting obligations extending to all states and
individuals. The Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the
involvement of children in armed conflict (OPAC) of 2002 is currently the only
international human rights treaty prohibiting the recruitment and use of persons under
eighteen, yet it has not been recognized as customary law, thus creating the obligation of
compliance exclusively to its State parties.
Early enlistment is seen as problematic, mostly by academics and child specialists
who call attention to the lack of maturity and de facto competence of a child below
eighteen to enlist in such a dangerous and challenging task as taking arms. Despite the
fact that it is important to acknowledge these rules may not reflect morally constituted
opinions regarding children’s capacities, the goal of the current work is not to challenge
the current law related to early recruitment, but expose the fact that international
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humanitarian law allows it, thus deeming these young people legally competent to engage
in combat training and hostilities.
Also equally problematic, if the child who has reached the minimum age of
military recruitment (set at fifteen) by International Humanitarian Law, happens to be
involved in the commission of a war crime (or any other international crime)
international law does not hold a consensus position regarding whether he or she is to
respond criminally for his or her act.
Despite the facts that all individuals are obligated to observe international
humanitarian law, and that children under eighteen perpetrate serious violations of
international humanitarian which would give rise to criminal accountability for an adult,
there are no international legal provisions, documents, or previous rulings from
competent international tribunals that specify if a child is subject to the principle of
individual criminal responsibility under international criminal law if accused of a grave
breach of international humanitarian law.
The drafters of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court intentionally
excluded individuals who were under the age of eighteen at the time the act was
committed from the Court’s jurisdiction.1 No other international court has yet brought a
juvenile to justice for violations of International Humanitarian Law. No domestic court
has tried a juvenile for grave breaches of international humanitarian law. The turning
point was the Statute of the SCSL which, for the first time, attributed criminal
responsibility to those fifteen years of age or older.
1

Schabas, William. The International Criminal Court: A Commentary on the Rome Statute, (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2007), 72.
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Before then, jurisdiction over crimes committed by child soldiers was been
exercised at the domestic level (and not at the international level) with three attempts to
prosecute former child soldiers – two rulings in the Democratic Republic of Congo and
one in Uganda.2 These children were brought to court charged with violations of
domestic law, not international crimes. No courts, international or national, have ever
tried child soldiers for violations of international law.
In International Law, children are mostly the victims of international crimes, even
if they are the ones who committed them. 3 When serious violations that amount to
international crimes are carried out by children, the “responsibility passes entirely to the
adult abductor, enlister, recruiter or commander.”4 “The fact that children are capable of
violence falls outside the entrenched modernist formulations of childhood” that
consequently feeds into the development of legal rules.5 As a result, serious violations,
which would amount to international crimes if committed by adults, do not receive the
same legal treatment when perpetrated by children. This is problematic because, when it

2

Happold, Matthew. “The Age of Criminal Responsibility for International Crimes Under International
Law,” From Peace to Justice Series International Criminal Accountability and Rights of Children, eds.
Karin Arts and Vesselin Popovski (Hague Academic Press, 2006), 69-84.
3

Mark Drumbl calls attention to how constructed images of child soldiers directly affect their legal
treatment. Within the existing available discourse of child soldiers (produced mainly in the West), the
overwhelming image of the child soldier as a faultless passive victim prevails. The child is seen as a victim
of violent recruitment and training by their commanders. Facing such violence and hardships of the war
children are helpless, and this innocence “fills the international legal imagination, influencing the substance
of international law and policy” (Drumbl, Mark A., Reimagining Child Soldiers in International Law and
Policy (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 9.
4

Drumbl, Reimagining Child Soldiers in International Law and Policy, 18.

5

Honwana, Alcinda . “Innocent and Guilty: Child-Soldiers as Interstitial and Tactical Agents,” Makers &
breakers: children & youth in postcolonial Africa, eds. Alcinda Honwana and Filip Boeck (Africa World
Press, 2005), 31, 37.

5

comes to international crimes, the nature and the seriousness of the crimes should not
outweigh the conditions of the accused, and the victim still has the rights to justice.
And what if the armed group was commanded by children, and not adults? As
strange as this may sound, the leaders of an armed rebel group, God’s Army, composed
of approximately 200 men, formed in 1997 to fight against the Burmese government, was
led by twin brothers, age nine. The boys operated the armed group until 2001 (age 13)
when they surrendered to the Thai government.6 In this case, when the leaders are/were
minors, where does criminal responsibility of those who ordered the crimes stands?

Ongwen’s ICC trials: a possible glimpse of the court’s position on the criminal
responsibility of former child soldiers
Dominic Ongwen’s criminal case, currently taking place at the ICC, may force the
Court to further elaborate its position whether former child soldiers are to be deemed
criminally responsible under International Criminal Law. Despite the fact that the ICC
has so far avoided discussion of the criminal responsibility involving acts committed by
child soldiers by deliberately avoiding the question of whether children can be submitted
to the principle of individual criminal responsibility when accused of international
crimes. Article 26 of the Rome Statute entitled “Exclusion of jurisdiction over persons
under eighteen” expresses clearly that the “The Court shall have no jurisdiction over any
person who was under the age of 18 at the time of the alleged commission of a crime.”

6

For more information, see: “Two little boys,” The Guardian, (London) July 07, 2000,
https://www.theguardian.com/g2/story/0,3604,347432,00.html.
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The trial of Ongwen, however, has touched on the matter by asking whether a
former child soldier, raised in an armed group, is to be held responsible for his criminal
acts? Ongwen’s case is interesting and important because “[Ongwen] is the first former
child soldier to face trial at the institution, and the first defendant to be both alleged
perpetrator and victim of the same crimes.”7 Ongwen’s case, despite not directly
addressing the issue of criminal acts committed by children (Ongwen is an adult at the
time of the judgement), nonetheless highlights the necessity for the Court to discuss if
and how much coercive conditions and young age affect criminal responsibility.
Ongwen’s story starts similarly to the stories of many child soldiers in Uganda;
he was abducted by the LRA at the age of ten, and forced to endure brutal training and
violence. Ongwen learned and suffered the violent life of a child soldier, yet as the years
passed, he was raised to more prominent positions within the group, and later, as a
commander, was in charge of ordering and committing human atrocities.
Ongwen is now facing criminal charges for all 70 counts brought by the
prosecution:
The alleged crimes were purportedly committed against internally
displaced persons in northern Uganda between 2002 and 2004. They
include attack against the civilian population, murder and attempted
murder, rape, sexual slavery, torture, cruel treatment, and outrages upon
personal dignity. Others are enslavement, forced marriage as an inhumane
act, persecution, destruction of property, pillaging, and the conscription

7

“Trial of ex-child soldier Dominic Ongwen to hear prosecution case,” The Guardian, January 16, 2017,
https://www.theguardian.com/law/2017/jan/16/trial-ex-child-soldier-dominic-ongwen-to-hear-prosecutioncase-icc-uganda.

7

and use of children under the age of 15 to participate actively in
hostilities.8
Most of the charges against Ongwen focus on attacks on refugee camps between
2002 and 2005 in northeastern Congo in December 2009, in which about 350 civilians
were killed and another 250, including at least 80 children, were abducted.9
The defense has concentrated on the fact that Ongwen was brutalized and
traumatized after being abducted: “He was tortured ... forced to watch people being
killed, used for fighting as a child soldier” … Such conditions would at least serve as “a
serious mitigating factor,” explained Thomas Obhof, a US lawyer based in Uganda and
part of the defense team.10
So, the central question for the court to decide, as framed by the defense team is
how much the experience of being an abducted and brutalized as a child and made into a
soldier unwillingly mitigates (if it does mitigate) the individual criminal responsibility of
the adult he became? That is the discussion brought forth by the present case. It will be
the first time that the ICC will hopefully be discussing and position itself regarding the
criminal responsibility of someone that is considered a perpetrator, yet was made a victim
by the same organization.

8

Wairagala Wakabi, “Ongwen Trial to Open in December but Defense Cites Challenges”, International
Justice Monitor, LRA Trials (May 31, 2016), https://www.ijmonitor.org/2016/05/ongwen-trial-to-open-indecember-but-defense-cites-challenges/).
9

“Trial of ex-child soldier Dominic Ongwen to hear prosecution case,” The Guardian (January 16, 2017).

10

“Trial of ex-child soldier Dominic Ongwen to hear prosecution case,” The Guardian (January 16, 2017).
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The trial is ongoing, with the prosecution currently making submissions, and it
only a matter a time before the final adjudications are out, and hopefully the ICC will
provide an indication of where it stands in relation to cases of criminal accountability of
former child soldiers.11
Numbers of active child soldiers. How many? Difficult to know
‘Any person under eighteen years of age who is part of any kind of regular or
irregular armed force or armed group in any capacity’ is to be considered a child soldier
according to the Cape Town Principles and Best Practices of 1997. As of 2007, the Paris
Principles have instead suggested a new term which would theoretically include a wider
protection for children involved in armed conflict, and this was labeled: ‘children
associated with armed forces and armed groups.’ Nonetheless, the academic literature
and jurists alike have continued to treated children involved in armed conflicts using the
nomenclature of child soldiers, as it will be done in the present work.
According to the Coalition to Stop the Use of Child Soldiers, child soldiers have
been used in most armed conflicts and almost every region of the world; “tens of
thousands of children under the age of eighteen continue to serve in government forces or
armed opposition groups. Some of those involved in armed conflict are under ten years
old.”12 Despite international organizations’ worldwide advocacy toward putting an end to
11

Lino Owor Ogora,”To Punish or to Pardon? Perspectives on Accountability and Forgiveness in the Case
of Dominic Ongwen, International Justice Monitor, LRA Trials, March 30, 2017,
https://www.ijmonitor.org/2017/03/to-punish-or-to-pardon-perspectives-on-accountability-and-forgivenessin-the-case-of-dominic-ongwen/.
12

Child Soldiers International, an independent human rights organization previously associated with a
coalition of leading human rights and humanitarian organizations, Amnesty International; Defense for
Children International; Human Rights Watch; International Federation Terre des Hommes; International
Save the Children Alliance; Jesuit Refugee Service; the Quaker United Nations Office—Geneva; and
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the recruitment and use of child soldiers, the number of governments employing children
has not decreased since 2004 (from ten situations of 2003 to nine situation of 2004 in
which governments used children).13
Child Soldiers International has declared:
Since January 2011, eighteen states were reported to have used girls or
boys in hostilities. In some cases, children were deployed as members of
official state armed forces including, national armies, paramilitaries, civil
defense, police and other forces established by law (Afghanistan, Côte
d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of the Congo/DRC, Iraq, Libya, Myanmar,
Philippines, Somalia, Sudan, South Sudan, Thailand and Yemen). In
others they were part of state–allied armed groups such as irregular
paramilitaries and “self–defense” groups which were backed by, or allied
to, government forces but were not officially part of them (Central African
Republic, Côte d’Ivoire, Somalia, Sudan and Yemen).14

World Vision International. http://www.child-soldiers.org/our_history.php and “About the issue” and
“Frequent Asked Questions”: At Child Soldier International: http://www.childsoldiers.org/about_the_issues.php ; http://www.child-soldiers.org/faq.php.
13

“Summary”, Child Soldier Global Report, https://www.child-soldiers.org/shop/global-report-2008-1
(United Kingdom, 2008).
14

According to Child Soldiers International:
There are, some states which, contrary to best practice, still permit the voluntary
recruitment of under-eighteens. According to the latest available information seventeen
year olds can enlist in the armed forces of Algeria, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan,
Bolivia, Brunei, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Cuba, Cyprus, France, Germany, Israel,
Jamaica, Lebanon, Malaysia, Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, the Philippines, Sao
Tome and Principe, Saudi Arabia, and the USA continue to permit the voluntary
recruitment at the lower age of sixteen years are: Bangladesh, Brazil, Canada, Egypt, El
Salvador, India, Iran, Ireland, Jordan, Mauritania, Mexico, Pakistan (with exception of
aero-technicians), Papua New Guinea, Singapore, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, the
United Kingdom, and Zambia. In a few states, there is no minimum age, or it has been set
below sixteen years. Such states include Barbados, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Pakistan
(aero-technicians only), and the Seychelles.

(“Frequent Answers, and Questions”, Child Soldier International, http://child-soldiers.org/faq.php and
http://www.child-soldiers.org/theme_reader.php?id=1).
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The recruitment of young soldiers is not an approach exclusively perpetuated by
developing countries; developed countries such as the United Kingdom and the United
States enlist children (individuals under the age of eighteen) in their military forces. 15
Whether forced into service or simply by volunteering to join, it is indisputable
that children become part of armed forces and armed groups. UNICEF’s data states that
around 300,000 children–boys and girls under the age of eighteen–are today involved in
more than 30 conflicts worldwide.16
Rachel Brett and Margaret McCallin in 1966 called child soldiers ‘invisible
soldiers.’17 They are the unseen soldiers; with no precise number of how many child
soldiers are currently engaged in armed conflicts. There are also no numbers of former
child combatants. One of the reasons being non-state armed groups, which are the largest
recruiters of child soldiers, work mostly illegally, with no concern for accountability,
making it impractical to know how many child soldiers they recruit. Also, it is very
common for armed groups and armed forces to deny the presence of child soldiers, in an
attempt to avoid moral and legal consequences:
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the presence of children in military ranks is not officially acknowledged –
in fact, is often denied – no measures are taken to prevent their
deployment. As a result, children are used extensively in hostilities both in
combat and non-combat roles by national armies of DRC, Myanmar,
Sudan and Yemen…In some countries, ‘age blindness’ can also be the
product of not knowing. In Uganda and the Philippines, for example, low
rates of birth registration result in the likelihood that children are present
among voluntary recruits.18
Brett and McCallin have acknowledged “there is a wide variation in the estimates
of the number of child soldiers involved. The total number of child soldiers in each
country, let alone the global figure, is not only unknown but unknowable. The figures
presented in their book functions as a ‘best guess’ as of May 1998.”19
Most of the websites and publications concerning child soldiers borrowed their
numbers from Graça Machel’ report “Impact of Armed Conflict on Children” requested
by the UN Secretary-General and submitted under General Assembly resolution 48/157
of 1996. In her report, she initially indicated that: “an estimated 300,000 children under
18 are participating in conflicts -- fighting on the front lines, abused as sex slaves or used
for portering.”20 However, oddly, this estimation is no longer present in her original
report. As it seems the original passage was substituted by: “…over the past 30 years,
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government or rebel armies around the world have recruited tens of thousands of
children. Most are adolescents, though many child soldiers are ten years of age…”21
In conclusion: “…providing authoritative figures for the number of child soldiers
worldwide today is nearly impossible – all numbers we quote are estimates, and even
estimates are not available for all situations of conflict,” said Nick Scarborough,
administrative officer of Child Soldiers International.22
With regard to young soldiers recruited by armed forces:
a survey conducted by Brett and McCallin’s (1998) shows that while most
state practice tends towards establishing recruitment policies starting at
age eighteen, a substantial minority (thirty-four, about a third of the total
surveyed) still recruited from the ages of fifteen, sixteen or seventeen.
This second group includes some states with significant regional or global
military capacities (Germany, Indonesia, Israel, South Africa, the UK, the
USA, and Yugoslavia) and contains representatives of all regions of the
world and the developing and developed states.23
More recent data collected by Child Soldier International shows that in the decade
between 1998 and 2008: “there was evidence that at least 25 states had used children in
21
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armed conflict as part of national armies. The figure for the first half of 2012 was less
than ten.”24 “In a few cases, an end to or reduced incidence of use of child soldiers by
national armies is directly attributable to specific protection measures taken by states.
However, in the majority of cases, the use of child soldiers has ceased simply because
hostilities have ended.25
Some states also continue to deploy child soldiers as confirmed by the Child
Soldier International report “Louder Than Words”:
ten States deployed under-18s in hostilities as part of national armies
(army, navy, air force), between January 2010 and June 2012 (Chad, Côte
d’Ivoire, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Libya, Myanmar,
Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan, United Kingdom and Yemen). But when the
wider spectrum of forces for which states are responsible are included
(other official elements of state armed forces and state-allied armed groups)
a total of seventeen states are found to have used child soldiers in this
period (the above, plus Afghanistan, Central African Republic, Eritrea,
Iraq, the Philippines, Rwanda and Thailand). In another three States:
Colombia, Israel and Syria children were not formally recruited but were
nevertheless reported to have been used for military purposes including
intelligence gathering and as human shields.26
Even when legal measures are in place to avoid the recruiting and deploying of
children under eighteen, in times of war, states can still make use of younger soldiers by
justifying the engagement as military necessity. As a result, if a state allows the
recruitment of young soldiers, there is no guarantee that it will cease using them if it
needs them.
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Background and conceptual framework
In International Law, the term ‘responsibility’ traditionally referred (and still
mostly does) to a ‘State responsibility,’ that is when a State is in violation of its legal
obligations, thus needing to provide compensation to any other State injured by its
violations. The doctrine of State responsibility evolved through custom and had been
codified by the International Law Commission. The Draft Articles on Responsibility of
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts was adopted by the UN General Assembly in
2001.
Until the end of the Second World War, the term ‘international responsibility’
was used almost exclusively to state’s violations of its international obligations.
Afterwards, the term found new connotations under the workings of the International
Military Tribunals of Nuremberg and the International Military Tribunal for the Far East.
At these Tribunals, men were brought to trial and charged individually for their alleged
violations of international law. Individual criminal responsibility, previously applied in
limited cases of piracy and slave trading, was henceforth attributed to war crimes and the
new category of crimes against humanity.
As a result, and since the end of the Second World War, states have been
authorized (and sometimes required) either to prosecute and punish or to extradite an
individual accused of having committed serious international crimes.27
According to international law, individuals unlike states, are subject to being
accused of international crimes.28 International crimes are understood as acts that violate
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essential values shared by the international community as a whole. When breaches of this
kind occur, each state shares the responsibility of bringing the accused to justice.29 In
other words, international crimes are subject to universal jurisdiction; this means
basically that any country – irrespective of whether it has a direct jurisdictional link to the
crimes – can bring the accused to trial. states are obligated to not obstruct justice for the
accused; therefore they should either “try or extradite” the accused so he or she can be
brought to justice in another State. This is because international crimes are understood to
affect the society of states as a whole, therefore allowing states to prosecute the accusers
independent of the existence of links of nationality or territoriality.
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The central assumption inaugurated by these two tribunals and later serving as the
main foundation of the newly established International Criminal Law is that individuals
who seriously violate International Humanitarian Law by committing international
crimes are to be submitted to the principles of individual criminal responsibility under the
International Law.
Currently, the principle of individual criminal responsibility stands at the center of
the international criminal legal system: it is to be enforceable at the national and
international level, and it has received the status of customary law, making it mandatory
for all states to observe.30 It is regarded as an indisputable advance towards achieving
international justice, and a significant change from the traditional understanding of
international responsibility in which states almost exclusively were the ones obligate to
provide reparation in cases of non–compliance with an international rule that caused
injury to another party.31
Therefore, International Criminal Law deals with the liability of individuals,
irrespective of who they are: “…the status of the perpetrator is irrelevant, except the
crime of aggression.” 32 Even “if the perpetrator has acted in official capacity (de jure or
de facto state official) the state on whose behalf he has performed the prohibited act is
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barred from claiming enjoyment of the immunity from the civil or criminal jurisdiction of
foreign states accruing under customary law…”33
There is no pre-established list of international crimes over which international
courts exercise jurisdiction. Each international court has the authority to determine its
jurisdictional limits subject to its constitutive instrument. The most widely accepted list
of international crimes subject to universal jurisdiction is that found in the Rome Statute,
and these are the crime of genocide; crimes against humanity; war crimes; the crime of
aggression.34
How does criminal law deal with the problem of child perpetrators?
In domestic law, children are recognized and treated as capable of responding to
their acts, at least criminal acts, after reaching a certain stipulated age at which he or she
is deemed legally competent to understand what he or she has done (this is the age of
legal competence in criminal law, or the minimum age of criminal responsibility). A
person who has attained the minimum age of criminal responsibility (MACR) is
considered to, at least, a priori to understand his/her act and be legally capable of being
held criminally accountable/responsible.
In most systems of criminal law, in addition to the criteria of status, for a person
to be held criminally liable, the behavior of the accused needs to meet two requirements:
a wrongful act (actus reus) and a guilty mind (mens rea). These two requirements
constitute the very concept of a “crime.” For one to “...be guilty of a crime, particularly
33
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about serious offenses, it is not enough simply to have done a particular prohibited act;
there must also be the element of a guilty mind.“35 If the element of mens rea is absent,
the person may be excused from criminal responsibility. 36 Mens rea, then is the
subjective criterion for a crime, and consists in the accused having acted with harmful
intention, knowledge or recklessness as to every element of the offense.37
Determining mens rea is one of the most challenging parts of the criminal justice
process mainly due to the fact that it is impossible to backtrack to the moment of the act,
get into the accused’s head, and proof harmful intention. All attributions of intention are
extrapolated from the accused’s and only done a posteriori, of course.
As in national law, in International Criminal Law a culpable state of mind is
normally proved in court by circumstantial evidence. In other words, one
may infer from the facts of the case whether or not the accused, when acting
in a certain way, willed or was aware, that his conduct would bring about
certain result… This is the position taken by national and international
courts.38
In most national criminal systems the lack of mens rea is mainly presumed
(defense of infancy) in younger children below the age of criminal responsibility.39
However, if the accused is an older child who has reached the age of criminal
responsibility, he or she may be considered legally competent to be brought to trial. The
trial can take place in a juvenile chamber, or depending on the age of the accused and the
seriousness of the crime, the child can face the adult penal system. It is the prosecution’s
35
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duty to “to establish by evidence or informed admission that the child defendant had
sufficient understanding of the nature of the offense.” 40 So, determining whether a child
meets the requirement of mens rea, besides being paramount, is widely case-specific
(context–dependent and better set on a case–by–case basis).
The goal here is not to extend the discussion to the viable ways the justice system
identifies and proves intentional harm, knowledge, or recklessness in a particular crime,
but to assert that in all of these cases, it should be established first and foremost that the
accused exercised legal capacity, that he or she was able to understand the act performed,
and could foresee the possible harmful outcomes.
How does international law deal with the problem of child soldiers?
International law deal with the problem of child soldiers by utilizing two fronts:
prohibiting states from recruiting and using children under fifteen years of age (these
obligations found in International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights
Law are set on states), and by bringing to justice those adult individuals directly involved
in conscripting or enlisting children under fifteen to participate in hostilities. The adult
recruiter is also responsible “…with respect to the acts perpetrated by the child soldier
him/herself.”41 Both of these positions are present in rules of International Humanitarian
Law, International Human Rights Law, and International Criminal Law.
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Since no child accused of serious violation of International Humanitarian and
Human Rights law has been brought before an international court or national court, it is –
at first glance – uncertain whether children are deemed legally subject to the international
criminal system.
Purpose of the study
This dissertation will focus on the contributions of the Special Court for Sierra
Leone in generating evidence of law on the issue of children’s criminal responsibility for
serious breaches of International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights
Law. The emphasis on the Special Court serves to answer, at least partially, the more
general question of children’s individual criminal responsibility in International Criminal
Law.
Research questions
1- What is International Criminal Law’s position on children accused of international
crimes? Can children old enough to be legally recruited be considered old enough to be
held criminally responsible? Are children deemed subjects of the international criminal
system?

2- How important to the development of International Criminal Law was the Special
Court’s decision to include children under eighteen years old as potentially liable for
criminal prosecution?
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Definition of terms and some more theoretical framework
‘Children’ will be considered ‘anyone below the age of eighteen, unless
previously granted majority by domestic law treated’ as defined by Article 1 of the
Convention on the Rights of the Child.
‘Child soldiers’ for the current work is understood as defined by the 2007 Paris
Principles as ‘any person below 18 years of age who is or who has been recruited or used
by an armed force or armed group in any capacity, including but not limited to children,
boys and girls used as fighters, cooks, porters, messengers, spies, or for sexual purposes.
It does not only refer to a child who is taking or has taken a direct part in hostilities’
(Principle 2.1).
The terms related to engagement with military services are borrowed from the
Report, Louder than Words (2012), published by Child Soldier International in which:
‘Recruitment’: Refers to the means by which people become (formally or informally)
members of armed forces or armed groups; ‘Enlistment or voluntary recruitment’ occurs
when persons facing no threat or penalty join armed forces or groups of their own free
will; ‘Conscription’ is compulsory recruitment into armed forces; ‘Forced recruitment’ is
a form of forced labor: it takes place without the consent of the person joining the armed
forces or armed groups. It is achieved mainly through coercion, abduction or under threat
of penalty; ‘Unlawful Recruitment‘ refers to the recruitment of children under the age
stipulated by international treaties applicable to the armed forces or armed groups.42
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Responsibility in criminal law and for the purpose of this work will be treated as
conceptualized by Duff (2007) as answerability. To be responsible is to be answerable;
“answerable to a person or body who has the right or standing to call me to account; and I
am thus answerable in virtue of some normatively laden description, typically a
description of a role, that I satisfy.”43
Responsibility, then, is invoked when someone has acted or failed to act in a
matter that was consistent with a certain set of rules, and thus was expected to behave in
such a way as to not cause some form of harm to somebody. “When we hold an agent
accountable for his actions, we do not merely demand an explanation for his actions. The
agent’s explanations make sense only because we think that there are norms that apply to
the agent.”44
The concept of accountability/responsibility is coupled with the idea that the act
committed has caused some form of physical or/and moral damage to another person or
institutions that can hold or request the doer to be held accountable. Accountability
initially involves that the person assumes some form of reparation of the damage done.
It is a commonplace that responsibility involves a dyadic relationship: an agent is
responsible for something. The relational conception of responsibility that concerns us
here is not merely dyadic, but triadic: I am responsible for X, to S – a person or body who
has the standing to call me to answer for X…45

43

Duff, Antony, Answering for Crime: Responsibility and Liability in the Criminal Law, (Oxford: Hart
2007), 23.
44

Tadros, Victor, Criminal Responsibility (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 29.

45

Duff, Answering for Crime: Responsibility and Liability in the Criminal Law (2007), 23.

23

Action is the main basis for attributing responsibility. When we hold a person
responsible, we hold them responsible for some act, which can ironically include failing
to act when it was expected thus generating some form of damage to another party.
Because “responsibility is fundamentally connected to answerability,” the person
who performed the act is indeed requested to provide an answer/provide a justification
for his actions, and if no suitable justification/explanation is provided, then he or she who
suffered the from the act may wish to file some claim against the perpetrator.46 If an
acceptable justification is given, then the perpetrator may have his or her responsibility
demised or waived completely.47
According to Tadros (2005) when an agent is held to account for his actions, he is
required to provide an explanation. ‘Why did you do this?’ tends to be the most intuitive
question asked, where the person who suffered the harm is requesting an explanation
regarding the reasons that motivated the doer’s actions. In other words, he is asked to
show that his motivating reasons correspond to normative reasons: reasons that ought to
have guided his actions. The relationship between motivating reasons and normative
reasons can help us to understand something further about reactive attitude of the
agents.48
As highlighted, attributing responsibility for something involves holding “reactive
attitudes towards the person to be held responsible… such as resentment, condemnation
46
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as well as gratitude and approval.” And these reactive attitudes “generate the social
practices of passing and blaming the individual.”49
In sum, and very broadly, responsibility is to hold someone(s) or an institution
answerable for its acts (or negligence) when it causes some form of damage to someone
other than to the accused. Thus, responsibility does not necessarily need to entail criminal
responsibility. Criminal responsibility is a form of individual responsibility as we will see
below. Most wrongful acts that give rise to responsibility on the part of the accused are
indeed not infringements of criminal law.
From moral responsibility to criminal responsibility
Moral responsibility and criminal responsibility are intimately related.50
Normally, criminal laws tend to prescribe moral behavior. An act that is criminal is, with
a few exceptions, morally condemned.51 Yet, there are some instances in which the
infringement of a criminal rule may not carry the weight of moral condemnation. And for
theses cases, it is common for the defense to present some form of excuse or justification
for the action of the accused. Excuses, in general, aim at negating criminal responsibility
altogether, while justifications act to argue against a possible incrimination (liability) yet
not negating responsibility. Baron makes a clear distinction between excuses and
justifications: “[T]o say that an action is justified is to say... that though the action is of a
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type that is usually wrong, in these circumstances it was not wrong. To say that an action
is excused, by contrast, is to say that it was indeed wrong (and the agent did commit the
act we are saying was wrong), but the agent is not blameworthy.”52
Criminal responsibility necessarily involves the breach of criminal rules. Duff
explains that “…criminal responsibility is a particular species of responsibility” and
Tadros adds that, in fact, responsibility is a necessary condition for criminal
responsibility. 53 Because responsibility is understood as an act (or lack of action) which
demands/asks for justification, Tadros continues, identifying “the practice of holding an
agent criminally responsible for breaching the criminal law is a specific instance of the
more general practice of holding agents responsible for what they do.”54 Thus
responsibility is to be treated as a necessary condition for criminal responsibility.55
In most cases, a criminal act also carries moral condemnation thus qualifying the
accused (by our reactive attitudes) for some form of retribution. Therefore, criminal
responsibility functions similarly to moral responsibility, yet it is considered a more
serious infringement of moral values, and, more importantly, a direct violation of existing
criminal law.
Criminal responsibility and criminal liability
When inquiring on the topic of legal responsibility one often stumbles upon the
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term “legal liability.” Are ‘legal liability’ and ‘legal responsibility’ synonymous? No.
According to Tadros (2005) and Duff (2007) responsibility is distinct and prior to
liability. A person can be held responsible for violating a rule/law, yet may not be found
liable he/she is able to produce an excuse that precludes his or her responsibility. Being
liable is being subject to some form of retribution. The same applies to criminal
responsibility and criminal liability. Duff argues that”…being held liable is equivalent to
being condemned by the referent legal authority, or authoritative organ to respond
punitively to the acts committed.”56 A person is considered liable after the authorized
organ has affirmed his or her condemnation for the act in question, and no exemptions or
excuses for their actions were presented or accepted. If an excuse or exemption has been
in fact accepted, then the accused can be held ‘criminally responsible without being
criminally liable’. The presenting of exemptions or excuses functions to impede the
transferal of responsibility to liability, while not necessarily eliminating criminal
responsibility. In other words, the presentation of an excuse, which precludes liability, is
what allows for the distinction between responsibility and liability, while not necessarily
exempting criminal responsibility. 57
Excuses and justification tend to affect the moral aspect of criminal responsibility
as well, describing the perception of blame. For example, when a person has acted
heroically saving someone’s life yet damaging private/military property as an uncalculated effect, or maybe has kidnapped a person in order to save her from a life
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threatening situation, the damaging act was indeed performed, yet it is possible to argue
against the existence of an intention to harm or of a violation of a moral rule.\
Why is this topic interesting?
Criminal law tends to function by constructing clear cut distinctions between the
victim and the perpetrator. However, in working with the issue of child soldiers and
criminal accountability for those who have committed gross international law breaches,
this dissertation necessarily challenges this binary configuration of criminal law. A child
who has committed international crimes is usually framed first as a victim even though he
or she is accused of being a perpetrator. This work, therefore, calls for the creation of a
category of victim-perpetrator for children old enough to be considered legally capable of
exercising criminal responsibility over their acts while still potentially victims
themselves.
Procedures / Methods:
The method applied for the analysis of child criminality under international law
will follow the lines of Legal Positivism, aiming at the delineation of the current state of
the law on the proposed problem. As explained by Bruno Simma and Andreas L. Paulus
in their work ‘The Responsibility of Individuals for Human Rights in Internal Conflicts:
A Positivist View’ (1999): a positivist approach to in a legal investigation focuses
primarily on an analysis of the existent sources of law: primary and secondary sources are
given priority, followed by an interpretation and explanation of the application of the
relevant sources to the problem. According to the authors, a positivist approach is one
which understands international law as “a unified system of rules that, according to most
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variants, emanate from state will. This system of rules is treated as an ‘objective’ reality
and needs to be distinguished from its normative counterpart: ‘as it should be’.”58
A legal positivist view of international law, implies that:
all norms derive their pedigree from one of the traditional sources of
international law, custom and treaty. Treaties embody the express consent
of states, custom nothing but their tacit consent. The only relevant conduct
is that of states seen as unitary actors. Treaties, including so-called
lawmaking treaties-e.g., those creating new rules or changing old ones-are
binding upon the contracting parties only. Whether habitual conduct of
states amounts to legally binding customs is a question of objective
determination of fact. 59
In practical terms, legal positivism offers a legal approach constructed based on
the investigation of the relevant legal sources. So, first, we will be delving into
International Humanitarian Rights and Human Rights treaties, as well as rules of law
from these regimes that have achieved customary status regarding the recruitment and use
of children in armed conflict. The next step then is to inquire into how international
criminal courts define and treat the crime of child soldiering.
Also, when conducting an analysis in the area of International Criminal Law, I
will be giving special attention to customary law, the law understood as binding upon all
states. The choice is due to the fact that international criminal courts tend to utilize
customary norms or universally binding norms as residual law, in an attempt, to fill a
legal gap whenever there is no direct rule or ruling which may serve as guidance.
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Another reason is of using customary law is to avoid clashing with the principle of
legality which is also understood as a “a norm of customary international law applicable
in both international and non-international armed conflicts.”60
The principle of legality expresses that:
No one may be accused or convicted of a criminal offence on account of
any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence under
national or international law at the time it was committed; nor may a
heavier penalty be imposed than that which was applicable at the time
the criminal offence was committed. 61
When no customary rules are found, the analysis extends to treaty rules, followed
by principles of international criminal law, and finally general principles of international
law, as explained by Cassese (2008).62 Next, I will be analyzing the Statutes and case
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law originated by the international criminal tribunals. A more detailed discussion of the
methods applied here is to be found in the following chapter.
Significance of the study
While most works on the issue of child soldiers and criminal accountability focus
on normative accounts when delving into the question of whether children should be
subject to the principle of individual criminal responsibility under international criminal
law for the commission of international crimes, the present work is one of the few which
investigates the ‘black letter of the law’ to provide an answer to the above question.
A few authors, such as Happold (2005) and Grover (2012) affirm that the lack of
an established minimum age of criminal responsibility in international law impedes or at
least makes it hard for international courts to judge anyone below the age of eighteen.
However, the research suggests that during the elaboration of the Statute of the Special
Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), the UN Secretary General with authorization of the UN
Security Council has utilized what I will call ‘the Minimum Age of Legal Recruitment’
(MALR) of children into the military (set at fifteen) as a reference for the establishment
of a minimum age of criminal responsibility at the SCSL. This suggests a correlation
between the minimum age of legal recruitment as set by International Humanitarian Law
and the Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility (MACR) inaugurated by the SCSL’s
Statute.
The research also indicates that the SCSL Statute has indeed created evidence of
law on an MACR within international criminal law that can be used by other international
criminal courts and national courts adjudicating against international crimes.
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Finally, the research suggests that by including those starting at age fifteen within
the jurisdiction of the court, the SCSL has recognized these children as a priori subjects
of the international criminal system.
Limitations of the study
One of the main challenges when conducting this dissertation was the lack of data
related to the numbers of child soldiers actively in duty, enlisted both in the armed forces
and in armed groups. As stated in previous sections of this chapter, “…the total number
of child soldiers in each country, let alone the global figure, is not only unknown but
unknowable.”63 And “…providing authoritative figures for the number of child soldiers
worldwide today is nearly impossible – all numbers we quote are estimates, and even
estimates are not available for all situations of conflict.”64 The only numbers made
available that were accessible were the names of countries that allow military recruitment
by their armed forces below the age of eighteen. In some cases, even these numbers are
not reliable. In some countries due to problems of birth registration, loss of paperwork, or
even deliberate age blindness, countries may recruit under fifteens and register them as
older. There are no viable means of getting the information on how many children are
involved in armed groups. Armed groups, by definition, mostly function outside of the
law, and do not register information about their personnel. Consequently, it must be
63
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understood that it is infeasible to accurately estimate the number of how many child
soldiers have been involved in the commission of serious breaches of international
humanitarian law.
An additional complication arising when trying to estimate the number of child
soldiers employed is the fact that countries conceptualize the term child soldier in
different ways. In some countries where the minimum age of legal enlistment is eighteen,
for example, anyone below this age would be considered a child soldier, recruited
illegally. On the other hand, if the minimum age were set at fifteen or sixteen, then a
person within the stipulated allowed age, even though below eighteen, would be
considered a legal soldier by the recruiting armed force. International standards set at
eighteen the age below which one is a child soldier; however, these standards are not
binding, and countries exercise the liberty to define their guidelines and rules. Also, the
two international legal regimes that prohibited states recruiting children recognize ‘child
soldiers’ differently. For example, International Humanitarian Law recognizes children
over fifteen, recruited legally as combatants, while International Human Rights Law
recognizes them as maintaining their status and special protection as children.
Goals
1. Call attention to the underrepresented and unproblematized issue of child soldiers
recruited legally into the armed forces
2. Highlight the Statute of the SCSL as the only international legal instrument that
directly addresses the criminal liability of children accused of serious violations of
International Humanitarian Law, emphasizing its creation of evidence of law on the
issue.
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3. Theorize the decision of the SCSL to set fifteen as the minimum age of criminal
responsibility, asking if and how the SCSL decision to grant criminal responsibility
for juveniles affects, more generally, the development of a possible rule of MACR set
at fifteen in International Criminal Law.
4. Develop a theoretical approach which explains the relationship between the liberty
rights to enlist and individual criminal responsibility (to be developed for future
research)
Organization of the study
The work is organized in eight relatively brief chapters. Following the
introduction, chapter two problematizes how international discourses (sources from
international organizations, international non-governmental organizations, media outlets
and certain academics) represent the figure of the child soldier as a single story of a
young child from the developing world who has been pressured or forced by means of
violence to engage in an armed conflict, mostly against his or her will. This
representation feeds into the primary discourse of the victimhood of children in the
debates about child soldiers and their potential criminal accountability. The end of the
chapter calls attention to the dangers of a single story representation, thus making it
unfeasible to conceive other descriptions of child soldiers.
Chapter three begins setting the terms of the debate, making it clear that the
research proposes a legal positivist investigation aiming at identifying, through an
analysis of the legal sources of International Law and International Criminal Law, the
current state of the law on the issue of children involved in the commission of
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international crimes. The chapter also clarifies that despite the importance of moral and
political debates on child prosecution and the goals of international law, the research will
not be delving deep into these areas.
In chapter four, the reader is introduced to a brief illustration of how currently the
concept of childhood is understood in the human sciences (more specifically in
Psychology) as a non-adult being in an adult-centric world, and how such descriptions
affect the ways by which law makers create and enforce legal standards for children. It
will be identified an overwhelming tendency of current existing debates on child soldiers
of presenting themselves in normative accounts founded by liberal and universal
conceptions of childhood, focusing on children’s incompetence, lack of legal and moral
agency, victimhood.
In chapter five, the dissertation delves into the legal analysis. Emphasis will be
given to treaty and customary law developed for the protection of children, below the age
of fifteen, from recruitment and use in armed conflict. This chapter calls attention to the
failure of international law’s provisions in completely banning the use of children
between the ages of fifteen and eighteen by armed forces and armed groups, thus framing
the recruitment of these children, in most cases, as complying with international
customary humanitarian law, and therefore as lawful.
After having illustrated the main provisions protecting children from early
military recruitment and use, chapter six presents an overview of how international law
scholars structure the issue of how international law deals with the issue of child soldiers
and criminal accountability. Here, it is possible to identify a shift in interpretation from a
more traditional account of children’s victimhood and lack of criminal responsibility
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compatible with what was presented in chapter three, into new positions which focus on
interpretations of international law which license criminal accountability to those fifteen
or older who have been accused of international crimes.
Chapter seven comprises the second part of the legal analysis. In it, I will present
how international law, via the works of international courts, addresses those individuals
who are accused of the commission of serious breaches of International Humanitarian
Law and International Human Rights Law. Special emphasis is given to the Special Court
for Sierra Leone for being the first international court to recognize juveniles as legally
capable of infringing international law, and to include them, starting from age fifteen,
within the jurisdiction ratione personae of the court.
The chapter concludes by suggesting these inclusions in the SCSL Statute
reflected the UN Security Council and the UN Secretary- General’s acknowledgment that
juveniles accused of serious violations of international law are at least a priori considered
viable subjects of the international criminal system.
The final chapter begins with a brief discussion of what it means to be a subject in
the international legal system, that is, being deemed capable of infringing the rules of a
legal system and thus responsible for those infringements.
It must be pointed out that International Humanitarian Law and International
Human Rights Law create obligations for all individuals qua individual irrespective of
age, which fulfills the most evident criterion of legal personality under international
criminal law. (We will have already established in previous chapters that children are
granted international legal rights under International Human Rights and International
Humanitarian Law regimes). Next, the dissertation turns to a complementary line of
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thought that supports the arguments that children legally recruited according to the
criteria specified by International Humanitarian Law are to be deemed legally competent
to exercise both the “liberty right” of military enlistment and being subject to the
principle of criminal responsibility for acts committed while in the field. The rationale
sustaining this conclusion rests on the concomitant relationships between liberty rights,
legal competence, and individual responsibility.
I intend to explore with greater depth the suggested relationship between the
minimum age of legal recruitment and the minimum age of criminal responsibility, to
develop a possible hypothesis regarding why the SCSL chose fifteen as their minimum
age for criminal prosecution. It will be suggested that the underlying foundation for the
linkage between the minimum age of recruitment and the minimum age of criminal
responsibility is the relationship between responsibility rights and liberty rights.
Cipriani’s and Hohfeld’s respective theories of rights, as well as theoretical
contributions from Tadros’ and Duff’s work on responsibility will be important sources
when extending the represent research in an attempt to build a theoretical foundation to
argue that liberty rights granted by International Humanitarian Law to children
voluntarily starting at age fifteen is ultimately founded on the presumption of legal
competence. The same presumption of legal competence is also what embodies and
qualifies the juvenile for criminal responsibility. Therefore, liberty rights and
responsibility coexist in a direct relationship, one enabling the other, as explained by
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Cipirani (2009) in Children’s Rights and the Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility.65
In simple terms: competence for early enlistment when granted to a young recruit, even
though only presumed, gives rise, at least legally, to individual responsibility.
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Chapter 2: Overview of how child soldiers are represented by UN officials, international
organizations and academics
At first blush, the concept of the child soldier seems an unnatural
conflation of two contradictory and incompatible terms. The first, child,
typically refers to a young person between infancy and youth and connotes
immaturity, simplicity, and an absence of full physical, mental, and
emotional development. The second, soldier, generally refers to men and
women who are skilled warriors.66
This chapter offers an initial exploration on the topic of child soldiering and how
international law and academics set the terms of the debate. More specifically, the
chapter will show how most accounts of child soldiers presuppose universal narratives of
childhood, ineptitude and victimhood ‘de-territorializes’ the experiences and varieties of
the experiences of children and their involvement in armed conflicts. By deterritorialization I mean a type of characterization that fails to honor the diversity that
arises from the multiplicity of cases of child soldiering, by creating a simple narrative, or
limited narratives of the experience of child soldiering. To illustrate the lack of variance
on how the phenomenon of child soldier is portrayed, I will be illustrating the main
discursive constructions / images of child soldiers reproduced by the media, legal experts
and academics, emphasizing how they tend to reproduce certain stereotypes which
override and restricts the viability of other narratives of child soldiering and child
soldiers. The difficulty of assessing the numbers of children employed in armed conflicts
will also be highlighted.
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Images of child soldiers
When we think of child soldiers, what usually comes to mind is an image of an
African child, frequently young, holding a firearm, and with a sense of lost childhood
reflected in his or her eyes. This image is widely portrayed in media outlets as depicting
the phenomenon of child soldiering, yet it is not necessarily accurate. Although 40% of
the cases of child soldiering are indeed placed in Africa, the rest of the countries and
armed groups outside of Africa are responsible for 60% of child soldiers, despite being
less visible. 67 Drumbl calls attention to the need to resist “tiresome tendencies that
Africanize a global phenomenon and pathologize African conflicts.”68 Neither are all
child soldiers from poor, economically debilitated countries; developed countries such as
the UK, Australia, and the US allow recruitment of individuals under the age of eighteen
for military duty. Most of the children used in armed conflicts are from armed groups
which mostly operate unlawfully; yet a significant portion of these child recruits are from
governmental forces, and some have been recruited lawfully.
In order to work towards de-pathologizing the phenomenon of child soldiering
away from an exclusively African or third world country experience, and widen the
perspectives of the debate by providing a more diverse typology, Drumbl in
‘Reimagining child soldiers’ (2012) offers four main categories of child soldiers as
represented by what he calls “transnational discourses.”69 These are 1) the faultless
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victims; 2) damaged goods; 3) the hero, 4) a demon and bandit. It is important to
emphasize that these categories are ideal types. Therefore, it is highly likely to identify
one or more images interposing on single cases. Fortunately, Drumbl is among the few
who identifies the viability of more than one characterization of a child soldier.
The most common characterization of child soldiers delineated by Drumbl is that
of a child victim: a victim of the externalities of the war, of poverty, misery, and
suffering, of adults‘ abuses, and of their own vulnerabilities. The image of the ‘faultless
passive victim’ abducted, coerced into service, manipulated by the adult who lacks moral
rectitude, and who forces children to fight and to kill is the most widely spread image of
child soldiers, especially among IOs, NGOs and media outlets. “The faultless passive
victim images binds communities of conscience” and feeds into the narrative of Western
humanitarianism, reinforcing the discourse that besides faultless for their acts, these
children have not choice but being rescued/saved by the good will of international
agencies.70
The second image is that of the children involved in the armed conflict as
‘damaged goods’; part of a lost generation, physiologically injured, traumatized and in
need of being rescued. This characterization is mostly utilized by international
organizations involved with the rescue and rehabilitation of child soldiers. Below, is a

academics…they all feed into what Drumbl calls the construction of a “legal imagination”: “a normative,
aspirational, and operational mix of international law, policy, and practice—constituted as it is directly and
indirectly by a broad constellation of actors.” (Drumbl, Reimagining Child Soldiers in International Law
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70

Drumbl, Reimagining Child Soldiers in International Law and Policy, 8-9.

41

part of a letter sent by Human Rights Watch Executive Director, Peter Takirambudde, to
Sierra Leonean President Kabbah in 1999 on the recruitment of child soldiers.
Emotionally and physically immature, children are ill-equipped to deal
with the harsh realities of armed conflict. Because of their inexperience
and lack of training, child soldiers suffer far higher casualty rates than
their adult counterparts. Those who survive may be permanently
disabled or bear psychological scars from being forced to both commit
and witness horrific atrocities. Former child combatants often require
much more intensive rehabilitation and reintegration services than adult
soldiers following a conflict. Often denied an education and the
opportunity to learn skills that are beneficial to civilian society, former
child combatants are often drawn back into conflicts and are easy prey
for armed groups and criminal gangs.71
The third image is of a demon and / or bandit, a child who is: irredeemable,
baleful, or sinister; an instrument of war manipulated by adult malefactors. Child soldiers
can be regarded as beasts with no mercy and no moral standing. Some are even framed as
delighted by the power that comes from holding the position of a soldier and owing a
firearm, while others seem entertained by all of the violence they are capable of
executing. Child soldiers were “… feared by many for their brutality.”72 “These new
soldiers are not simply children; they can also be callous killers capable of the most
terrible acts of cruelty and brutality.”73 The image of a child soldier as a demon and
bandit is mostly commonly promoted by people and societies who have witnessed and
suffered the violence committed by these young soldiers.
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The fourth and last image is of a child soldier as a hero. Someone who has
sacrificed himself to join a morally urgent fight, for example, a young soldier who has
joined the resistance to fight against external oppression. Commonly, the images of
young soldiers as heroes are mostly propagated by armed forces and armed groups to
target possible recruits in similar hardship.
I have chosen to use Drumbl’s typology because it is possible to identify these
‘ideal type’ characterizations in most discourses about child soldiers. Overall, Drumbl’s
typology calls attention to the overwhelming presence of the first two images of child
soldiers: the ‘faultless victims’, and ‘damage goods;’ as we will see in the section below.
Child soldiers as described by international organizations
Specialized IOs and NGOs working with child soldiers produce and publicize a
body of literature that is considered authoritative by many, despite those groups’ political
interest in the issue. In this section, it will be shown, as an example, how a few main IOs
and NGOs that work with children in armed conflicts share a set of perceptions of how
they perceive and categorize child soldiers.
Child Soldier International is the leading NGO addressing the problem of child
soldiering. The organization also works towards ending the military recruitment of
persons under eighteen. It recognizes child soldiers as “children (under eighteen) who are
used for military purposes.”74
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Child Soldier International functions with a broad definition of child soldier that aligns
with the conceptualizations offered by the Cape Town Principles and the Paris
Principles.75
The organization’s website, under the title “What are Child Soldiers?” describes
child soldiers as mostly victims of abused by their commanders, forced to commit violent
acts, to kill, to follow any rule despite their moral judgment.
Some child soldiers are used for fighting – they’re forced to take part in
wars and conflicts, obliged to kill, and commit other acts of violence.
Some are compelled to act as suicide bombers. Some join ‘voluntarily,’
driven by poverty, sense of duty, or circumstance…Child soldiers can be
both boys and girls. While some may be in their late teens, others are as
young as four years old.76
The strategic use of the word ‘some’ to indicate the possibility that not all are
submitted to this type of violent treatment, yet the organization fails to offer an
alternative description of what a child soldier may encounter when they are recruited to
duty.
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The word “voluntarily” is presented between quotation marks, indicating that the
organization does not believe that child soldiers can be entitled to a genuine choice to
enlist. For this reason, CSI legal adviser Tomaso Falchetta has expressed the view that:
“child soldiers should be considered as victims and the NGO opposed their prosecution,
as emphasis should be on the criminal responsibility of the adult recruiter… The CSI
does not advocate for a cutoff point for the prosecution of child soldiers, as it is a difficult
issue.”77 Child Soldier International expresses the opinion that even when recruitment is
done lawfully, it is still to de condemned because it “puts [children] at undue risk and
jeopardizes their human rights”78
Child Soldier International may be among the very few NGOs that recognizes the
fact that at least one developed country, Great Britain, recruits underage soldiers into its
armed forces as standard policy. “Child soldiers are recruited and used by both official
government armed forces and armed groups around the world…Today, most state armed
forces worldwide only recruit adults (from age eighteen). But some countries still recruit
children under the age of eighteen – for example the UK, Myanmar, and Afghanistan”
which would technically, as we will see in the coming chapters, qualify as a child
soldier.79
Human Rights Watch offers a more explicit victimized characterization of child
soldiers, framing the child soldier as an underprivileged child from a developing country,
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suffering from poverty, war, fear, lacking opportunities, and more commonly than not,
severely abused and taken advantage of. The involvement of the child with the armed
conflict is mostly a product of abduction, forcible recruitment, or an act of desperation on
the part of the child. The possibility of voluntary enlistment into armed conflict is
represented as nonexistent.
Thousands of children are serving as soldiers in armed conflicts around
the world. These boys and girls, some as young as eight years old, serve in
government forces and armed opposition groups. They may fight on the
front lines, participate in suicide missions, and act as spies, messengers, or
lookouts. Girls may be forced into sexual slavery. Many are abducted or
recruited by force, while others join out of desperation, believing that
armed groups offer their best chance for survival.80
The organization published several reports about child soldiers in which it
explores the lives of child soldiers, both from armed groups and from armed forces in
South Sudan, Syria, Yemen, Somalia, India’s Chhattisgarh State, Congo, Chad, Nepal,
Sri Lanka, Burundi, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire, Guinea, Colombia, Northern
Uganda, Angola, Burma ranging from years 2003 to 2015. All countries in the report
were from the developing world, facing serious economic and security challenges. In
addition, the children focused fit the stereotype of an underprivileged child suffering
from poverty, war, fear, lack of opportunities. There were no reports of developed
countries that enlist or recruit underage soldiers.81
The Office of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children
and Armed Conflict of the United Nations characterizes child soldiers as children, in high
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numbers: “hundreds of thousands… used in armed conflicts around the world… [who]
are abducted and beaten into submission, others join military groups to escape poverty, to
defend their communities, out of a feeling of revenge or for other reasons.” The Office
also holds that children who have become child soldiers are “victims” “regardless of how
children are recruited and of their roles… “their participation in conflict bears grave
consequences for their physical and emotional well-being. They are commonly subject to
abuse and most of them witness death, killing, and sexual violence. Many are forced to
perpetrate these atrocities, and some suffer serious long-term psychological
consequences. The reintegration of these children into civilian life is a complex
process.”82
UNICEF, the agency of the United Nations dedicated to improving the health and
nutrition of children and mothers throughout the world describes the urgent situation of
child soldiers as: “Children as young as eight years of age are forcibly recruited, coerced
and induced to become combatants. Manipulated by adults, children have been drawn
into violence that they are too young to resist and with consequences they cannot
imagine.”83
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When considering how children end up in armed groups and armed forces,
UNICEF explains that “child soldiers are recruited in many different ways. Some are
conscripted, others are press-ganged or kidnapped, and still others are forced to join
armed groups to defend their families. Sometimes, children become soldiers simply to
survive.”84
Common features of how international legal discourse describes child soldiers
Children are legally framed as in need of special protection due to their
vulnerabilities. The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) reaffirms the belief – as
indicated in the Declaration of the Rights of the Child – that
the child, by reason of his physical and mental immaturity, needs special
safeguards and care, including appropriate legal protection, before as well
as after birth… [and that] the need to extend particular care to the child has
been stated in the Geneva Declaration of the Rights of the Child of 1924
and in the Declaration of the Rights of the Child adopted by the General
Assembly on 20 November 1959 and recognized in the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, in the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (in particular in articles 23 and 24), in the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (in particular in Article
10) and in the statutes and relevant instruments of specialized agencies and
international organizations concerned with the welfare of children. 85
International Humanitarian Law affirms that children affected by armed conflict
are entitled to special respect and protection, as first expressed in Geneva Convention IV,
then later in Additional Protocols I and II. These conventions codify special protection
awarded to children during conflict: “the requirement of special protection for children
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relates to the provision of food, clothing and tonics, care of children who are orphaned or
separated from their families, treatment during deprivation of liberty and the distribution
of relief consignments and can be found throughout the Fourth Geneva Convention and
in Additional Protocol I (Fourth Geneva Convention, Articles 23–24, 38, 50, 76 and 89
(cited in Vol. II, Ch. 39, §§ 139–144); Additional Protocol I, Article 70(1).” Additional
Protocol I also determines that: “children shall be the object of special respect” (Article
77(1)) and Additional Protocol II adds that: “children shall be provided with the care and
aid they require” (Article 4(3)).86
Large parts of the available material on child soldiers focus on crimes committed
against children and not by children. Identified by the UN Secretary General and
enumerated by the Security Council in its resolutions, forming the basis of the Council’s
architecture for protecting children during war, International law frames six grave
violations against children during times of armed conflict.87 These six violations are: the
recruitment and use of children; killing or maiming of children; sexual violence against
children; attacks against schools or hospitals; abduction of children, denial of
humanitarian access.88
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The legal basis for these violations lies in relevant international law, which in turn
encompasses international humanitarian law, international human rights law and
international criminal law. During armed conflict, international humanitarian law
and international human rights law must be respected, with special regard to
children who often have no means to defend themselves against abuses. The full
range of children’s rights, economic, social and cultural as well as political and
civil, must be respected, protected and fulfilled. 89
More specifically related to child soldiering, the Statutes of the International
Criminal Court and the Special Court for Sierra Leone have labeled the recruitment and
use of children under the age of fifteen by armed forces and armed groups, a war crime.
The criminal responsibility falls exclusively upon the adult recruiter. If the child is
accused of an international crime, international law is unclear regarding the status of the
child as possible perpetrator; that is, whether the child is criminally responsible.90
International courts and domestic courts applying international law have yet to bring a
child to trial for international crimes.
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Children are generally recognized as victims of war, even when they are
perpetrators. They are represented as victims of abuse from adult recruiters and
commanders and from the distress of war. International organizations have constructed a
discourse of child soldiers that is based exclusively on the quality of victimhood of the
child, even if the child is the one perpetrating the acts: “Children, if anyone, should be
considered victims of armed conflict and protected accordingly. The assumption of a
relationship between victimhood and childhood is prevalent in the literature on the status
of children in war… in the context of war, children are seen as a product of abuse,
maneuvered by adult malevolence, presupposing that children are “dependent, exploited,
and powerless.”91
The Paris Principles declared that if children under 18 years who are unlawfully
recruited or used by armed forces or groups are accused of crimes against international
law are to be considered primarily as victims of violations of international law. Even if
they have been accused of serious offenses they are to be treated in accordance with
international standards for juvenile justice.92
As exemplified, the victimization of child soldiers is a commonplace among NGO
and UN discourses. Former UN Secretary General Kofi Annan, in the 2002 Report of the
Secretary-General on the establishment of a Special Court for Sierra Leone declared that:
although the children of Sierra Leone may be among those who have
committed the worst crimes; they are to be regarded first and foremost as
victims“…. More than in any other conflict where children have been
91
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used as combatants, in Sierra Leone, child combatants were initially
abducted, forcibly recruited, sexually abused, reduced to the slavery of all
kinds and trained, often under the influence of drugs, to kill, maim and
burn.93
Children should not be held criminally accountable for criminal violations. The
position against child prosecution is a common one. Rosen (2005) and Grover (2012), for
example, both argue that children should be exempt from exercising criminal
responsibility for any violations they have committed. For Rosen (2005) “children lack
moral agency, [therefore] cannot be held responsible for the war crimes they commit
because they are considered to have no legally relevant agency.”94
Following the same line of thought, Grover (2012) argues that children involved
in armed forces and armed groups are to be framed exclusively as victims, even when
they have committed hideous crimes. Their lack of responsibility is due to the coercive
condition under which they act and the threat of violence they face if they attempt to
refuse the order given. Even when the of the child is formally considered a volunteer, she
or he is usually reacting to the contextual or/and explicit violence which forces them to
serve in the first place; thus enlistment should not be seen not as the exercise of choice,
rather a survival strategy, or a way to keep their family and loved ones safe and fed:
The issue of duress is ever present in child soldier cases (where the child is
accused of having committed grave conflict-related international crimes)
even if one assumes that allegedly the child ‘voluntarily’ joined the armed
group or force committing mass atrocities and genocide95
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Finally, Grover (2012) frames the responsibility of child soldiering as falling on
both the adult recruiters who take advantage of the fragile state of the child, and the State
which has failed to protect the child from being recruited and used in the first place. In
her opinion, allowing children to be recruited and used for military purposes violates
international legal principles such as the “special protection of the child in times of
conflict” guaranteed by Additional Protocols I and II, the CRC and the OPAC, as well as
the principles of life, development, best interest of the child also codified by the CRC.
Similarly, Singer argues that the entire process of recruitment and training serves
the purpose of indoctrination, utilizing tactics of “fear, brutality, and psychological
manipulation to achieve high levels of obedience ...harsh discipline and the threat of
death continue to underscore the training programs of almost all child soldier groups.96
Grover adds to Singer’s comments on harsh recruitment techniques that even when the
service of the child is formally considered voluntary, she or he is usually reacting to the
violence that submits them to serve in the first place, and to the violence, they have been
submitted by the training process.97 Aptel (2010) also asserts that children who have
participated in international crimes should also be considered primarily as victims,
especially when the circumstances surrounding these offenses are inherently coercive.
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It is important for children to emerge as a recognized category of victims
because the process acknowledges and empowers them. It is essential to
break away from an adult-centric understanding of international crimes
and recognize that, in numerous contexts, victims and witnesses of
international crimes are children, and as children, they have specific rights
and specific needs.98
As one can see, in most of the literature dedicated to child soldiers, these children
are framed as lacking agency, maturity, and competence, thus being considered incapable
of choice. Such a position is evident in the discussion of voluntary enlistment, in which
the child’s decision to join the armed conflict is greatly influenced by push and pull
factors, and therefore cannot be representative of a genuine expression of free will.
Children are drawn into armed conflict by both push and pull factors.
Push factors include negatives that children escape by joining an armed
group. Abuse suffered in the family is a push factor – the child might join
an armed group to escape an abusive situation. They may also seek to
escape boredom, physical insecurity, extreme poverty, and the
humiliation associated with personal or family victimization and shame.
These push factors are only partial causes since most children who have
difficult family situations or live in abject poverty do not become child
soldiers. Equally or more compelling are the pull factors, which are the
positive rewards or incentives for joining armed groups. Analysts have
tended to underestimate the importance of pull factors, probably because
the emphasis of much child-soldiering literature has been on protecting
children from exploitation. Although most analysts view child soldiering
as a heinous form of exploitation, children who join armed groups often
see soldiering in different terms. Many see it as entering an opportunity
space in which they can obtain things they could not obtain otherwise –
including a family, power, revenge, wealth, education, and a commitment
to a cause. To understand the lure of these incentives, one has to imagine
the attraction felt by a child who comes from a very low-income family
and who has always felt powerless but who now carries a gun and is
feared and respected by many.99
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Rivet goes beyond stating that “regardless of whether these children are forcibly
recruited or joined the armed forces voluntarily out of fear, they are left with no choice,
but to commit such crimes to survive.”100
Answering to Rivet, joining the armed forces to survive, and being left without a
choice but to commit atrocities is too strong of a statement, and does not translate well all
the cases of child soldering. Children who have been lawfully recruited before eighteen
by the armed forces of developed countries like the UK, Australia, and the US, for
example, are understood to not fit this description.
The current legal imagination regarding abduction and coercive recruitment as the
major ways that children join armed forces and armed groups “leads to the undertheorization and under exploration of youth volunteerism.”101 It is presumed that children
are incapable of volunteering to join the armed forces due to an alleged lack of
competence and choice, and as a result, “the very notion of voluntary recruitment is
largely an illusion.”102 Also, in discussions related to children’s capacity, the minors are
mostly regarded as a uniform group; for example, in very few works authors differentiate
between younger and older children’s capacity for decision-making, an essential point
when discussion the young’s competence towards the genuine exercise of choice.
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Hart’s divergent position
Jason Hart, in his article, “Saving Children: What Role for anthropology?” offers
an alternative, more critical perspective. The author calls attention to how the current
literature on child soldiers tends to produce a discourse which de-contextualizes and thus,
deterritorializes the experience of competence of the children involved. Hart defends the
point that: “representational practices of child-focused humanitarianism on the grounds…
influence popular understanding of children’s lives, as well as the political uses to which
such representations may be put.”103 As an example, he illustrates Singer’s book
“Children of War” (2005):
We are given a generic account of ‘child soldiers’ in which the appalling
experience of one individual stands for all…A tone of indignation at the
adults who encourage children to take up arms to such effect pervades this
prime example of a humanitarian discussion of child soldiers. Noting that
technological developments and socio-economic conditions combine to
make the employment of children as combatants attractive, Singer remarks
that ‘[t]he only remaining ingredients required are groups or leaders
without scruples[...] As the payoffs can be huge, many take this moral
plunge.’104
In Hart’s opinion, “the above statement is typical of a book in which the moral landscape
extends only as far as the borders of the state.”105 Hart criticizes authors who engage in
what he calls a “global account of child soldiers,” disqualifying the child for any “real
measure of choice about recruitment.”106
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My problematization follows the line of Hart’s argument, directed against the
urge of understanding and treating the problem of child soldiering as represented by one
ideal type of child soldier: a young child forcibly abducted by armed groups, and thus
victimized by war and human violence. Most traditional approaches to child soldiers and
criminal accountability fails to provide proper representation of the numerous facets of
child soldiering.
Also, it is widely held that recruitment of young children (below the age of
fifteen), besides being legally prohibited by international law, is also morally condemned
by international society as a whole. Conversely, the early enlistment of individuals under
the age of eighteen to the armed forces for most parts does not cause equal repugnance.
In most cases, it is part of the official military policies and not labeled as a practice of
child soldiering. As a conclusion, the current and most common images/descriptions of
child soldiers are exclusionary, failing to reflect the reality of an older child (age fifteen,
sixteen, seventeen) officially recruited to join the armed forces and which have done so
as an exercise of choice and not as a desperate attempt to survival.
The current chapter has provided an overview of the main characterizations of
child soldiers, calling attention to the dominant discourses that encapsulate and reinforce
a single perspective.
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Chapter 3: Initial remarks and a note on methodology and the sources of International
Law
The general aim of this dissertation is to conduct a legal investigation to determine
whether international law recognizes the individual criminal responsibility of a person
who is under the age of eighteen. Secondly, a more specific aim is to inquire into the role
of the Special Court for Sierra Leone‘s contribution to the development of a legal norm
of minors’ criminal responsibility under international law. With both issues, my primary
concern will be identifying whether there is law to guide the topic at hand, and if so,
where the law is to be found. Lastly, I am also interested in determining whether the
place where the law is situated affects its interpretation and use. For the present
investigation, I will be using a legal positivist approach that understands and utilizes the
sources of international law (as recognized by international courts) as tools of analysis.
In practical terms, legal positivists understand the sources of law as the foundation of
a legal system and thus valuable guideposts to where the law is to be found. This way,
starting a legal analysis by identifying the legal sources applicable to the referent
question/case makes good sense. A legal positivist also views the law as a source-based
legal system in which the validity of legal rules emanates from their legal rules. This
affirmation, however, is not the same as saying that legal sources are the only factors
which determine legal rulings, and legal positivism does not ignore non-legal factors such
as accounts of morality, justice, political considerations, or how these enter into the
making of international law and courts’ decisions on specific cases. When non-legal
factors are brought within legal reasoning, and used by courts, they tend to be
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incorporated as part of the existing legal resources due to the doctrine of precedent. 107
Nonetheless, it still makes sense to start a legal analysis by inquiring into the sources if
one is interested in identifying whether there is law on the issue and where it is located.
One of the most common criticisms addressed to positivism is its disassociation
from moral and political accounts of how law is created and operates.108 “A theory that
insists on the facticity of law seems to contribute little to our understanding that law has
important functions in making human life go well, that the rule of law is a prized ideal,
and that language and practice of law is highly moralized.”109 Yet, as mentioned in the
previous paragraph, a legal positivist approach does not ignore non-legal factors or their
influence on courts’ decisions. “It is beyond doubt that moral and political considerations
bear on legal philosophy… the reasons we have for establishing, maintaining or
reforming law include moral reasons, and these reasons, therefore, shape our legal
concepts.110 The current analysis rather identifies the law by its sources, and not its
merits, therefore I will not be inquiring into whether the legal rules under investigation
are morally justified.
In other words, by working within a legal positivist framework, I will not be
developing a normative approach of how international law ought to be applied to reach a
specific desired outcome on the topic of child solders and accountability. My exclusive
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concern is with the ‘black letter of the law’, and more specifically, with the question of
whether international criminal law recognizes children as subjects of the principles of
individual criminal responsibility if accused of committing serious breaches of
international humanitarian law.
It should be noted that I recognize that most discussions related to child soldiers
and accountability currently available are normatively driven. In transitional justice, for
example, the question of children’s criminal accountability revolves around the question
whether child soldiers should face prosecution for their legal wrongdoing, and whether
any type of retribution is fair, and lastly if such a course is effective or detrimental for
that society’s transition from war to peace. These interrogations lead to a moral debate
regarding the minor’s subjection to criminal liability and, and under what criteria liability
can exist. Experts and academics have not been able to reach a consensus on the issue;
some assert that bringing a minor to trial for alleged crimes is neither efficient nor fair.
They argue that children under eighteen, in most cases, do not have a full understanding
of their actions and consequences. Therefore, if any type of accountability is
recommended, it should be rehabilitation and not punishment. Others bring direct their
attention to the victims, arguing that victims of minors’ violence are equally entitled to
justice, and that bringing perpetrators to trial, besides reinforcing the institution of justice
in that specific society, offers those who have suffered the crimes and their families a
sense of closure. As a conclusion, most of the analysis and work published up to date
approaches the matter as a substance of normative / principled interpretation, addressing
the question of how the current law should be interpreted. The normative approach is due
to the fact that high principles embedded with universal accounts of childhood, such as
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immaturity, lack of emotional control and agency, incompetence, lack of individual
responsibility greatly influence and inform the debate on child soldiers. On the following
chapter, I will highlight how most approaches focus on principled interpretations of the
law, bringing into their accounts moralized and universalized conceptions of how the
issues should be treated legally. When I analyze the principled accounts my goal is
simply to illustrate an existing dissonance between where the law is and where a handful
jurists and academics argue it should be.
Why is it important to utilize a legal positivist approach when conducting a legal
analysis?
It is common to find in transnational discourses reflected by UN officials, other
non UN-IOs, NGOs and specialized literature, moral, political and even presumed legal
positions of what is to be understood as morally fair and appropriate on the legal
treatment of child soldiers. However, most of these accounts fail to give a more careful
consideration of the where the current black letter of the law related to these young
combatants stands. Even if one‘s goal is to make normative statements about the law, an
analysis of where the law stands seems to be a fundamental first step. This being, an
inquiry into the sources of the law pertinent to the case is customary to jurists and courts
alike when adjudicating or even investigating a specific topic. I cannot emphasis enough
the importance of establishing first an investigation on the sources of law before one can
interpret and apply the fitting rules to the case at hand.
The sources of International Law
International law, unlike national legal systems, is a decentralized arrangement of
legal rules mostly built by commitments states establish with each other on a voluntary
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basis. states, therefore, chose to engage in legal relationships, for many reasons such as
creating a cooperative structure to solve multilateral problems, prescribing certain rules to
avoid conflict and confrontation, establishing reciprocity, instituting minimum levels of
protection to individuals, etc. The sources of international law are the building blocks of
the international legal system; they answer the questions “where does international law
come from and how is it made?”111 In practice, whenever a court, jurist, or even an
academic seeks to investigate whether there is a law on a particular issue and where that
law is found, they work to identify which sources of law are pertinent to the issue.
Article 38 of the ICJ Statute lists the five primary source of international law
considered by the Court: international treaties, customary law, general principles of law,
judicial decisions, and the writing of publicists. Despite the ICJ indicating that there is no
existing hierarchy among the listed sources, courts and jurists assign priority to
international treaties and customary law when conducting legal inquiry, because these are
lawmaking sources; that is, sources that directly generate international obligations. The
other sources are commonly utilized when a lack of treaty law and customary law is
evident, and to provide complementary guidance on how the law found in treaty or
custom is to be interpreted and applied. The current work will also give preference to
treaties and customary law when analyzing whether international law provides a legal
answer to the issue of children’s criminal responsibility.

111

Greenwood, Christopher, “Sources of International Law: An Introduction,” (2008),
http://legal.un.org/avl/pdf/ls/greenwood_outline.pdf).

62

International treaties
Treaties are the most common form of written commitments developed in the
international community. Treaties are governed by international law and are intended to
create a legal obligation.112 A treaty needs to be ratified / acceded to by a state for it to
create binding legal obligations for that State. When a state has ratified a treaty, it is
obligated to incorporate the treaty’s provisions into its domestic legal system, which
ultimately allows state parties’ national courts to rule on questions of international law, if
deemed necessary.
Evidence of the legal relationship established between states is found, for
example, in the numerous treaties established by states throughout history. Since the
creation of the United Nations “…more than 500 multilateral treaties have been deposited
with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.113 Many other treaties are deposited
with governments or other entities.”114
The development, implementation, and interpretation of treaties are regulated by
the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties developed in 1969. The provisions found
in the VCLT were mostly already customary rules. The VCLT does not apply to treaties
established before 1969 (the VCLT does not have a retroactive effect) apart from those
rules that had already achieved customary status. Three fundamental principles of
international law codified in the VCLT establish the foundations for how treaties are to
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be created, implemented and interpreted. These three principles are the Principle of
Consent, the principle of pacta sunt servanda, and the Principle of Good Faith.
The Principle of Consent can be found in Articles 34 – 36 of the VCLT; it
expresses that a state shall only be bound by a treaty to which it has consented to it. As a
consequence, treaties do not bind non-party or “third” states, except for any specific
treaty rules which have been recognized as codifying existing customary law.115
Article 26 of the VCLT reflects the principle of pacta sunt servanda, and it lays
out that: “every treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed in
good faith.” In Latin, pacta sunt servanda means “agreements must be kept;” this applies
to all legal treaty commitments made by state parties. Article 26 also mentions that states
must observe the treaty and act in good faith, thus exposing the significant concomitant
relationship between the principles of pacta sunt servanda and good faith.116 The
principle of good faith, even though explicitly present in the VCLT extends beyond this
treaty, serving as the foundation of all international obligations emanating from
international law. 117
When a state wishes to become party to a treaty, but it objects to one or more
provisions of the treaty (not wanting to be bound by them), it may register a reservation,
the subject of Articles 19 – 15. Reservations are the way the State asks to be excused
from the obligation to comply with the undesired clauses. Normally, reservations are
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valid except in cases when: 1) they are explicitly prohibited by the treaty; 2) the
particular clause prohibits a reservation or; 3) when the reservation is deemed
incompatible with the objects and purposes of the treaty.
Customary law
The second primary source of international law cited by ICJ Article 38(1)(b) is
international custom. International custom, or customary law, is defined by Article
38(1)(b) as “evidence of a general practice accepted as law.” The most common legal
view regarding the formation of customs (reflected on the ICJ ruling of the ICJ in The
North Sea Continental Shelf Cases (1968)118 expresses that customs are created by the
combination of two elements: an objective element consisting of a relatively uniform and
constant state practice (usus); and a psychological element composed of “the conviction
that such practice reflects, or amounts to, law (opinio juris) or is required by social,
economic, or political exigencies (opinio necessitatis).”119
An interesting feature of customary law is that:
the main feature of customs is that normally it is not a deliberate
lawmaking process. In the case of customs, States, when participating in
the norm-setting process, do not act for the primary purpose of laying
down international rules. Their main concern is to safeguard some
economic, social or political interests. The gradual birth of a new
international rule is the side effect of States’ conduct in international
relations.120
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Even though international treaties and international customary law are both
considered primary sources of international law because they express primary rules (what
is permitted and what is prohibited), a central difference between them is that while
“…customary rules are normally binding upon all members of the world community (or
of a regional group of States, in the case or regional customs), treaties only bind those
States that ratify or adhere to them.”121 Legal obligations deriving from international
customary law therefore applies nearly to all states indeed, with a few exceptions.122
Although international customary law can be commonly found codified in international
treaties, customs do not need to be written in any international document for them to be
obligatory. The authority of customary law emanates from being reflective of the
continual behavior of states throughout history and the shared belief that such acts were
so important they needed to become mandatory to all states.123 The obligations created
by treaties and customary law are equally authoritative : “rules created using bilateral or
multilateral treaties were not stronger than, or superior to, customary or general rules, and
vice-versa. Both sets of rule possessed equal rank and status.”124
When legal rules originating from different sources conflict, International Law
applies a set of principles to determine which is to be applied: “a later law repeals an
earlier one (lex posterior derogat priori); a later law, general in character, does not
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derogate from a previous one which is special in character (lex posterior generalis non
derogat priori speciali); a special law prevails over a general law or lex speciali derogat
generali.” 125
Jus cogens
Jus cogens rules or peremptory norms are “international customary rules of the
highest status of law”; they express moral absolutes from which no State can claim an
exemption.126 “Jus cogens are hierarchically superior to all the other rules of international
law, and as such, the three general principles governing the relationship between
international regulations (consent, pacta sunt servanda, good faith) do not apply to
them.”127
“States may not derogate from peremptory norms through treaties or customary
rules that do not have the special legal force of such norms.”128As defined by Article 53
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties: “a peremptory norm of general
international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of
states as a whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be
modified only by a subsequent norm of general international law having the same
character.”
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International society has not yet agreed upon a definitive list of jus cogens
rules.129 Most states and international courts have recognized that grave violations of
International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law such as war
crimes, genocide, torture, crimes against humanity, for example, are considered
violations of jus cogens rules.
Jus cogens, as peremptory obligations, extend to individuals. If and when
infringed, a duty to prosecute violations of jus cogens rules is a placed upon states, yet
owed to the international society as a whole. In other words, the obligation to prosecute is
an obligation erga omnes (the obligations falls over the international community as a
whole); any state that holds in custody someone accused of violating a rule of jus cogens
status may prosecute, with no need of a national or territorial link to the case. Indeed,
under the principle aut dedere, aut judicare that State must either prosecute them in good
faith, or it must extradite them to a state that is willing and able to do so.130
Secondary sources of International Law
The secondary or subsidiary sources of international law are used to fill gaps
when there are no primary sources of law guiding a particular case. Despite not
generating binding commitments themselves, these sources serve as guidance for the
implementation and interpretation of existing treaties and customary law, and may also
constitute evidence of law, thus being essential in any legal analysis.
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Some examples of secondary sources of law are general principles of international law,
judicial decisions of international or national courts applying international law, and the
writings of renowned publicists and jurists.
General principles of International Law
When a court is unable to find a treaty provision relevant to a dispute, or customary law,
and to avoid a finding of non liquet (when the law in that particular case is not clear)
courts may apply general principles of international law.131 General principles of
international law can either be inferred from municipal laws or deduced from the nature
of the international community.132 There is no established consensus between jurists
whether it is one or another. “The case law of the ICJ shows that the Court has had
recourse to both.”133
Judicial decisions
Previous decisions, whether coming from the same court or another do not carry the same
obligatory character in international law that they do in Common Law systems. “Article
59 of the Statute of the Court provides that: the decision of the Court has no binding force
except between the parties and in respect of that particular case” and this because not all
states have the same international obligations.134 States’ international obligations are
distinct, as they reflect which treaties a particular state has voluntarily engaged to follow.
The international courts, for example, when asked to adjudicate a case, it does so by
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taking into consideration which international obligations each State holds and how these
vary from one state to another. Since there is no precedent doctrine in international law
(stare decisis) international court and tribunal cases do not necessarily make law. The
non-precedent doctrine is challenged in international criminal law where individuals do
in fact follow the same international legal obligations.
The writings of publicists and the teachings of the most highly qualified jurists of the
various nations
Examples are the International Law Commission, the American Law Institute,
L’Institut de Droit International, the Hague Academy of International Law and the
International Commission of the Red Cross (ICRC), 135these sources function as
subsidiary, meaning, the writings of experts do not constitute law per se, but they provide
essential guidance in properly applying and interpreting the existing laws. The written
work of these groups can be consulted, or their members can be called to provide expert
testimony in a court’s ruling.
The present chapter has served as an introductory mapping of the main sources of
law recognized by International Law (as set by Article 38 of the International Court of
Justice). The sources are to be considered the main tools of analysis for the current work.
In latter chapters, I will explain how international courts utilize the sources here listed.
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Chapter 4: Universal conceptions of childhood and the international regime of children’s
rights
Childhood is universally described as a developmental phase between birth and
adulthood, consisting of a period during which the individual still has limited capacities
and should be protected and cared for by society and the law.
Universal conceptions of childhood delivered by the human sciences are the
common ground that inform and influence how governments recognize and treat children
under the law. In international law, the legal regime regarding the status of minors that
was developed by states and international organizations is not in any way different;
children are framed as entitled to special protections. The Convention on the Rights of the
Child, nonetheless, marks an important starting point towards change in the discourse of
child competence.
Childhood
Childhood is generally understood as the phase between birth/infancy and
adulthood. The exact limits of where the period of childhood starts and where it ends, as
well as what it means to be a child, is a source of controversy and debate. One possible
reason for the lack of consensus is that the concept of childhood is culturally defined, not
fixed, and in constant negotiation. “Society’s notions of childhood are intrinsically linked
to the way [children] are educated, the way they are dressed, the age at which they are
expected to work and fend for themselves, and through common notions of responsibility
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of parents and the state towards them.” 136 Besides being culturally demarcated, the
definition of childhood is also an adult-centric endeavor. Specialized literature generally
understands childhood in negative terms: that is, a child is someone who lacks adult
capacities and competencies. 137 ‘Not yet an adult’ is the common adult-centric
conceptualizations of what it is to be a child, despite seriously failing to characterize what
being a child is.
Legal policies relating to children’s capacities are also mostly influenced by the
mainstream conception that the phase of childhood is made of a series of “separate states
a child goes through until adulthood” which entitles them to protection due to their
vulnerability and immaturity. 138
For us, childhood is a stage or state of incompetence relative to adulthood.
The ideal adult is equipped with certain cognitive capacities, is rational,
physically independent and autonomous, has a sense of identity, and is
conscious of her beliefs and desires, and thus able to make informed free
choices for which she can be held personally responsible. It is on account
of these dispositions that an adult is thought able to work for her living, be
accountable at law for her actions, make sexual choices and help to choose
the government of the community. It is because the child lacks these adult
dispositions that he may not participate in this adult world.139
An international human rights regime has been established with the goal of
guaranteeing what is understood as an appropriate minimum level of protection to all
children, despite its origins, color, nationality, sex and gender.
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The International children’s rights regime
Children’s rights are a part of human rights; they are human rights specifically
addressed to children. International Human Rights Law’s point of departure is the
underlying assumption that every human being is entitled to something, by simple virtue
of being a human being. Human rights are universal (belonging ‘to each of us regardless
of ethnicity, race, gender, sexuality, age, religion, political conviction, or type of
government’) and subjective (being ‘the properties of individual subjects’). Human rights
are laid down in various international and domestic agreements, such as the United
Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights, multilateral and regional treaties, as
well as, nationals constitutions around the world.140
An international regime of children rights first arose from the perception that, in
times of war, children are among those who suffer the most. As a direct effect of
children’s involvement and suffering during the first World War, the League of Nations
in 1924 promulgated the Geneva Declaration of the Rights of the Child, considered the
first international document to declare legal standards for the treatment of children at the
international level. The Geneva Declaration spelled out five provisions.141 These
provisions were formulated not necessarily “…in terms of rights of children but, rather,
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as duties declared and accepted by men and women of all nations.”142 In the text, children
were entitled to protection rights exclusively as a result of the adults’ exercising their
obligation not to violate them. In other words, children’s rights were, therefore, framed
simply as a responsibility of the adults, who held an obligation to refrain from violating
their protection rights in times of conflict and in times of peace.143 Interestingly, even
though the beneficiaries of the declaration were ‘children’, no definition of child was
presented.
The Declaration was the first platform for children’s rights at the international
level and it marked an important landmark even though it was not legally binding. For the
very first time “…countries of different cultures recognized universal principles and
necessities of the Rights of the Child.”144
The Geneva Declaration was followed by the UN Declaration of the Rights of the
Child (1959). This declaration was adopted “… unanimously by all 78 Member States of
the United Nations General Assembly in Resolution 1386 (XIV),145 and it marked the
first major international consensus on the fundamental principles of children’s rights.”146
Ten principles were set. The General Assembly called upon “…parents, upon men and
women as individuals, and upon voluntary organizations, local authorities and national
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Governments to recognize these rights and strive for their observance by legislative and
other measures progressively taken by the following principles.”147 Again, no definition
of children was given.
Eleven years before the 1959 UN Declaration of the Rights of the Child, in 1948,
the UN General Assembly took gradual steps toward establishing a universal platform for
human rights in general, children included. Article Two of the UDHR established that:
everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this
Declaration [Universal Declaration of Human Rights] without distinction
of any kind, such as race, color, sex, language, religion, political or
another opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or another
status. Furthermore, no distinction shall be made by the political,
jurisdictional or international status of the country or territory to which a
person belongs, whether it be independent, trust, non-self-governing or
under any other limitation of sovereignty.
Although discrimination by age was not mentioned, “in the text, children (as well
as, mothers to be) were recognized as a vulnerable social group, thus entitled to ‘special
help and assistance’ (Article 25 (2)). It was the understanding that the rights proclaimed
in the UDHR, would “apply equally to children and adults” which explained why the text
did not attribute a different status to children, nor treated them as a detached social group
with specific needs. 148
The UDHR (sourced by a General Assembly Resolution) was not created as a
legally binding instrument; therefore, in order to translate the newly internationally
delineated human rights into more precise and binding terms, aiming at increasing level
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of compliance with its provisions, the United Nations promulgated two fundamental
international human treaties - the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights (ICCPR) and the 1966 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights (ICESCR). Both treaties contained provisions related to rights delineated in the
UDHR, such as the right to the protection against economic exploitation, the right to be
educated and the right to healthcare (ICESCR) and the right to have a name and a
nationality (ICCPR).149 However, this time, the provisions were contained in
international treaties that were binding upon State parties.
Since then, most of the articles contained in the UDHR have been recognized as
customary law, some acquiring the status of jus cogens rules, thus holding obligatory
status for all states and people.150 As argued by Detrick, both covenants, the ICCPR and
the ICESCR contained provisions applying to “the child,” “children,” “young persons,”
or “juvenile persons,” however, they do not provide definitions of these terms.151 The
author goes on to explain that the UN Human Rights Committee provided a comment on
Article 24 of the ICCPR, stating, “the covenant does not indicate the age at which he [the
minor] attains his majority… [because] this is to be determined by each State party in
light of the relevant social and cultural conditions.”152
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The next step toward building a greater child protection legal apparatus came
from the International Labor Organization (ILO) in 1973. The ILO established – in the
Convention concerning Minimum Age for Admission to Employment – the minimum age
of fifteen for employment. This age limit reflected the age of completion of compulsory
schooling (Article 2.3). The convention also set the minimum age for employment or
work considered dangerous or possibly of jeopardizing one’s health, safety or morals to
no less than 18 years, which includes military work (Article 3.1).153 The 1973 Convention
also encourages states to effectively abolish child labor below the stipulated minimum
age.
In 1979, in light of the United Nations’ declaration of the International Year of
the Child, the Polish delegation proposed developing a revised international charter
addressed specifically to children which would carry mandatory status. Poland argument
was that it was time for a change: “…almost twenty years after the proclamation of the
principles of the UN Declaration of 1959 it was time to take further and more consistent
steps by adopting an internationally binding instrument in the form of a convention.”154
Poland’s proposal led to ten years of work and the creation and adoption of the 1989
Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).
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The CRC
The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) is the most important and
“the most widely ratified treaty in history” – with the United States being the only
state failing to engage before full worldwide ratification.155 Approved by the UN General
Assembly, it entered into force in 1989, and it marked the 30th anniversary of the UN
Declaration of the Rights of the Child. The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC)
of 1989 is the cornerstone of children‘s rights in the world, detailing the rights to which
children are entitled both as people and because of their special status.
Because it is so widely accepted, most academics, jurists, and international
organizations treat the CRC as having attained universal ratification. UNICEF has even
argued that “the ratification of a treaty by nearly all the States… is strong evidence that it
has become customary international law.”156
State parties to the CRC are obligated to make the “appropriate legislative, policy,
administrative, and other measures for the implementation of the rights contained
therein…ensuring, by all appropriate means, that the provisions are given legal effect in
the States Parties’ domestic legal systems.”157
The Convention was the product of ten years of negotiation, and was received as
the realization of consistent steps towards assuring that all children of the world were
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recognized as bearers of rights, and that, as a result, they were entitled to the necessary
protections to ensure the enjoyment of a happy, safe and healthy life. The message set
forth was that children’s rights were were recognized as holding the same rights as adults,
interconnected and of equal importance.158
The CRC also provided an innovative approach to human rights, marking a
departure from earlier instruments and traditional notions of child welfare by being the
first international human rights treaty to contain a comprehensive set of universally
recognized norms asserting the complementarity and interdependence of human rights:
civil and political, economic, social and cultural. The Convention also set a new vision
of the child, embodying a consensus regarding the empowerment and protection of
children.159 The goal was “changing the way children are viewed and treated – i.e., as
human beings with a distinct set of rights instead of as passive objects of care and
charity.”160
Some parts of the CRC are essential to this dissertation. Article 1, for example,
provides a definition of a child: “for the purpose of the convention a child would mean
every human being below the age of eighteen years unless, under the law applicable to
the child, majority is attained earlier.”161 The CRC is the first international agreement to
offer a definition for children. “The CRC’s drafters decided to … set the upper age limit
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for eighteen years…to maximize the protections offered by the CRC and to ensure that
the rights set forth therein would uniformly apply to as large an age group as possible.”162
Another legal innovation was the institutionalization of the idea that children were
bearers of rights as well. Children were seen as entitled to participation / liberty rights
similarly to adults. Examples of such rights are: respect for the views of the child,
freedom of expression, freedom of association, rights to privacy, access to information as
expressed in Articles 4163, 12164, 13165, 14166, 15167, 16168, 17169. These rights, ultimately
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guaranteed by the state party, were framed as being equally important to protective rights
and fundamental for the development of the child into a well-established, healthy and
happy human being.
When applying the provisions set forth by the CRC, the Committee on the Right
of the Child (CRC Committee) has indicated that states should be guided by four general
principles –non-discrimination (Art. 2 CRC), the best interests of the child (Art. 3 CRC),
the right to life, survival, and development (Art. 6 CRC; Life, Right to, International
Protection; Development, Right to, International Protection), and evolving capacities of
the child (Art. 5 and Art. 12, CRC). Arising from international treaty law, these principles
are to be implemented by states within their domestic legislation.170
The principle ‘evolving capacity of the child’ is explicitly found in Articles 5 and
12 of the CRC as expressed in UNICEF’s report Evolving Capacities of the Child (2005):
Article 5 of the Convention states that direction and guidance, provided by
parents or others with responsibility for the child, must take account of the
capacities of the child to exercise rights on his or her behalf. This principle
has profound implications for the human rights of the child. It has been
described as a new principle of interpretation in international law,
recognizing that as children acquire enhanced competencies, accordingly,
there is a reduced need for direction and a greater capacity to take
responsibility for decisions affecting their lives.171
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The goal of the drafters was to create a legal scenario in which “children’s capacities can
differ according to [their maturity level and] the nature of the rights to be exercised.
Children, therefore, require varying degrees of protection, participation, and opportunity
for autonomy in different contexts and across different areas of decision-making.”172
Article 12.1 expresses that “State Parties shall assure to the child who is capable
of forming his or her own views the right to express those views freely in all matters
affecting the child, the views of the child being given due weight in accordance with the
age and maturity of the child;” in other words, the greater the age and capacity of the
child, the more seriously their views should be considered.173
The Committee on the Rights of the Child has identified Article 12 as one of the
central underlying principles of the Convention, demanding a fundamental shift in the
conventional approach of casting children as passive recipients of adult protection to
acknowledging them as active agents, entitled to participate in decisions that affect their
lives.174
The second principle worth highlighting that sheds light on how the provisions of
the Convention are to be interpreted, as determined by the Committee on the Rights of the
Child, is the “best interest of the child.”175 Found mainly in Articles 5 and 18, this
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principle identifies the child as the recipient of the protections and rights enshrined in the
CRC. Article 5 once again stresses that the State must respect the rights and
responsibilities of parents or other caregivers to provide “appropriate direction and
guidance in the exercise by the child of their rights in a manner consistent with the
evolving capacities of the child.” In other words: “parental rights and responsibilities are
not unbounded. By inserting the word ‘appropriate,’ Article 5 removes the possibility that
parents to have carte blanche to provide, or fail to provide, whatever guidance and
support they deem suitable.”176
The chapter has provided an overview on the universalized conceptions of
childhood which influence the fields of the human sciences, as well as policies related to
the protection of the child in an adult-centric world. The establishment of the Convention
of the Rights of the Child (1989) can be celebrated as a successful breakpoint from older
views of passivity and incompetence attributed to children. By framing the child as bearer
of rights (and not only recipient of protections), and by establishing provisions which
focus on the evolving capacity and best interests of the child, the Convention has paved
the ground for discussions of the autonomy, legal competence, and responsibility of
children in the international legal system.
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Chapter 5: Analysis of treaty and customary law on child recruitment and misperceptions
arising from them
Chapter five invites the reader to embark on the legal mapping of the current
international rights and legal protections awarded to the child in times of peace and in
times of armed conflict. These protections are mainly found in International
Humanitarian Law (IHL) and International Human Rights Law (IHRL) regimes. The first
part of the chapter consists of a brief presentation of the main sources of these fields of
international law. Treaties and customary law will be given priority in the analysis
because they create obligations. Additional sources such as multilateral declarations will
also be acknowledged, despite not usually generating obligation; their importance comes
from the capacity to point to a possibly emerging different legal landscape. The first part
of the chapter will also provide a brief presentation of the three international legal
regimes which set out the protective measures granted to the child in both times of
conflict and times of peace: International Humanitarian Law, International Human Rights
Law, and International Criminal Law (ICL). The last one consisting on rules which
impose punitive measures on those who violate the protective measures contained in IHL
and IHRL. When analyzing the established law, the chapter will highlight the Minimum
Age of Legal Recruitment (MALR) set at fifteen years of age by International
Humanitarian Law at fifteen.
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Finally, the section will call attention to the politically misrepresentation of lex lata177
presented by the International Committee of the Red Cross and the UN Office of the
Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflicts.
The legal concept of child soldier
The first attempt to codify the term child soldier occurred in the 1997 Cape Town
“Symposium on the Prevention of Recruitment of Children into the Armed Forces and on
Demobilization and Social Reintegration of Child Soldiers in Africa”, which resulted in
the adoption of the “Cape Town Principles and Best Practices.” In this document, a child
soldier was defined as “any person under 18 years of age (emphasis added) who is part of
any kind of regular or irregular armed force or armed group in any capacity, including but
not limited to cooks, porters, messengers and anyone accompanying such groups, other
than family members. The definition includes girls recruited for sexual purposes and
forced marriage. It does not, therefore, only refer to a child who is carrying or has carried
arms.” The symposium was an initiative jointly led by the NGO Working Group on the
Convention on the Rights of the Child and UNICEF, and it aimed at “bring[ing] together
experts and partners to develop strategies for preventing recruitment of children, in
particular, for establishing 18 as the minimum age for recruitment and for demobilizing
child soldiers and helping them reintegrate into society.”178
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Ten years later, a second international convention took place that would further
contribute to the definition of a child soldier. In 2007, as a result of the international
conference ‘Free Children from War’ held in Paris, co-hosted by the government of
France and UNICEF, two additional non-binding documents were added to the existing
network of legal protection of children during armed conflict: the “Paris Commitments to
Protect Children from Unlawful Recruitment or Use by Armed Forces or Armed Groups”
and the “Paris Principles and Guidelines on Children Associated with Armed Forces or
Armed Groups.” The Paris Principles set an important landmark in the discussion of the
concept of a child soldier in the international legal discourse.179 Intended to extend the
Cape Town protections, the Paris Principles abandoned the more strict focus on child
soldiers to instead consider a wider approach to protection that would focus on all
children associated with armed groups and armed forces. The wider and more
comprehensive approach proposed by the Paris Principles has been the trend followed by
most current international legal discourse to honor the notion that war affects children in
general, despite the fact that some may carry arms, while others do not.
Article 2.1 of the Paris Principles presents the definition for “children associated
with armed forces and armed groups” as:
…any person below 18 years of age (emphasis added) who is or who has
been recruited or used by an armed force or armed group in any capacity,
including but not limited to children, boys and girls, used as fighters,
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cooks, porters, messengers, spies or for sexual purposes. It does not only
refer to a child who is taking or has taken a direct part in hostilities.”180
Due to the fact that the concept extends to all children involved in armed groups and
armed forces, it has been considered by a “very wide definition by some scholars.”181
And although “the official nomenclature drifted away from child soldier as initially set
out and defined in the Cape Town Principles, into… the somewhat tongue-trying children
associated with armed forces and armed groups…[in practical terms] both still share
considerable textual overlaps regarding the actual persons they protect.”182 Despite the
nomenclature change, the term ‘child soldier’ is still mostly applied in the media and in
specialized literature to identify those underage individuals who have been recruited to
join an armed group or the armed forces.
Definition of child soldier follows age criteria: fifteen or eighteen years old?
Both the Cape Town and Paris conferences defined child soldiers as anyone
below the age of eighteen “who is part of any regular or irregular armed force or armed
group in any capacity” or “who has been recruited or used by an armed force or armed
group in any capacity.” This being, eighteen years of age was the age selected to
determine the line between legal and illegal recruitment of minors on both of these
conferences.
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In international law, the definition of children, and thus, child soldiers
follows age criteria: “international law relates to what constitutes a child simply
regarding age;”183, the Convention on the Rights of the Child defines a child generally as
anyone below the age of eighteen, so logically, at least in International Human Rights
Law, a child soldier would be characterized as a soldier under the age of eighteen. The
provisions that regulate the recruitment of child soldiers are also based on age criteria,
and not other more subjective criteria tied to localized maturity standards.184 Recall,
however, that International Humanitarian Law, as set by the CRC and its Additional
Protocols allows for the recruitment and use of children in armed conflicts starting at age
fifteen, and that in the commentaries to the Additional Protocols, the drafters declared
that they understood children to be individuals up to the age of fifteen.185 The logical
conclusion to be drawn from this is that international law, and more importantly,
Humanitarian Law allows the recruitment and use of children in armed conflicts starting
at age fifteen despite the fact that anyone below eighteen may still be considered a child
soldier.
Putting it differently, there is a still an amount of confusion in regards to what
international law considers a child soldiers when it comes to legal age of recruitment. In
the commentaries to Additional Protocols I and II (International Humanitarian Law)
published by the ICRC, the drafters expressed the opinion that ‘children’ is understood as
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individuals up to the age of fifteen. However, afterwards the CRC (International Human
Rights Law) defines children as anyone below eighteen, which would lead us to conclude
that Additional Protocols I and II as well as the CRC (Article 38) actually allow for the
legal recruitment and use of individuals under eighteen which according to the stipulated
age set by CRC and the definitions of child soldiers presented in both conferences on
child soldiers would be considered child soldier.
The confusion is further explored by Waschefort (2015) in the passage below:
there are two ways in which to address this phenomenon [child
soldiering]. First, one can argue that the law does not prohibit the
enlistment of the child into the military, that child will not be deemed a
child soldier. Or, alternatively, that the child soldier remains a child
soldier, but that no legal norms were violated in recruitment or even using
that child in military operations, where the relevant state has not
subscribed to a legal obligation to the contrary. The United Kingdom, for
example, has not subscribed to any legal norm that bars it from recruiting
persons under sixteen years of age or older into its armed forces, and
indeed the UK does recruit such persons. [As 2013, the UK became a
party to the OPAC, and thus hold the obligation of not recruiting anyone
below sixteen.] In contrast, Norway has subscribed to such international
norms. If one were to favor an interpretation in terms of which concept of
child soldier is the one which inherently denotes unlawfulness of the
child‘s enlistment, conscription or use, it would mean that a sixteen-yearold child would be deemed to be a child soldier if she or he were in the
Norwegian Armed Forced but would not be deemed a child soldier if she
or he were in the British Armed Forces.186
Waschefort concludes by stating, “the term child soldier is thus broadly and
legally imprecise… As a result, a child soldier in one country may not be a ‘child soldier
in another.”187
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The dubiety in the nomenclature highlighted by Waschefort relates to the gap
between the minimum military age adopted by certain countries and the age of majority
set at eighteen by the CRC. As established by national law, the minimum age of
recruitment varies from one country to another; so, in one country, a person recruited at
age sixteen may not be considered a child soldier according to national standards, while
in another country where the minimum age of recruitment is eighteen, that sixteen-yearold child, if recruited, would be labeled as a child soldier. Waschefort is accurate when
applying domestic standards to characterize whether the young recruit is considered a
child soldier, however, the plurality of these domestic rules nonetheless increase the level
of confusion.
How international law deals with the problem of child soldering
The international legal regimes aimed at protecting the child from early
recruitment and use in armed conflicts is the subject of the present chapter. The next
chapter delves into the other side of how international law enforces the protection against
child soldiering by authorizing international and domestic courts to try those who are
accused of recruiting and use children below the age of fifteen in armed conflicts.
Legal protections against the recruitment and use of children in armed conflicts
1. Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions (1977)
The first efforts to internationally prohibit children’s direct involvement in armed
conflicts (international and non-international) by placing obligations on states against the
recruitment of young soldiers are found in Additional Protocols I and II to the Geneva
Conventions (1977).
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Before the Additional Protocols, “there is no express regulation of the participation of
children in armed conflicts in any of the four Geneva Conventions (the GCs).
“Additional Protocol I (AP I) and Additional Protocol II (AP II) to the 1949
Geneva Conventions… clearly set out the obligation under International Humanitarian
Law of State parties to those Protocols, when engaged in armed conflict, to provide
special protection to children of all ages caught up in the conflict as a protected class in
and of themselves.”188 More specifically, Additional Protocol I – regulating international
armed conflicts – determines in Article 77.2 that:
The Parties to the conflict shall take all feasible measures in order that
children who have not attained the age of fifteen years do not take a direct
part in hostilities and, in particular, they shall refrain from recruiting them
into their armed forces. In recruiting among those persons who have
attained the age of fifteen years but who have not attained the age of
eighteen years, the Parties to the conflict shall endeavor to give priority to
those who are oldest.
Additional Protocol II – aimed at regulating non-international conflicts – creates
a positive obligation for states and non-State parties alike to a conflict to assure that
“children who have not attained the age of fifteen years shall neither be recruited in the
armed forces or groups nor allowed to take part in hostilities” and “ that children who
have not attained the age of fifteen years shall remain applicable to them if they take a
direct part in hostilities…”189
The drafters of the Additional Protocols understood children to be a separate
group, more dependent and vulnerable than their adult counterparts, and because their
188
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vulnerability intensifies during times of armed conflict, the Committee placed special
protections directly on to children. These protections were additional to those offered
generally to civilians not involved in the hostilities (‘protected persons’ according to
International Humanitarian Law).
No definition or age limitation regarding who is to be regarded as ‘children’ was
provided in the Additional Protocols. The omission of what constitutes ‘children’ was
intentional; “the term ‘child’ does not have an accepted definition.”190 The ICRC
commentaries explained that:
According to the Concise Oxford Dictionary, the term “child” means a
young human being who has not reached the age of discretion, i.e., the age
at which one is fit to manage one’s affairs (7th edition, 1982). The Oxford
English Dictionary (1970) defines a child as a human being up to the age
of puberty. The French Dictionary Robert indicates that it means a human
being from birth up to the age of thirteen; this is followed by adolescence.
The age of puberty varies, depending on climate, race and the individual.
However, the limit of fifteen years of age, which is given many times in
the fourth Convention and is also given in paragraphs 2 and 3 of this
article, seems to provide a reasonable basis for a definition. Moreover, the
article itself in paragraphs 2 and 5 uses the word “persons” in referring to
a limit of eighteen years. This does not prevent the fact that some
countries have adopted a lower or higher age than fifteen years, but there
is no doubt that all human beings under fifteen should, within the meaning
of the Fourth Convention and [p.900] this Protocol, be considered and
treated like children. The age of fifteen most often corresponds to such
development of the human faculties that extraordinary measures are no
longer required to the same degree. However, some flexibility is
appropriate, for there are individuals who remain children, both physically
and mentally, after the age of fifteen. Furthermore, this age of fifteen has
been adopted in other international instruments. Thus, for example, in a
recommendation of 1965 relating to the minimum age for marriage
(Resolution 2018 (XX)) the United Nations General Assembly requested
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States to determine a minimum age for marriage and specified that that
age should in no case be under fifteen years.191
As we can see in the Commentaries to the Additional Protocols of the CRC
(1977), it was the opinion of the Committee and its predecessors that: ‘children’ is
considered anyone up to the age of fifteen. The age of fifteen was chosen by the drafters
to be the minimum age for the legal recruitment and use of children by armed forces and
armed groups in international armed conflicts (found in Additional Protocol I) and noninternational armed conflicts (found in Additional Protocol II).

2. Article 38 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child
Article 38 of the CRC, despite being contained within an International Human
Rights Law convention, is applicable in International Humanitarian Law because it
addresses the recruitment and use of children during armed conflicts, and thus,
interestingly brings two branches of IL (International Humanitarian Law and
International Human Rights Law) more closely together.192 This proximity explicitly
illustrates how the drafters believed that protecting children in times of conflict closely
was aligned with the need of protecting children also in times of peace.
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Article 38 is “…structured according to a typical International Humanitarian Law
scheme: its first paragraph contains a general provision on the applicability of
International Humanitarian Law, the second and third paragraph deal with the protection
of children from participation in hostilities or recruitment in the armed forces, and the
fourth paragraph reminds the states Parties to protect the civilian population. Article 38,
as a whole, apparently covers International Humanitarian Law substance, which is
reinforced by its explicit references to International Humanitarian Law and the
terminology (‘hostilities,’ ‘recruiting,’ ‘civilian population’, . . .) used… Thus, Article 38
of the CRC should be interpreted in line within International Humanitarian Law.”193
As explained by Ang: “Article 38 of the CRC has a hybrid character. Materially
speaking, Article 38 of the CRC is clearly an International Humanitarian Law provision
yet within human rights instrument.” 194 Article 38 of the CRC establishes that:
“Governments must do everything they can to protect and care for children affected by
war. Children under fifteen should not be forced or recruited to take part in a war or join
the armed forces.”195 The Article reaffirms the need for states “to respect and to ensure
respect for rules of international humanitarian law applicable to them in armed conflicts
which are relevant to the child.”
The rules of International Humanitarian Law applicable specifically to the child is
found in the Additional Protocols of the Geneva Convention I and II as discussed earlier.
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There is no consensus regarding whether these protocols have achieved customary law
status, thus being considered obligatory only to states parties. All three conventions, the
Additional Protocols I and II, and the CRC allow for the recruitment and use of children
fifteen and above by armed forces and armed groups.
In terms of setting legal prohibitions against child recruitment, the CRC – as we
have seen previously – fails to completely ban the deployment of persons under eighteen
to hostilities, only requesting that states “take all feasible measures [weak obligation] to
ensure that persons who have not attained the age of fifteen years do not take a direct part
in hostilities.” (Article 38.2) The obligation set on states is to “refrain from recruiting any
person who has not attained the age of fifteen years into their armed forces.” However,
this does allow states to recruit children above the age of fifteen with the requirement that
states are to prioritize the older children.
Another major downfall of the CRC is that it does not address, at least not
directly, non-state armed groups. The CRC does not impose obligations upon armed
groups regarding recruitment of juveniles; however, it does place a rather weak
obligation upon states to “ensure that persons who have not attained the age of fifteen
years do not take a direct part in hostilities” (Art. 38.2), which would include the
criminalization of armed groups who recruit and use children under the age of fifteen.
3. The OPAC
The Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the
Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict (OPAC), established in 2000 complements the
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CRC and offers wider and stronger protective measures against the recruitment and use
of children (individuals under eighteen) in conflicts.196
In the case of the the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the
Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, the protocol “is an effort to
strengthen implementation of the Convention and increase the protection of children
during armed conflicts.”197 Additional protections offered by the protocol include raising
the age of conscription to eighteen; prohibiting states from deploying persons under
eighteen to fight in direct hostilities. Another important innovation is that the protocol
differently than the CRC, addresses armed forces and armed groups, which would
theoretically widen the scope of protection of children involved in armed conflicts. 198
The OPAC also raises the minimum age for voluntary enlistment to sixteen, instead of
fifteen as set by the Additional Protocols I, II and the CRC. Still, the Optional Protocol
has been seen as an advance upon the Convention on the Rights of the Child regarding
addressing and redressing the “loose” provisions of minimum age of conscription,
deployment, and use of children by armed groups.199
In despite of the apparent progress, the Protocol sets a weak obligation against the
recruitment and use of those below the age of eighteen by armed groups and armed
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forces. Article 1 urges states to take “all feasible measures to ensure that members of
their armed forces who have not attained the age of eighteen do not take direct part in
hostilities” (Article 1). ‘All feasible measure’ is considered by many commentators as a
fragile, and thus an inadequate means of protection, reflecting an obligation of means and
not of result.200 This effectively translates to: states are to comply only if possible. The
outbreak of a war and the need for manpower can be (and have traditionally been used as)
a military necessity, and thus a viable justification for derogating from the provision to be
fulfilled. For example, as argued by Child Soldier International:
The USA along with countries such as Australia and the United Kingdom
also restrict protection for children if the withdrawal of under-18s would
adversely affect the success of a military operation. The USA defines
“feasible measures” as only those measures which are “practical or
practically possible, taking into account all the circumstances ruling at the
time, including humanitarian and military considerations.” In the United
Kingdom, deployment of members of the armed forces who have not yet
reached 18 years is permitted where there is a genuine military need, the
situation is urgent, it is otherwise not practicable to withdraw minors
before deployment, or it would undermine the operational effectiveness of
their ship or unit. In Australia “feasible measures” are required only to the
maximum extent possible, and where it will not adversely impact the
conduct of operations.201
A definite move forwards is that the OPAC completely bans the recruitment and
use of individual below age eighteen by armed groups. Article 4.1 states that: “Armed
groups that are distinct from the armed forces of a State should not, under any
circumstances, recruit or use in hostilities persons under the age of 18 years.”
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In sum, the OPAC rules out the possibility of an armed group legally recruiting
and using individuals below the age of eighteen in hostilities, yet, the same level of
prohibition does not apply to governmental armed forces which can still recruit under
eighteens, if the recruitment is allowed by domestic law and follows the established safe
measurements established by the treaty. The OPAC makes states responsible for
prohibiting and to enforcing measures to prevent the recruitment and use of children
below the stipulated age in hostilities.
On a last note, the convention still kept the definition of children provided by the
CRC. As a result, the recruits below the age of eighteen who have enlisted voluntarily are
still considered by the convention as children. Therefore, it is safe to affirm that the
OPAC, as the previous conventions before, continues to allow the lawful recruitment of
children; those under eighteen years to serve in the military. Another important
characteristic of the Protocol is that it has not reached the status of customary law, being
obligatory only to those states parties to the document.

5. ILO Convention 182 concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the
Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labor
The last international treaty that directly addresses the prohibition of children’s
involvement in military actions and armed conflicts is the International Labor
Organization (ILO) Convention 182 concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for
the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour (2012). “Under this treaty, forced or
compulsory (but not voluntary) recruitment of children under the age of 18 for use in
armed conflict are among the worst forms of child labor from which children must be
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protected.”202 The treaty establishes that each state party “shall take all necessary
measures to ensure the effective implementation and enforcement of the provisions
giving effect to this Convention including the provision and application of penal
sanctions or, as appropriate, other sanctions” (Article 7.1) as well as “take effective and
time-bound measures to (7.2.a) prevent the engagement of children in the worst forms of
child labour” and (7.2.b) “provide the necessary and appropriate direct assistance for the
removal of children from the worst forms of child labour and for their rehabilitation and
social integration.” Convention 182 is considered to use stronger language to prohibit
recruitment and use of children by the military, yet, still only applies exclusively to state
parties. In 2017, a total of 180 states were signatories to the ILO Convention 182.
If a state is party to any of the instruments discussed in this chapter, its armed
forces can continue to recruit persons under eighteen (individuals still considered
children under CRC) while still being fully in compliance with international law if
enlistment is considered voluntary: “Some countries using and recruiting child soldiers
do so without violating any international legal obligation.”203 The fact that International
Law still allows armed forces (not armed groups) to legally use persons under eighteen
seems not to be regarded problematic, and, for the most part, not to be considered the
crime of child soldering.
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When a child is engaged directly in the armed conflict does he or she loses the status of
protected persons? How do International Humanitarian Law and International Human
Rights Law treat an active child soldier?
One conceivable way to answer to the above questions is to affirm that the
protections required by International Humanitarian Law are meant to protect all of those
not taking direct part in the hostilities as well as a special category of vulnerable persons
such as children. So, children due to their vulnerability, involved in armed conflict, or
not, are per excellence protected persons.204
Another way to look at the issue is arguing that International Humanitarian Law
sets a limitation in relation to civilians who have engaged in the armed conflict, which
can include children. Civilians who have ‘picked up arms’ are, in general, no longer
deemed as protected persons under International Humanitarian Law; they have lost their
status of protection, are now considered legitimate targets under the law of armed conflict
because they have chosen to engage in the conflict.
Reinforcing the second perspective, Rene Provost argues that: “If a child is
enrolled in the armed forces of a party to an international armed conflict, there seems to
be no apparent basis in current international humanitarian law to characterize that child as
anything other than as a combatant.”205 Conversely, if the recruitment is by an armed
group, and the child is not taking part of the conflict directly, then he or she keeps the
status of “protected persons” under International Humanitarian Law.
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Frederic Megret offers a different position:
It may be helpful to think creatively about a unique status for children.
Specifically, it could be helpful to treat child soldiers as either noncombatant members of the armed forces (akin to medical or religious
military personnel, notwithstanding the fact that they may potentially
engage in hostilities), or as non-combatants tout court (despite the fact that
they are actually members of the armed forces who would normally be
targetable as such), subject to the exception that they may be treated as
combatants if and only to the extent that they participate in hostilities, in
the sense that that expression is understood in relation to civilians. This is
an intermediary position fashioned from the normative clay that is the
basis of international humanitarian law. It is not one that is sustained by
anybody of practice, let alone opinio juris. Nonetheless, I see it as striking
a fair middle ground between the repulsive idea of knowingly targeting
children who should never have been on the battlefield in the first place,
and the evident risk to one’s troops of treating what are actual combatants
with, as it were, “kids’ gloves. It gives child soldiers an extra chance,
although no guarantee that if they participate in hostilities that they will
escape unscathed; it reinforces the idea that it is the duty of all responsible
parties to an armed conflict to protect childhood within the bounds of
military necessity, narrowly understood.206
Both positions, despite being at variance with each other, acknowledge
International Humanitarian Law’s position of attributing a combatant status to a child
soldier who has been legally recruited. If the child is a regular member of the armed
forces, the rules of International Humanitarian Law apply as it would to a regular
combatant.
Disagreements are common. As an illustration, Ang (2005) provides a dissenting
position from the previous two. She asserts that the rules of International Humanitarian
Law relevant to the child, which come from the Geneva Conventions and their Additional
Protocols… “provide two categories of protections: on the one hand, there are rules
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regulating the treatment of child civilians, and on the other hand, there are those
regulating the treatment of child combatants. About the first category Ang affirms that
child civilians benefit from the ‘general protection’ in their capacity as civilians and from
a ‘special protection’ in their capacity as children.”207 In the CRC, these protections are
present in the second, third and fourth paragraphs of Article 38. However, an opinion
shared by most scholars writing on Article 38 of the CRC is that paragraphs two and
three under the heading ‘participation in hostilities and recruitment’ apply to child
combatant, while paragraph 4, under the heading ‘protection and care of civilians’,
applies to child civilians.208 In Ang‘s opinion, this dissonance does not make sense since
“the child combatant does not benefit very much from the protection from participation in
hostilities or recruitment since he or she is already fighting, or he or she is already a
member of the armed forces.”209 Therefore, child combatants should not be excluded
from the protections awarded to children under the CRC and treaties of Humanitarian
Law.210
The rules regulating the treatment of child combatants are part of the rules
of International Humanitarian Law relevant to the child, fully applicable to
the States Parties…Under International Humanitarian Law, captured child
combatants are entitled to the extensive and vigorous protection granted to
prisoners of war, notwithstanding the possibility to qualify child
combatants as ‘unlawful combatants’. This protection includes important
guarantees such as the right to humane treatment. ‘Child war criminals’
also receive a specific treatment with a view to their young age. However,
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the situation of child combatants who are not captured is not explicitly
regulated under International Humanitarian Law.211

“International Human Rights Law on the other hand, differently than International
Humanitarian Law, does not differentiate between ‘combatants’ and ‘civilians.’ Such
categorization could logically be understood as going against the concept of human rights
itself.” 212 In International Human Rights Law, children, are awarded certain legal
protection available to them in times of peace and in times of war and “ the Committee
on the Rights of the Child indeed predominantly speaks of the rights of ‘children’ in
armed conflict, without making a further distinction”213 which allows us to conclude that
all children are entitled to the same level of protections.214
It is worthwhile to call attention once again for the sake of clarity on how
differently International Human Rights Law and International Humanitarian Law
conceptualizes child soldiers. In International Human Rights Law, when a person below
the age of eighteen is recruited, he or she is considered a child, as stipulated by the CRC;
however, “the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocols (International Humanitarian
Law) use different age-limits on different protective measures for children…fifteen
[being] the most common.”215

211

Ang, Article 38: Children in Armed Conflicts, 28.

212

Ang, Article 38: Children in Armed Conflicts, 29.

213

Ang, Article 38: Children in Armed Conflicts, 29.

214

Ang, Article 38: Children in Armed Conflicts, 29.

215

“Rule 135: Children, Definition of children,” ICRC Handbook of Customary IHL: https://ihldatabases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v1_cha_chapter39_rule135

103

So, a young recruit at age sixteen is considered a child soldier in International
Human Rights Law, but may not be considered a child at all under International
Humanitarian Law.
An additional side note on misrepresentation of lex lata216 by the ICRC and the Office of
the Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Children and Armed Conflicts
Rule 136 of the ICRC Handbook of Customary International Humanitarian Law
states that “children must not be recruited into armed forces or armed groups” and “the
ICRC has recognized this rule as customary International Humanitarian Law as it reflects
State practice…applicable in both international and non-international armed conflicts.”
The text also affirms that Additional Protocols I and II prohibitions are reflected in the
Convention on the Rights of the Child…”217 As much as the last sentence is accurate, and
reflection does not necessarily mean replication, we have seen earlier in the present
chapter that the Additional Protocols prohibitions against the recruitment and use of
children in armed forces and armed groups apply exclusively to those below the age of
fifteen, and not for those older.
Therefore, the affirmation made by the ICRC found in the Handbook of
Customary International Humanitarian Law that customary International Humanitarian
Law as reflected in Additional Protocols I and II and the CRC prohibits the recruitment
of children is in the best intention anachronic, and can only be found to be true before
216
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1989 – the year in which the CRC raised the age limit of children to include all persons
below eighteen. 218
To better explain: The Additional Protocols to the Geneva Conventions only
prohibit the recruitment and use of children below fifteen, despite the fact that eleven
years later the CRC has raised the age limit of childhood to eighteen, considering anyone
under eighteen to be a child. Quite confusingly, the CRC has keeps the language used in
the Additional Protocols, prohibiting the recruitment and use of children below the age of
fifteen (and not eighteen). So, if the CRC were to outlaw/ban the recruitment of children,
it would need to extend the prohibition of recruitment to all of those below the age of
eighteen, which is not the case (the convention continues to prohibits the recruitment and
use of those below fifteen).
On its web page, the Office of the Special Representative of the SecretaryGeneral for Children and Armed Conflicts states that:
Human rights law declares eighteen as the minimum legal age for
recruitment and use of children in hostilities. Recruiting and using
children under the age of fifteen as soldiers are prohibited under
international humanitarian law – treaty, and custom – and is defined as a
war crime by the International Criminal Court. Parties to conflict that
recruit and use children are listed by the Secretary-General in the annexes
of his annual report on children and armed conflict.219
After the exposition of the current chapter, we can easily reach the conclusion that
the above statement does not accurately reflect the current status of international law.
Recruitment of children fifteen and above by the armed forces is allowed by the CRC
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which is recognized as a human rights treaty with possible universal application. OPAC
itself allows for voluntary recruitment of those sixteen and above when following certain
safe measures. At best, one can say that the use of children in hostilities is discouraged by
legal authorities, but not forbidden by International Humanitarian Law or International
Human Rights Law.
It is unfortunate (yet comprehensible) that the ICRC and the Special
Representative, two important sources of information on the existing legislation of the
topic of child protection and military recruitment, would inadequately represent existing
law, thus allowing their concepts of how the law should function to override their
commitment to adequately inform what the law is.
The current chapter addresses the current laws (treaty law and customary law)
related to the protection of children from recruitment and use in armed conflicts.
International law partly addresses the problem of child soldiering by creating prohibitions
for states and armed groups against the recruitment and use children under fifteen.
The chapter calls attention to the permissive character of the current law, allowing
the recruitment and use of children at and over the age of fifteen – under customary
International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law – and sixteen for
State parties to the OPAC (International Human Rights Law), thus clearly failing to
protect those under eighteen.
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Chapter 6: How International Law currently deals with child soldiers: a relationship
marked by inconsistencies
The predominant story of child soldiering as told by international organizations,
and academics is one in which the child is placed almost exclusively in the place of the
victim, despite the possibility of the child be accused of an international crime. However,
some academics and UN officials have begun to challenge this singular story of the child
victim. The present chapter presents a few of these divergent positions, which have
embarked and opened the door to an investigation fed by legal considerations which
frames a different story: If the child is legally recruited, he or she is competent enough to
respond for his or her criminal acts. Authors such as Leveau have identified the position
of child criminal responsibility as one licensed by international law. These differing
accounts have instituted different sets of imageries questioning the overwhelming
representation of the child victimhood.
A discussion of the Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility (MACR)
To engage in a discussion of criminal responsibility (MACR) of children under
international law, the first step is to delineate how criminal systems in general determine
who can be subjected to criminal rules. In all domestic legal systems, an individual is
considered capable of infringing criminal laws only after certain criteria are met, for
example, a minimum age is required, as also the accused being considered legally
competent.
The minimum age by which can be considered a target of the criminal law is
denominated ‘minimum age of of criminal responsibility’ or MACR. The aim of
establishing an MACR is to answer the question: starting at what age may children be
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understood as capable enough to be considered capable and culpable of infringing penal
law? The MACR does not respond if children, overall, may or may not infringe criminal
laws. The underlying assumption when fixing a MACR is that children are capable of
breaching the law, and can be held legally responsible for their wrongdoing, but only
upon reaching a certain age. The MACR then demarcates the beginning of legal
competency when the child in the eyes of the criminal system is deemed legally capable
of holding obligations and being subjected to penal accountability.
The MACR set by policy makers and legal systems results in an “age–
competency connection” which “fixe[s] age limits, and forces the difficult link between
competency and rights. Such a connection is made to establish, even though arbitrarily, a
minimum functioning age at which an individual can be legally prosecuted for crimes.”220
This age of minimum functioning is also intrinsically related to how childhood is seen
and treated within that specific society. Thus allowing for a complex concept such as
“childhood” which “…bundles together ideas and expectations about young people and
their roles in societies, and, as such, its meaning is socially constructed and varies over
time within and across cultures” [to be translated into more precise workable age limits
which mark the boundaries of childhood and adolescence.] 221 It ideally expresses
society’s acknowledgment “that the child has attained the emotional, mental and
intellectual maturity to be held responsible for their [criminal] actions…In nearly all
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countries, children above the age of criminal responsibility “may in principle be subject
to arrest, detention, and imprisonment.”222
Below the MACR, the child is frequently presumed excused from criminal
liability due to lack of legal competence, which can also be translated into the absence of
mens rea (infancy defense). In other words: “children younger than the prescribed age are
assumed legally incompetent in that context [criminal laws]. They still enjoy protection
rights for their relevant interests, but not liberty rights to assert their interests on their
own behalf.”223 What Cipriani is saying is that children below the MACR are vested with
protection rights, rights given by the state and overseen by parents and guardians to
guarantee some degree of guardianship, as well as fewer liberty rights, which are
entitlements offered to individuals after they have achieved a certain level of maturity,
such as the right to drink, to marry, to drive.
Also, the MACR should not be confused with the age of majority. The age of
majority indicates that the individual has attained the age to be considered a legal adult,
capacity wise. So, if the person above the MACR is to violate criminal law, he or she will
be potentially answerable to in the ‘adult penal system.’224 Differently, a child
perpetrator who has achieved the age of MACR, but not the age of majority he or she is,
in most cases, deemed answerable for her acts in a juvenile justice system. Less common
is having a child who has reached the MACR subjected to an adult-oriented, formal
222
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criminal prosecution, but it can happen. The allocation of the child to a juvenile or adult
justice system is entirely up to domestic authorities and legislation. In some countries and
in the case of the United States, some states, depending on the crime and the age of
accused, children can be tried by the adult criminal system despite having not achieved
the age of majority.
So, at the domestic level, states adopt different MACRs based on their cultural
understandings of childhood, ranging from as low as six up to eighteen years of age. The
median age worldwide is twelve.225
The legal treatment of the young, when accused of breaching penal laws is not
exclusively determined by him/her having reached (or not) the minimum age, other
factors are also taken in consideration when deciding upon culpability of a child such as
the presence of duress or a mental illness (factors that would also affect an adult’s
criminal responsibility).
In the international legal arena, Article 40.4 of the Convention on the Rights of the
Child (CRC) requires states to establish an MACR operational within national
jurisdiction: “States shall seek to promote the establishment of a minimum age below
which children shall be presumed not to have the capacity to infringe the penal law [again
within the national system; and (b) Whenever appropriate and desirable, measures for
dealing with such children without resorting to judicial proceedings, providing that
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human rights and legal safeguards are fully respected.” 226 The present provision does not
create the obligation for states to set a certain pre-established minimum age of criminal
responsibility; states are at liberty to choose the minimum age applicable within their
national jurisdiction, thus honoring historical and cultural differences in relation to the
concept of childhood and perceptions of youth competence. The only stipulation made by
the Committee of the CRC is states should to not fix the minimum age “too low bearing
in mind the facts of emotional, mental and intellectual maturity.”227
In international criminal law, no universal MACR has been established, so it is
not clear what the minimum age of criminal responsibility is with respect to those who
have committed international crimes. In Happold’s words: “…it is unclear whether
international law fixes a minimum age of criminal responsibility at all.” 228 Drumbl
argues that states, having failed to produce any consensus on where the MACR should
stands, mirror the position of the ICC of intentionally excluding persons under the age of
eighteen at the time of the alleged offense from its jurisdiction. The exclusion was a
result of the drafters failing to reach an agreement on whether children would be held
accountable by the court. And after a consensus position failed to be reached, “the
Working Group on General Principles agreed to impose a ‘jurisdictional solution’
reflected in in Article 26 simply stating that the Court would be unable to prosecute
226
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persons who were under eighteen at the time of the commission of the crime.”229
The ICC decision to exclude minors, according to the International Criminal Tribunal for
the former Yugoslavia “ is purely jurisdictional in nature” and “the proposition that there
was no criminal responsibility for crimes committed by persons under the age of eighteen
‘is completely unfounded in law’ under either conventional or customary international
law.”230 Going against the legal argument, Drumbl identifies a growing tendency “among
states, UN agencies, global civil society, as well as those lawyers who operate and staff
these institutions” to exclude those under eighteen from the jurisdiction of international
or internationalized institutions.231
The absence of an international standard for MACR is seen by many academics
and jurists as an obstacle when trying to determine where International Criminal Law
stands on the issue of the individual responsibility of minors. As stated by Grover (2012),
establishing a universal MACR is a pre–requisite for claims of responsibility or the
prosecution of children by international courts:
Formulating a universal minimum age of criminal culpability for
international crimes will seem an absolute prerequisite if States wish to
prosecute persons who were under 18 years old at the time they committed
an international crime (i.e. war crime, crime against humanity or
genocide) in a manner that is legally supportable regarding equity. The
absence of such a universal minimum age is then an absolute bar, in
principle at least, to the prosecution of children for international crimes.232
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Grover here makes an important point: the establishment of an age of legal
competence is an essential criterion for the attribution of individual criminal
responsibility for those under eighteen. Without the institutionalization of such landmark,
we are not sure where International Criminal Law stands on the issue of children’s
criminal responsibility.
Children before the UN ad hoc tribunals and the ICC
What we know is, up to date, no child has ever been prosecuted under
international law, either by international criminal tribunals or by a domestic court
utilizing international law. In the few instances in which child soldiers were brought to
trial, they were tried for ordinary crimes under national legislation, and not for
international crimes under international law.233
Until the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL), no international court had
included children (individuals below eighteen) under its jurisdiction. The International
Criminal Tribunal for Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda (ICTR) granted jurisdiction over ‘natural persons’ as stated in both Statutes
(Arts. 6 and 5, respectively) which would technically include children, but no specific
mention of children was made in either Statute, and no cases including children
defendants were tried.234
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After the SCSL, nonetheless, two hybrid courts: the Special Tribunal for Lebanon and the
Special Panels for Serious Crimes for Timor-Leste, included minors between the ages of
twelve and sixteen years in their Statutes, which would suggest that the norms and legal
principles developed by the SCSL have exerted direct influence in the work of the most
recent ‘hybrid’ courts.235
Criminal responsibility of child soldiers under current International Law
International criminal courts, more specifically the International Criminal Court
(ICC) and the Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) have codified the act of recruiting
and using children below the age of fifteen in armed conflicts as the crime of child
soldiering. The crime of child soldiering was given the status of an international crimes.
236

“The international community and international human rights groups have [also]

declared that child soldering is a grave abuse of children’s rights.”237 The blame for the
crime of child soldering fails over, entirely, on to the adult recruiter or commander. Also,
as we have seen, following rules of International Humanitarian Law the criminalization
of child soldering only applies when the child is below fifteen, mainly due to the fact that
international customary law (Article 38 of the CRC, for example) allows individuals from
ages fifteen to seventeen to be legally recruited to serve in armed conflicts. Children ages
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fifteen to seventeen at the time of the recruitment fall into a legal gap of protection and
are not condemned by international criminal law as targets of child soldiering. Instead,
they are merely considered young soldiers. Also, as shown in previous chapters,
International Humanitarian Law treats young soldiers as lawful combatants, who are
legally entitled to the same level of protection as older soldiers (see the discussion in
previous chapters regarding the status of legal combatant attributed to young soldiers).
The allegation that child soldiering violates children’s rights, while commonly
found in the international discourse, carries inconsistencies. The recruitment of children
for military purposes challenges moral concepts of childhood, no doubt, and it can be said
to even run counter to the overall intention of most children’s rights treaties, yet, the
enlistment of persons under eighteen in military service is still allowed under all
international children’s treaties currently in force.
Freeland (2010) is also correct in highlighting the sense of inconsistency present
in the legal treatment of the child involved in child soldiering: while the SCSL recognizes
the potential criminal responsibility of those fifteen and over, the ICC refuses to exercise
jurisdiction over those under the age of eighteen.
On the one hand, international law by allowing legal recruitment at age fifteen yet
not establishing a position on whether these young qualify for criminal
prosecution seems to communicate exclusively that there is no criminal
wrongdoing in engaging children of 15, 16 or 17 years in armed conflict, and if
these children are involved in serious violations of international law, then this is
just unfortunate. The ICC is not mandated to examine the actions of individuals
under eighteen, even where they might have committed international crimes.238
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It is difficult to reconcile the apparent desire of the international community to
protect children under the age of 18 from participating in armed conflict with the
criminalization of recruitment activities only in respect of children below the age
of 15 years. One can surely accept an argument that the recruitment or use of
children of, for example, 15 years of age does constitute (in the absence of other
factors that may properly negate criminal responsibility) an action that is at odds
with the basic norms that have now been set by the international community. Such
an action could and should constitute an international crime and the definitions in
the Rome Statute should be ‘upgraded’ accordingly…239
Cassese clearly expressed the legal gaps in how current international law frames the
issue of child soldiers and criminal accountability: “It follows that a state, a national
liberation movement or insurgent [and national armies] may lawfully enlist children of
sixteen or seventeen – but if these children engage in criminal conduct, they are not
amenable to judicial process before the ICC (although these children could be brought to
trial before national courts, assuming such courts have jurisdiction over them). 240
Cassese is also on target identifying the ICC decision to exclude persons under the
age of eighteen from the jurisdiction of the court (Article 26) as one which would not
necessarily point to the existence of “…a substantive rule of criminal law whereby
minors may not be held criminally responsible.” 241 “It follows that, under that provision,
it would be lawful for a contracting party to bring to trial before its national courts
persons under eighteen for allegedly committing war crimes if this were allowed under
the relevant national legislation.” 242
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Divergent positions: International law allows for the incrimination of children accused of
war crimes
Against the morally inclined positions held by IOs, NGOs, and academics alike
that children should not be targeted by international criminal law, and that legal
provisions should instead focus on prohibiting crimes committed against children and not
by children; there is a growing tendency among a few academics to offer a contrasting
position.
Leveau’s article “Liability of Child Soldiers under International Criminal Law”
(2013) successfully focuses on the responsibility of the child soldier and illustrates how
international law does, in fact, allow for the exercise of criminal responsibility on those
under the age of eighteen when accused of grave violations of international law. In the
present article, the author brings attention to crimes committed by children, instead of
crimes against children. She acknowledges children as perpetrators, and discusses their
potential criminal responsibility under international criminal law. In her opinion
“interpretation of [legal] instruments suggest that child soldiers could be prosecuted by
international criminal tribunals,”243 while still having to respect certain specific juvenile
justice standards, already established by international law.
Leveau goes on to present three reasons why prosecution of those under eighteen
should be available in international criminal law. First, she argues that bringing to justice
those who have committed international crimes is the aim of international criminal
justice; second, it is understood as authorized by international human rights law; and
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third, most domestic systems already allow prosecutions of child soldiers and, in fact,
some have done so. 244
Leveau is categorical in defending the view that prosecution of child soldiers is
allowed by international human rights law. According to her, international human rights
law does not prohibit child prosecution. The CRC, for example, contains chapters
specifically on children in conflict with the law (even though the convention does not
explicitly authorize or prohibit the prosecution of children), thus acknowledging that the
legal prosecution of children is possible, at least in theory and within domestic legal
systems.245 The wide ratification of the CRC is for her, a strong indication that states
agree that: “child prosecution could occur and a fortiori is authorized.”246
The fact that an international treaty as widely ratified as the CRC
recognizes that prosecution of children can occur at a domestic level
impacts our understanding of international law. Indeed, provisions of the
CRC have crystallized under customary international law. Indirectly, this
indicates that the international community is not substantially opposed to
the prosecution of children at the international level. 247
A common position against the viable prosecution of child soldiers in
International Law comes from critics who argue that even though children in most
criminal system are deemed capable of forming mens rea for ordinary crimes, this does
necessarily entail the competence to form the means rea necessary for an international
crime. 248 These authors have pointed to the fact that international crimes, unlike most
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ordinary crimes, require a more complex mens rea requirement, which may prove to be
extremely difficult for a child to acquire. 249 To address this valuable line of questioning,
Leveau presents the argument set forth by Happold (2008) in which he explains that with
the exception of the crime of genocide, the international requirements for international
crimes are not more complex than domestic crimes.
Most international crimes [with the exception of genocide] … do not
require proof of any special intent. They merely require knowledge of the
existence of particular circumstances. Crimes against humanity have a
contextual element, calling for proof that they were ‘committed as part of
a widespread or systematic attack directed against the civilian population,’
but it needs only to be shown that ‘[t]he perpetrator knew that the conduct
was part of such an attack’ (Rome Statute, Article 7). War crimes require
that the prohibited conduct “took place in the context of and was
associated with” an armed conflict but only require proof that ‘[t]he
perpetrator was aware of factual circumstances that established the
existence’ of the conflict. In most cases, therefore, the problem would
seem to be one of proof rather than of principle. For example, it’s hard to
envisage a child soldier being successfully prosecuted for the international
crime of aggression. However, this is because child soldiers do not hold
sufficiently exalted rank to participate in decisions to wage aggressive
war. Indeed, one might go further and say that there is no principled
difference between the issues arising from attempts to hold children
responsible for complex domestic and complex international crimes. At
best, the argument is over-inclusive. In each case the difficulties will be
the same and, as a result, the argument cannot be used to distinguish
children’s legal responsibility for international crimes from their criminal
responsibility in domestic law.250
In other words, according to existing international criminal law, as set by the ICC,
a juvenile can indeed qualify as having met the mens rea criterion for the prosecution for
international crimes, since “most international crimes … do not require proof of any
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special intent. They merely require knowledge of the existence of particular
circumstances [again with the exception of genocide].”251
One of the other main concerns of those who oppose the idea of children’s
prosecution under International Criminal Law is the idea that prosecution can never be
conducted in a way that can deliver proper rehabilitation to the child accused, as well as,
be considered in the child’s best interest. Leveau makes a compelling counterargument
explaining that if done with the intention of rehabilitation, holding a child criminally
liable can, in fact, help the child return to society without the stigma of impunity:
…by condemning a child to low sentences [which] may help them
reintegrate into society while they are still young, and society would feel
that the wrongs committed by child soldiers have been dealt with. It may
also be more inclined to reaccept them and move forward.252“ Besides,
one of the central aims of international criminal law is to bring justice to
the victims and “one can hardly imagine how victims of child soldiers
would reaccept these children as part of their community without feeling
that justice had been done.”253
To sum, despite the large majority of authors defending the position that children
should not, as a matter of morals, or a matter of law, be liable for criminal prosecution
under International Criminal Law, most recent (yet sparse) literature has successfully
shown the existence of legal interpretations and lines of reasoning supporting the viability
of children to be subject to the principle of individual criminal responsibility under
international criminal law when accused of the commission of war crimes.
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Chapter 7: International tribunals and the contribution of the SCSL to the emerging law
on children’s criminal responsibility in International Criminal Law
The current chapter argues in favor of the UN Security Council and the UN Secretary
General, via the Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, generating a legal rule
which clearly establishes individual criminal responsibility on minors, starting at age
fifteen, when accused of serious breaches of international law. This rule is influential
towards the general development of international criminal law, since other international
and domestic courts alike are able to use the precedent to bring juveniles to justice under
the accusation of international crimes.
However, before reaching this conclusion, the chapter starts with an overview of
international criminal law and the workings of the international criminal tribunals. These
two – international criminal law and international criminal courts – are associated in the
current analysis precisely because it is through the creation and functioning of
international criminal courts that International Criminal Law has experienced its greatest
development, expansion, and precision. Next, we will examine the workings of the
Special Court for Sierra Leone, in particular its jurisdictional contribution as the first
international court to include juveniles as viable subjects of its international criminal
jurisdiction. The inclusion of minors is articulated in Article 7(1) of the court’s Statute.
The Statute was first developed by the UN Secretary General, in consultation with the
government of Sierra Leone, and has received support and authorization from the UN
Security Council. It will be argued that the decision of the Statute’s authors to include
jurisdiction over minors, despite not having framed it as compulsory, can nonetheless be
used as evidence of law, inviting other courts to do so when ruling on similar cases. The
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chapter concludes with a revealing interpretation: by including juveniles under the
jurisdiction of the SCSL, the UN Secretary General has acknowledged that juveniles,
after the age of minimum legal recruitment, set at age fifteen, can be considered viable
subjects of the international criminal system.
International criminal tribunals: an introduction
By the end of the Second World War, Europe had witnessed a level of human
catastrophe shocking to the international community, reaching what was considered a
moral tipping point. Moved by the rationale “never again,” the Allies established, via a
multilateral treaty (London Agreement of August, 8th 1945), the first International
Military Tribunal (IMT) located in Nuremberg, Germany. The court aimed at convicting
Nazi war officials for war crimes, crimes against humanity and waging aggressive war.254
One year later, a second military tribunal, the International Military Tribunal for
the Far East, also known as the Tokyo Tribunal took place following the same purpose.
The Tokyo Tribunal was also established by an international agreement between the
Allies towards the prosecution of Japanese war officials. Operating similarly to its
predecessor and holding jurisdiction over the same list of crimes (crimes against peace,
war crimes and crimes against humanity)255 the court successfully brought twenty-eight
defendants to justice.256
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In terms of legacy, both courts inaugurated a new period in international law by
institutionalizing the legal principle of individual criminal responsibility; a principle
which acts imposing criminal responsibilities directly on to individuals without the need
of State intermediation. As a result, an individual can be brought to justice exclusively
through international mechanisms.257
The rationale behind the legal premise of individual’s criminal accountability was
that: “never again” would state sovereignty shield those who have committed gross
human atrocities, and “never again” would State sovereignty affect the obstruction of
justice of those who seriously violated International Humanitarian Law. Individuals
would receive protection from international law against wide-scale atrocities wherever
they are performed.258 “The Nuremberg trials established that all of humanity would be
guarded by an international legal shield…”259
Efforts at creating an international individual accountability system were also a
direct response to the incapacity or unwillingness of local courts to bring to trial those
responsible for internationally criminal acts, as well as the desire shared by the Allies of
sending a clear message to the rest of the world that human atrocities committed by a
government would no longer be tolerated. Sovereignty would no longer act as a shield
protecting authorities accused of committing atrocities.
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The legacy that started with the Nuremberg trials marked the birth of modern
International Criminal Law. The codification of a branch of international law responsible
for criminalizing violations of IHR and International Human Rights Law, including by
governmental agents, through international and national courts was only possible through
a process that pierced through the sacrosanct institution of sovereignty.
The new legal paradigm introduced was well defined by Nuremberg’s famous
declaration that “crimes against international law are committed by men, not abstract
entities, and only by punishing individuals who commit such crimes can the provisions of
international law be enforced.”260 The perpetrators were to be held directly accountable
“without the intermediary of the state wielding authority over such individuals,” even in
cases when the accused was in fact acting as an official representative of a State.261
The process, the establishment of individual criminal responsibility under
international law, faced two main obstacles: first, in classical international
law, states, not individuals, were the exclusive subjects. Therefore, the
establishment of criminal norms in international law first required the
recognition of the individual as a subject of international law. Second, it
was necessary to overcome states‘ defensive attitude towards outside
interference, which was rooted in the concept of sovereignty.262
If we take a step back, before the establishment of the Nuremberg tribunal, it is
important to mention that International Law traditionally did not address individuals, only
states and state representatives. 263 Individuals, in their private capacity, were not
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understood as capable of infringing international law 264 and any act performed by an
individual was to be addressed by the State concerned and through the works of domestic
courts. International law also did not prescribe punitive measures. When a sate was in
violation of its international obligations, the accused state was under the duty to
discontinue the violation and grant some form of reparation. Rules of international
responsibility evolved through customs and were later codified by the International Law
Commission in ‘Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts’ (2001) and
submitted to the UN General Assembly.
The IMT challenged the traditional view by affirming that: “individuals [based on
customs] have international duties which transcend the national obligations of obedience
imposed by the individual State.”265 In this statement, the court was mostly referring to
obligations derived from International Humanitarian Law, already binding upon
individuals before the creation of the IMT. Attempts to regulate warfare began earlier
than the IMT, in, for example, the Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907; however, the
provisions of those conferences’ resulting treaties did not prescribe criminal penalties for
violation, and were strongly limited by notions of State sovereignty.266
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“The Hague Convention nowhere designates such practices [methods of waging war] as
criminal, nor is any sentence prescribed, nor any mention made of a court to try and
punish offenders.”267
From an institutional legal perspective, the creation of the IMT marked a turning
point in international law. With the adoption of the Agreement and the Charter of the
IMT, the Allies had created the first “genuinely international body of criminal law
capable of universal application that brought together several different legal
traditions.”268 Both of these courts were set to try “war criminals whose offenses have no
particular geographical location whether they are accused individually or in their capacity
as members of organizations or groups or both capacities.”269 The IMT Charter
established that “individuals could be criminally liable as a matter of international law,
rejecting in passing the Defense arguments that international law only provided liability
for states, not individuals.”270
In addition, the IMT institutionalized the idea that individuals had international
obligations as a matter of international law, and these obligations were to be given
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precedence over their national duties and responsibilities: individuals were seen to “have
international duties which transcend the national obligations of obedience imposed by the
individual state. He who violates the laws of war cannot obtain immunity while acting in
pursuance of the authority of the state if the state in authorizing action moves outside its
competence under international law.”271
Possibly one of the most important outcomes of the IMT was the Court’s
determination that the prohibition of the crimes under its jurisdiction [laid down in the
Charter] did not constitute new law.272 In the view of the Tribunal, the Charter was the
expression of international law existing at the time of its creation; the Charter merely
codified the law. This conclusion is disputed by a number of jurists and scholars. “While
some claimed that the Charter of the Nuremberg Tribunal merely codified existing
principles, others were more forthcoming in acknowledging that, in fact, a great deal of it
was new law… If there was no law to punish these crimes, it was the general view that
law should be made. And so it was.”273
An important point to keep in mind is that subsequent international courts have
also adopted the same position: to negate the creation of new law for the sake of not
confronting the principle of legality.274
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The Nuremberg Tribunal heritage influenced other international law venues, such
as the creation of the United Nations Genocide Convention (1948), the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights (1948), and the Geneva Conventions on the Laws and
Customs of War (1949). The International Military Tribunal also supplied a useful
precedent for the trials of Japanese war criminals in Tokyo (1946-48); the 1961 trial of
Nazi leader Adolf Eichmann in Israel (1906-62); and the establishment of tribunals for
international crimes committed in the former Yugoslavia (1993) and in Rwanda
(1994).275
Bringing the accused to justice: domestic courts and international courts
When states are under the obligation to bring those accused of grave breaches of
International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law to justice, the
process is mainly done through their domestic courts.276 Domestic courts are a paramount
element to the delivery of international justice.277 The obligation to bring those accused to
justice does not exclusively rest on the State in which the crime occurred or the State
from which the perpetrator or victims are nationals. These international obligations are
shared by international society as a whole and any State that has custody of the accused
may exercise jurisdiction over the case, and prosecute the accused.
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If the State holding custody is not willing to prosecute in good faith, it must extradite to
another that is ready to bring the accused to justice.
Before 1945, domestic courts were generally the only way of bringing individuals
to justice for violations of international law. However, these violations were judged as
breaches of domestic law, and the crimes were considered common national crimes. Each
country had a different set of criminal rules and procedures. While the latter still holds
true, after 1945, the international community “…moved increasingly toward the
development of a system of international jurisdictions, complementary to that of domestic
courts to try people accused of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity.”278
Currently, gross violations of International Humanitarian Law and International
Human Rights Law carry the obligation of prosecution. States are required either to
prosecute and punish an individual accused of committing international crimes, or to
extradite them so an interested State can do so.279 “Recalling that it is the duty of every
State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international
crimes.”280
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The development of a system of international jurisdiction was possible through
the establishment and operation of international courts, which can be divided analytically
into three types (international ad hoc criminal courts, hybrid courts, and a permanent
criminal court), established in two different settings (post-conflict or permanently). The
first two types, ad hoc international criminal courts and other types of internationalized
tribunals, such as hybrid courts, were created after the 1990s followed by serious armed
conflicts, and were aimed at addressing serious violations arising exclusively from these
armed conflicts. Common traits among these two type of courts was that they were
United Nations’ involvement; they were operated temporarily and held a limited
territorial jurisdiction (jurisdiction ratione loci). The major difference between these two
(ad hoc courts and hybrid courts) was the first, ad hoc courts, were exclusively
international courts, and thus the court followed and responded to international law, while
the hybrid courts were composed of a combination of international and national judges
and followed both international and domestic law.
The third type of international criminal court is the permanent International
Criminal Court (ICC). The ICC came from a prolonged desire of states to build a
permanent court to address serious international crimes that could result in means of
clashing jurisdiction. A permanent court would also serve to address cases in which states
were unwilling to try due to political reasons, or possibly even lack of resources.281
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Contributions of the international tribunals from post Second World War to the twenty
first century
International tribunals have operated since the beginning of the modern
international system, with the purpose of settling disputes between states. These were not
criminal courts, however, and they only addressed states. It is mainly with the Nuremberg
trials after World War II, however, that ad hoc tribunals dealing with criminal cases
against individuals were created to address the core international crimes, namely
genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity.282 It is safe to affirm that these
international criminal courts have changed the landscape of international law, targeting
mainly the individuals responsible for the planning and commission of gross human
atrocities. The rationale behind their creation was to assure that when states were either
unwilling or incapable of bringing the accused to justice through national legal channels,
the international community as a whole might step in to ensure that serious violations of
IL do not go unpunished.
The ICTY and ICTR
The legacy created by the Nuremberg Tribunal allowed the emergence, years
later, of the ICTY and the ICTR. The years of 1993 (ICTY) and 1995 marked the
creation of the first two “truly” international criminal tribunals to be ever established,283
both were created by the UN Security Council as subsidiary organs (extensions) of the
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UN under Chapter VII.284 These courts were brought to being under the terms of Article
29 of the United Nations Charter, having the United Nations operating within a judicial
nature.285 The establishment of the ICTY and the ICTR via Chapter VII of the UN
Security Council served to “…ensure more expeditious establishment and universal
application.”286
Both of these courts had limited temporal and territorial scope. The ICTY
exercised authority over “persons responsible for serious violations of international
humanitarian law committed in the territory of the former Yugoslavia since 1991 in
accordance with the provisions of the present Statute.” It has jurisdiction over grave
breaches of the 1949 Geneva Conventions, violations of the laws or customs of war,
genocide, and crimes against humanity. While the ICTR had jurisdiction (its work ended
in 2015) to prosecute persons responsible for serious violations of international
humanitarian law committed in the territory of Rwanda or over Rwandan citizens
responsible for such violations committed in the territory of neighboring states, between
1 January 1994 and 31 December 1994.
The ICTY Statute was drafted by the UN Office of Legal Affairs, and was
approved and adopted by the UN Security Council without alteration.287 By comparison,
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when developing the ICTR Statute, the UN Security Council did not request the
involvement of the UN Secretary-General or the Office of Legal Affairs, it simply
“closely mirrored the Yugoslavia Tribunal’s Statute…”288
The Special Court for Sierra Leone
A third international court was created by the United Nations in agreement with
the government of Sierra Leone in 2002 and it aimed at bringing to justice those most
responsible for the International Humanitarian Law violations occurred during the Sierra
Leone civil war. The Special Court for Sierra Leone (SCSL) came as a result of “Sierra
Leone’s request for UN assistance in establishing an independent tribunal to try those
responsible for alleged crimes during its decade-long civil war.”289 A more detailed
analysis of the SCSL’s characteristics and functioning will be covered subsequently in
this chapter.
Other internationalized courts were created after the SCSL, such as the UN
Special Panel for Serious Crimes in East Timor and the Extraordinary Chambers in the
Courts of Cambodia (ECCC). These two were hybrid courts fostered by UN initiative.290

288

Scharf, Michael and Margaux Day, “The ad hoc international criminal tribunals: launching a new era
of accountability,” The Routledge Handbook of International Criminal Law, 58.
289

Scharf, Michael and Margaux Day, “The ad hoc international criminal tribunals: launching a new era
of accountability,” The Routledge Handbook of International Criminal Law, 58.
290

The ECCC was established by an agreement between the UN and the Royal Government of Cambodia
in 2003 concerning the Prosecution under Cambodian Law of Crimes committed during the period of the
Democratic Kampuchea (ECCC Agreement). The ECCC despite being created by the UN and the
government, its operation was set to be independent of them. It is paramount to stress that the ECCC is not
an international court, but a Cambodian court with international participation design to apply international
standards. The ECCC exercised authority to prosecute “only two categories of alleged perpetrators for
alleged crimes committed between 17 April 1975 and 6 January 1979: 1) Senior leaders of Democratic
Kampuchea; and 2) Those believed to be most responsible for grave violations of national and international
law,” (https://www.eccc.gov.kh/en/document/legal/agreement).

133

My analysis will not include hybrid courts; I am focusing exclusively on criminal courts
of an international nature since these are the ones to affect more directly the development
of International Criminal Law.
The International Criminal Court
The International Criminal Court (ICC) is the only permanent international
criminal court created by the international community. The ICC “investigates and, where
warranted, tries individuals charged with the gravest crimes of concern to the
international community: genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity.”291
Established in 2002, the ICC currently has 124 State parties to the Rome Statute.292 Its
temporal jurisdiction applies from the establishment date onward, and extends to all those
State parties.
The ICC operates differently than the UN based ad hoc courts. To begin with, it
does not exercise primacy over national courts, the ICC instead has jurisdiction
complementary to domestic courts, which means the court will try a case only if the
country where the crime occurred, or any other country for the matter, has failed or is
unwilling to bring the accused to justice.
The ICC may only bring charges against nationals from a State party, with a few
exceptions to this directive, such as when the crime has occurred within a state that is
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party to the ICC; when a case is referred to the ICC Prosecutor by the UN Security
Council. Third, when the nonparty State has consented to have its nationals prosecuted.293
The importance of international courts
International courts (ad hoc and non-ad hoc) were and are still important for
several reasons. First, these courts were created to bring those most responsible for
human atrocities (serious violations of International Humanitarian Law and International
Human Rights Law) to justice through international mechanisms when national courts
were incapable or unwilling to do it, thus, avoiding international impunity, and honoring
the victims’ rights to justice. Second, regarding jurisprudential legal development, the
international courts exercise the role of:
ascertaining the existence and content of customary rules, interpreting and
clarifying treaty provisions, and elaborating-according to general
principles-legal categories and constructs for the application of
international criminal rules. The result is that the rapid development of
substantive international criminal law is mainly due to judicial
decisions.294
Finally, “…many of the core jurisdictional principles and jurisprudence
developed by them (international courts in general) will influence decisions of the
International Criminal Court, and remain an important subsidiary source of customary
international law.”295
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So, one can safely conclude from the above remarks that the work of one
international court, whether ad hoc or not, can greatly influence the functioning of the
others.
A deeper look at the Special Court for Sierra Leone
Following the bloodshed that occurred during Sierra Leone’s civil conflict, former
President Kabban of Sierra Leone sent a letter dated12 June 2000 to the UN Secretary
General requesting UN’s assistance in the creation of “a credible court” to try the worst
offenders of the Sierra Leone conflict.296 As a result, the UN Secretary General persuaded
the UN Security Council to adopt Resolution 1315 (2000), which authorized the UN
Secretary General to negotiate a bilateral treaty, between the UN and the government of
Sierra Leone, for the establishment of such a court.297 The negotiations were conducted
by the UN Secretary General, with authorization and under scrutiny of the UN Security
Council, as well as with guidance/counsel of UN legal advisers. The negotiation resulted
in the UN-Sierra Leone Agreement and its annexed Statute which received the last UN
Security Council approval before it was signed by the UN Secretary General and Sierra
Leone in January 2002.298
The Court operated from 16 January 2002 to 26 September 2013. September 2013
marked the date of the court’s final ruling delivered by the Appeals Chamber upholding a
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50-year sentence to former Liberian President Charles Taylor.299 Taylor had been found
guilty in April 2012 of five counts of crimes against humanity, five counts of war crimes
and one count of other serious violations of international humanitarian law perpetrated by
Sierra Leone’s Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebels, who he supported.300
The SCSL as its predecessors, the IMT, the Tokyo Tribunal, the ICTY, and ICTR,
all exercised the power to determine their own jurisdiction. “This power, known as the
principle of ‘Kompetenz-Kompetenz’ in German or ‘la compétence de la compétence’ in
French, is part, and indeed a major part, of the incidental or inherent jurisdiction of any
judicial or arbitral tribunal, consisting of the ‘jurisdiction to determine its jurisdiction’, as
stated by the SCSL Appeals Chamber” following the ICTY Tadić decisions. 301 In other
words, The SCSL “…is empowered to pronounce on the validity and legality of its
creation.”302
The jurisdiction of the SCSL was directed toward the prosecution of persons who
“bear the greatest responsibility for serious violations of international humanitarian law
and Sierra Leonean law committed in the territory of Sierra Leone since 30 November
1996, including those leaders who, in committing such crimes, have threatened the
establishment of and implementation of the peace process in Sierra Leone.”303
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Unlike the ICTY and ICTR, which were created as subsidiary organs of the UN
under Chapter VII of the Charter, the SCSL followed a design inaugurated by the IMT,
that is, it was created by an international treaty, between the UN and the government of
Sierra Leone. 304 The SCSL was negotiated between the UN and the Government of
Sierra Leone, which makes this Court the first criminal tribunal to be established by an
agreement between the UN and one of its Member states.305 The Appeals Chamber of the
SCSL has affirmed the agreement between the United Nations and Sierra Leone as one
operative ‘between all members of the United Nations and Sierra Leone’ making it ‘an
expression of the will of the international community.’306 What does it mean, in terms of
treaty obligations, to have the UN as one of the parties to a bi-lateral treaty? Would this
mean that the obligations derived from the treaty would also apply to all the UN
members? That would appear to be the case, however, this idea raises uncertainties and is
not bound by the rules of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. As expressed by
Articles 34 – 36 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, treaties do not create
obligations to third parties. Meaning only those who have consented to be bound by a
treaty are expected to follow its provisions. One exception is treaties that were concluded
via a UNSC resolution based on Chapter VII, as was the case with the Statutes of the
ICTY and the ICTR. In this case, the obligation for compliance extends to all State
members (of the UN).
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But if this is not the case, as it was not with the SCSL, then what does it mean, in
practical terms, for the UN to be one of the parties to the treaty? I am not certain that
there is an answer to this question yet.
That being said, having the UN as one of the parties to a treaty certainly offers a
greater level of political legitimacy (for more info see the work of Inis Claude, 1966) and
legal validity since the UN has defined as one of its central roles, as established by the
General Assembly, the development and promotion of international law. 307 For this task,
the Assembly created in 1948 the International Law Commission (ILC) aimed at
promoting “the progressive development of international law and its codification.”
(Article 1 of the Statute of the International Criminal Law). ‘Progressive development’ is
defined as “the preparation of draft conventions on subjects which have not yet been
regulated by international law or in regard to which the law has not yet been sufficiently
developed in the practice of States” and ‘codification’ as “the more precise formulation
and systematization of rules of international law in fields where there already has been
extensive State practice, precedent and doctrine” (Article 15 of the International Criminal
Law Statute).308
Another factor which brings legitimacy to the SCSL is the “high level of
involvement of the Security Council in the in the establishment of the court included, but
not limited to, approving the Statute of the Special Court and initiating and facilitating

307

Claude, L. Inis, “Collective Legitimization as a Political Function of the United Nations”, International
Organizations (1966).
308

“About the Commission, Organization: programme and methods of work”: International Law
Commission, http://legal.un.org/ilc/work.shtml).

139

arrangements for the funding of the Court.”309 Schabas (2006) has argued that despite the
SCSL not being a UN Security Council subsidiary organ, the Council exercised immense
influence on its creation and operation. The Council explicitly authorized the creation of
the SCSL by Resolution 1315, and was directly involved in the drafting of the Statute of
the court. In exchange communications between the UN Secretary General and the
Security Council, the Council set its preferences for certain parts of the Statute and on
every point, the view of the Council prevailed.310 Finally, the Security Council authorized
the draft that became the final version of the Statute.311
How international criminal courts operate
International courts are bound per excellence only by international law as
explained by ICTY Judge Cassese. In reference to the ICTY Cassese expresses that:
“This International Tribunal is called upon to apply international law, in particular, our
Statute and principles and rules of international humanitarian law and international
criminal law. Our International Tribunal is a court of law; it is bound only by
international law.“312
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Domestic law may be used by international courts when the court finds that the
“applicable law instruments are inadequate for the solution of legal problems.”313 All
three UN based ad hoc courts (ICTY, ICTR, and SCSL) have Statutes that “make specific
reference to the possible application of the national criminal law of the State where the
crime was committed. In the case of the ICTY and ICTR, this occurs in the sentencing
provisions, while in the SCSL Statute national law is given a more prominent
role…incorporating some offenses drawn from the national law.”314
The Special Court officially functions with a “mixed jurisdiction and composition
format”315 (ratione materiae jurisdiction), which means “the Prosecutor could invoke
either or both international and Sierra Leonean law to prosecute offenders.”316 In fact,
domestic law may be used when the court finds that the “applicable law instruments are
inadequate for the solution of legal problems.”317 Despite the Special Court exhibiting
some national features, it is recognized and treated as a UN-established international
court: “a creature of international law, not domestic law”318 and “…independent of Sierra
Leonean courts and possessing the distinct legal personality of an international
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organization that permits it to operate in the sphere of international law.”319 Being labeled
an international court meant the SCSL was an independent court, created by international
law and operating under international law, as determined by the Ratification Act of 2002
(signed by the Parliament of Sierra Leone).320
Sources of law of the international courts
The principal legal instrument of all three ad hoc tribunals is the Statute, followed
by the Rules of Procedure and Evidence (RPE).321 The Statute spells out the structure, the
current law under which the court will follow, and the jurisdiction and limitations of the
international courts. It functions similarly to setting down the operational “rules of the
game,” while the RPE sets the procedural rules of how the court is to operate.
When the Statutes [or the Rules of Procedure and Evidence] do not provide
appropriate legal answers to cases, the Courts may exercise the liberty of diverting from
these instruments in the interest of justice, and / or more commonly, the Tribunals have
acted as if there were a provision in the statutes inviting them to apply customary law as
residual law.322 The reason the drafters of the Statutes of international Tribunals attributed
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international customary law a place as residual law is to avoid violating the principle of
nullum crimen sine lege or principle of legality if a party to the conflict has not adhere to
a specific treaty.323 The principle of legality holds that no one can be considered guilty of
a crime if their act or omission was not considered a penal offense under the referent
legal system at the time it was committed.324
As an illustration of how customary law is recognized as a predominant source of
law is the ICTR Appeals Chamber’s affirmation that “[t]he International Tribunal
is…governed by its own Statute and by the provisions of customary international law,
where these can be discerned.”325
Perhaps the most significant concerns of the international Courts is to reinforce
their compliance with the principle of legality through the use of customary law when
applying and interpreting their Statutes, because all three tribunals exercise jurisdiction
over crimes committed before their establishment, as well as prospectively. When the
ICTY Statute was drafted, the Secretary-General and the Security Council sought to
avoid potential challenges of not confirming with the principle of legality and made
explicit that the Tribunal’s subject-matter jurisdiction to offenses was “beyond any doubt
of criminal law are also the foundation for criminal defenses the defenses of international criminal law such
as such as minimum age or mental incapacity, drawing upon general principles of law recognized by all
nations.’ (Schabas, The UN International Criminal Tribunals: The Former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Sierra
Leone, 2006, 104).
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part of customary law so that the problem of adherence of some but not all States to
specific conventions does not arise.”326 In Schabas’ opinion “the statement made by the
Secretary-General’s Report to the Security Council327 has been used to justify what
amounts to an interpretative presumption regarding the relationship between the principle
of legality and customary law. Next, Schabas cites a pronouncement by by the ICTY

Appeals Chamber:328
“...in case of doubt and whenever the contrary is not apparent from the text of a
statutory or treaty provision, such a provision must be interpreted in light of, and in
conformity with, customary international law. In the case of the Statute, it must be
presumed that the Security Council, where it did not explicitly or implicitly depart from
general rules of international law, intended to remain within the confines of such
rules.“329
Customary law is also fundamental when determining which crimes fall within
the jurisdiction of the Court for the same reason of staying in compliance with the
principle of legality. The UN Secretary General stated quite clearly in his report on the
establishment of the ICTY, that the Tribunal would only be able to prosecute offenses
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that were unquestionably recognized as customary international law:330 “the International
Tribunal only has jurisdiction over offenses that constituted crimes under customary
international law at the time the alleged offenses were committed” as previously
stipulated by one of the Trial Chamber of the ICTY.331 One again, the ICTY Chamber
clarified that “the only reason behind the stated purpose of the drafters that the
International Tribunal should apply customary international law was to avoid violating
the principle of nullum crimen sine lege if a party to the conflict did not adhere to a
specific treaty.”332
Keeping conformity with international customs is also the rule when a certain
provision of the Statute requires clarification. If the judges were to conclude that a
specific provision in the Statute was inconsistent with existing customary international
law “such that the discrepancy could not be resolved by interpretation, they would have
no choice but to declare the impugned provision to be inoperative.”333
Leading us to conclude that international customary law is an essential guide
when creating and operating any international court; it guides the development of Statutes
and Rules of Procedure and Evidence and courts apply customary law as residual law
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whenever the existing treaty rules do not enlighten or provide guidance on a certain case.
Schabas (2006) has taken one step forward supporting the argument, as expressed by
most international courts statutes, that the list of crimes under the court’s jurisdiction,
reflects customary law. Such position has also been affirmed by the Trial Chambers of
ICTY: “The ICTY determined that the crimes covered by Articles 2, 3, 4, and 5 of the
Tribunal’s Statute reflect customary international law. The Blaskić Appeals Chamber,
quoting the Hadzihasanović case, stated, in the context of a discussion of nullum crimen
sine lege, that “it has always been the approach of this Tribunal not to rely merely on a
construction of the Statute to establish the applicable law on criminal responsibility, but
to ascertain the state of customary law in force at the time the crimes were committed.”334
Overall, if we take a step back, the strategy to affirm conformity with current law, and
more specifically customary law has been the strategy used by most international courts
past and present.
The claim that international courts has followed international customary law when
creating its documents as well as adjudicating its cases is bound to provoke controversy
when applied to the provision contained in Article 7(1) of the Statute of the SCSL, which
grants the Court authorization to exercise “jurisdiction over persons who were fifteen
years of age at the time of the alleged commission of the crime.” The rule was written by
334
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the UN Secretary General in consultation with the government of Sierra Leone and the
UN Security Council, and received the full support of the Security Council. Therefore,
Article 7(1) is a product of international law-making coming from the UN Secretary
General and the Security Council, and provides a clear indication of the UN’s position
and where it believes customary law stands on the issue of children’s criminal
responsibility under international law.
How important was the Special Court’s decision to include minors as liable to individual
criminal prosecution to the development of international criminal law?
There are two steps when attempting to answer the above question. First, by
showing how international courts influence each other’s work, in this case, how the
SCSL’s decision to include children under its jurisdiction serves as guidance for other
international courts or for national courts applying international criminal law to do so as
well. The second step, which can also be seen as a complement to the first attempt, is to
argue that the Statute of the SCSL, which included that children fifteen years of age and
older could be brought to the court, is an expression of established international law. This
in practical terms means that the decision of the Court to include juveniles can be
understood as providing evidence (for other international courts or national courts) of an
existing rule of international law on the issue of juvenile justice when minors are accused
of serious breaches of International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights
Law.
It is important to mention that despite the level of cooperation and even similarity
between international criminal courts -- which is fundamental to the enlargement and
refinement of International Criminal Law – these courts are not under an obligation to
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follow the doctrine of precedence. The doctrine of precedence or Stares Decisis: “is a
doctrine according to which when a court has once laid down a principle of law as
applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle, and apply it to all
future cases, where the facts are substantially the same.”335 In other words, the doctrine of
precedence consists of an authoritative way of legal reasoning and decision making
predominantly found in common law systems, in which, an “international judge seems to
feel bound by the jurisprudence of another court” or even previous decisions of the same
court. 336 The decision to take into consideration judicial rulings from external other
courts is a discretionary practice: courts can choose to do so if they wish, and judicial
decisions count as evidence of law, not necessarily as sources of law. However, the use of
judicial decisions by international courts has been gaining space in International Criminal
Law, as expressed by Terris, Romano, and Swigart in a study conducted in 2007. The
authors concluded that international judges, even though they are at liberty to choose
their paths of reasoning, have been entertaining the use of other courts’ decisions when a
lack of precedent is evident.337
Seeking guidance from other court’s decisions has not been the traditional path set
by international courts; this is the reason why the work of Terris, Romano, and Swigart is
so revealing. As stated in the Statute of the ICJ, the three main sources utilized by the
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court are: treaties, customary law, and general principles of law. If no law on the matter
in question can be found in these three sources, then the court may utilize previous
judicial decisions and the writings of jurists as evidence of the law, or divert from the
sources and decide ex aequo et bono (from equity and goodness), if the parties agree. The
list and explanation of the sources of International Law sources are found in chapter two
of the present dissertation.
The sources of international law utilized by the ICC and the various tribunals
differ somewhat from the ICJ’s list, and include first, to be given precedence over the
others: The Statute, followed by the Elements of Crimes and the Rules of Procedure and
Evidence. If legal guidance on the issue at hand is not to be found within these sources,
then “the second tier in the hierarchy of sources consists of applicable treaties and the
principles and rules of international law, including the established principles of the
international law of armed conflict.”338 According to Schabas, “this second tier in the
hierarchy of sources corresponds to the sources of international law as set out in Article
38 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, although the wording is quite
original.”339 It is only with the ICJ’s source list that one will find ‘judicial decisions’
listed as a source of international law.
We can also identify international courts’ cooperation in the statement given by
the ICTY Trial Chambers about the court‘s legal sources:
The primary sources on which the ICTY relies are other decisions of the
ICTY and decisions of the Rwanda Tribunal, with an emphasis on
338
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Appeals Chamber decisions. As a secondary source, the ICTY may be
‘guided by the case-law of the Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals, the
tribunals established under Allied Control Council Law No. 10, and the
Tribunal for East Timor.’340 Furthermore, the ICTY may apply
customary international law, and it may apply treaty law, so long as the
treaty ‘(i) was unquestionably binding on the parties at the time of the
alleged offense; and (ii) was not in conflict with or derogating from
peremptory norms of international law, as are most customary rules of
international humanitarian law.’341 When applying treaties, the ICTY
recognized that it should interpret conventions in conformity with
Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.342
So, the ICTY main sources for deciding its cases emanate from the
ICTY itself, and other international courts, as well as from customary
law.343
Another indication of how the ICTY and ICTR can make a “significant
contribution to the general corpus of international criminal law is expressed in Article
20(3) of the Special Court of Sierra Leone’s Statute which allows the court to be guided
by the decisions of the joint ICTY/ICTR Appeals Chamber.344 The article stipulates that:
“the judges of the Appeals Chamber of the Special Court shall be guided by the decisions
of the Appeals Chamber of the International Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda. In the interpretation and application of the laws of Sierra Leone, they shall be
guided by the decisions of the Supreme Court of Sierra Leone.”345 In Cryer’s words, “the
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Special Court “will apply the decisions of the ICTY and ICTR for their persuasive value,
with necessary modifications and adaptations, taking into account the particular
circumstances of the Special Court.”346
In addition, as a rule, international courts have been profoundly influenced by
their predecessors347: the ICTY was highly influenced by the Statute and the workings of
the Nuremberg Tribunal, which also determined how the Tokyo Tribunal would operate.
And when developing the Statute of the ICTR, the UNSC largely adopted the text of the
Statute of the ICTY (with a few minor differences regarding the scope of jurisdiction),
acknowledging the proximity of these two international courts.348
After having established that Statutes and the case law of one court exercises
significant influence on the work of other international courts, it is safe to affirm that the
SCSL decision to include children starting at age fifteen under its jurisdiction should not
be seen differently; it is thus evidence of law on the issue, and invites other courts to
adopt this position if they wish.. So, even though applying past decisions are not legally
required in IL, following the rulings and jurisdictional decisions of other international
courts (or even the same court) may be the most efficient way of identify where the law –
if any –stands, thus avoiding non liquet (a situation in which the law on the issue is not
clear, preventing the court from ruling).

346

Cryer, Robert, Prosecuting International Crimes: Selectivity and the International Criminal Law
Regime (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 170.
348

Schabas, The UN International Criminal Tribunals: The Former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Sierra
Leone, 30-31.

151

Another possible reason why legal precedent can serve as guidance with regard to
existing law in international criminal law (in this case, differently than in the doctrine of
State International Responsibility as framed by International Law) is that in international
criminal law, the same obligations apply to all individuals. All individuals carry the
obligation of following International Humanitarian Law, and any serious violation may
give rise to individual criminal responsibility.
Why fifteen was the chosen age by the UN Secretary General to act as the MACR in the
Statute of the SCSL?
We have seen that international customary law, as codified in Additional
Protocols I and II, as well as by Article 38 of the CRC, sets the minimum age of legal
recruitment (MALR) at fifteen. Below fifteen, international law criminalizes the practice
of recruiting and using children in combat, however, in the child is fifteen or older, he/she
according to customary international law, can legally be recruited and used in hostilities.
The Special Court for Sierra Leone has followed the legal provisions set by International
Humanitarian Law conventions when setting fifteen as the minimum age of criminal
responsibility (MACR) in its Statute. Happold argued the choice of age made by the UN
Secretary General as “mirroring” previous customary International Humanitarian Law
rules, such as Articles 77 of Additional Protocol I and Part 4 of Additional Protocol II, as
well as, Article 38 of the CRC provisions “on the ground that if children under fifteen are
too young to be recruited, they must be too young to be held responsible for their
actions.”349
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As a conclusion, I suggest that the decision of the UN Secretary General,
approved by the UN Security Council, to set the MACR for the SCSL was based on the
MALR set by international humanitarian law.
Concluding remarks on the jurisprudential contributions of the SCSL applicable to the
debate on children’s criminal responsibility in international criminal law
The first contribution of the SCSL to the debate on children’s criminal
responsibility under IL was the court’s establishment of a minimum age of criminal
responsibility set at fifteen years of age. Granting the SCSL the competence to bring to
justice those starting at age fifteen is equivalent to saying that fifteen is the MACR
operational under the jurisdiction of the SCSL: “the United Nations specified fifteen as
the age of criminal responsibility in the Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone.”350
Fifteen was the considered by the UN Secretary General and the UN Security Council as
the age by which minors already possess a general understanding of the criminal laws as
well as the legal competence to be held responsible for any violations.351 Because the
SCSL is per excellence an international court, and international courts influence each
other, this provision may be used by other courts, international or national, as legal
evidence of law when seeking to bring those age fifteen or above to justice when accused
of serious breaches of International Humanitarian Law.
The argument that international law has allowed for the creation of an evidence of
law which allows for courts to bring individuals starting at age fifteen to trial was
350
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reinforced by an International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (ICTY) Trial
Chamber ruling in 2006 which established that was ‘no rule in convention or customary
international law against criminal liability for a war crime committed by an individual
below the age of 18 existed.”352 Therefore, nothing in IL forbids a child from being held
criminally responsible for breaches of IL. If though, the confirmation comes in a negative
form: no rule in IL forbids prosecution of persons under eighteen, we can consider this an
important yet timid step towards the acknowledgment of a rule set by the Statute of the
SCSL.
The second contribution of the SCSL is possibly the most important. The UN
Secretary General and UN Security Council decision, reflected in the SCSL’s Statute, to
include persons fifteen and over, can be interpreted as an expression of court stating that
juveniles starting at age fifteen, are capable of committing international crimes, and thus
are to be regarded, at least, a priori as viable subjects of international criminal law
(emphasis added).
To consider someone or some entity as a subject in IL, it must first be established
that the individual or entity has rights and responsibilities within the referent legal
system. If they do not, then there are no individual obligations that can be breached, and
the individual cannot be deemed responsible. Having a “legal personality” within a legal
system entails rights, and in return means bearing certain responsibilities under the legal
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system that empowers them.353 If these obligations are not met, they affect other legal
subjects, and give rise to a system of accountability, in this case, criminal accountability
since the laws breached were international criminal rules. The following chapter will
extend on the concept of legal personality and the importance of being considered a
subject of a legal-political system.

353

Crawford, and Simon Olleson, “The Nature and Forms of International Responsibility.” In International
Law, 442.

155

Chapter 8: Final remarks on the presumed legal competence of children at the age of
fifteen and over and individual criminal responsibility
Chapter eight is composed of a brief exposition of the concept of legal personality
as it is conceived and utilized in International Law. The illustration serves the purpose of
reinforcing the conclusion reached in the previous chapter which points to the Statute of
the Special Court for Sierra Leone as the first evidence of existing law attributing the
status of subject of international criminal law to minors involved in serious breaches of
International Humanitarian Law starting at age fifteen. Next, the chapter will present a
section I believe to be an essential complement to further the discussion of the legal
competence of children as framed by existing international law and criminal
responsibility. This second part of the chapter has been developed to guide future
research on the topic.
Legal Personality in International Law
Asking about legal personality is inquiring whether an entity holds some form of
standing or status within a legal system; in other words, it is asking whether the entity is
“somebody” in that particular normative system. “The importance of an entity being
recognized as a subject of international law is that without international legal personality
it does not exist in international law, i.e. its acts will not be recognized in international
law…”354
A subject of international law, or an entity holding international legal personality,
holds rights and obligations under international law, besides having the capacity to “act”
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within that legal system, for example, to enter into legal relationships, such as
undertaking legal obligations, or bringing claims on their behalf (or other entities behalf)
to assure that their rights and entitlements are not being infringed by others.355 And “apart
from the legal considerations, when an entity is regarded a subject of international law, it
is granted political recognition from other subjects of international law” as a somebody in
the present system. 356 In other words, having legal personality provides a sense of
existence within the international legal system, which affects how others acknowledge
and treat you.
Those that “exist” within a legal system are granted rights, and in return, they also
hold certain responsibilities: “Being a subject of any legal system involves being subject
to responsibilities as well as enjoying rights.”357 If these obligations are not met, they
affect other legal subjects, and give rise to a system of accountability. The system of
accountability in international law is called international responsibility. To recap, only
those who have obligations in the first place as a consequence of being a subject of the
system, hold the capacity to violate these obligations, and thus generating a system of
accountability and responsibility.
Inquiring whether children can be considered subjects of international law should
anticipate the question of individual responsibility. In other words, it does not make sense
to engage in a discussion of responsibility before one is certain if the entity in question
has obligations to fulfill within the legal system in the first place. The rationale is that one
355
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must be entitled to obligations before one can violate them and be held responsible for
these violations. If the person has no obligations, there is nothing to be made legally
accountable for. That being said, the inquiry regarding whether children hold
international obligations under international law (as adults do) even though very rarely
addressed in the literature (if dealt with at all), should be addressed first, precisely
because, in International Law, legal personality is directly related and a pre-requisite of
international responsibility.
States as primary subjects and the place of the individual
Traditionally, states were the only subjects of the international legal system.
“[T]hey alone had the capacity to make claims on the international plane in respect of
breaches of international law, capacity to make treaties and other binding international
agreements, and the ability to enjoy privileges and immunities from national
jurisdiction.”358 states remain are still the main subjects of the law. Yet in the last century,
more entities actively participating in the making of international relations were
considered making the legal personality list, such as international organizations and
individuals.
The state, and some state-like entities, are still the one with full legal personality,
while the other entities are considered by most to be “partial” subjects of or “participants”
in international law.
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This configuration reflects the dominant view that international law is still a
largely State-based system, in which the participation of other subjects varies widely
depending on the consent of states.359
As we can notice, not all subjects of international law are the same, that is, they
do not have the same legal standing. This was confirmed by the ICJ in its Advisory
Opinion on the Reparation for Injuries Suffered in the Service of the United Nations in
which the Court held the opinion that: “subjects of law in any legal system are not
necessarily identical in their nature or in the extent of their rights’ which allowed the
court to make a “…distinction between partial and full legal personality.” 360
The trajectory of individuals in international law is quite interesting.
Traditionally, the actions of individuals did not give rise to any international
responsibility on them; “international responsibility only applied when the actions of
individuals were attributed to the State, and the State was internationally responsible.”361
Currently, individuals, as framed by most jurists, are considered “partial” subjects of IL.
The partial character is explained by them having obligations directly placed upon them
by IL (International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law more
specifically), while at the same time, the creation and enforcement of their rights is still
largely dependent upon action and the political will of the states. Individuals in rare
instances are legally capable representing themselves before international tribunals, they
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are contingent on states developing and enforcing their human rights – as well as the need
to initiate and participate on claim against another State accused of violating his or her
human right. In arrangements in which the individual has direct access to regional and
international courts to bring a claim against a state, the claims must need to go through
the domestic justice mechanism first (what it called exhaust domestic legal remedies)
before it claim can be considered at the regional or international level.
Individuals, therefore, can be characterized as holding a a “handicapped status” in
International Law as described by Judge Higgins: for once they have direct criminal
responsibility imposed on them for violations of treaty and customary law, but still
largely need the State to fully guarantee the creation, as well as, the observance and
protection of their human rights. Individuals are also dependent on the State when it
comes to seeking justice for a human rights violation, thus needing to file claims /
opening juridical processes in international courts.
Moreover, in terms of international obligations, individuals have legal
requirements placed directly onto them by International Human Rights Law and
International Humanitarian Law, which means, that all persons are subjected to a set of
uniform duties emanating from these legal regimes, and in case of serious breach of these
duties, courts (domestic or international) may hold them personally and directly
accountable.
if individuals – mainly understood as, adults with full societal citizenship, are
considered ‘partial,’ ‘incomplete,’ or even ‘handicapped’ subjects of international law,
then what can be said of children? Children are mostly understood as ‘non-adults, adults
in the making, still not equipped with moral, psychological and physical capacities of an
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adult, yet they are still considered an individual, a person, just not one fully sui juris.
Answering the question about the legal personality of children requires a more
elaborated analysis of whether children have the same “rights” and “obligations” under
IL as adults. We know that children hold international rights. The main example of
international children’s rights is the Convention on the Rights of the Child. In this
convention, children are granted the traditional types of rights – protective rights – rights
that assure that their interests are taken into consideration, while still being represented
by adults, as well as more novel participation/liberty rights. These novel types of rights
act of fulfilling the purpose of which is to guarantee that every child has an active voice
regarding their life and their development. As expressed by UNICEF: “Children are
entitled to the freedom to express opinions and to have a say in matters affecting their
social, economic, religious, cultural and political life. Participation rights include the
right to express opinions and be heard, the right to information and freedom of
association. Engaging these rights as they mature helps children bring about the
realization of all their rights and prepares them for an active role in society.”362
Children also carry obligations like adults. For instance, all children are obligated
to follow International Humanitarian Law in times of conflict, as well as to not infringe
other people’s internationally guaranteed rights. In fact, these obligations, emanating
from International Human Rights Law and International Humanitarian Rights are
addressed to all individuals including children (despite not having found data on the
362
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issue). Someone holding rights and obligations under a legal system is to be considered a
subject (even though partial) of that legal system. So, it is safe to conclude that the status
of the individual as person in international law would also include those under the age of
eighteen.
Tadros’ concept of status-responsibility
Inquiring about the legal responsibility of children is also inquiring about the
status of children within the international criminal system. When we talk about the
individual holding the capacity to be bound by a legal system, we are qualifying the
individual as someone who is a subject of the criminal system. For Tadros, the question
of who is a responsible agent as far as the criminal law is concerned is a question of
status, and he calls this “status-responsibility.”363 In Tadros’ analysis, being capable of
holding status-responsibility in the criminal system is equivalent to being considered a
viable target of the criminal laws. When inquiring about whether the object in question is
capable of holding status responsibility, Tadros is interested in determining whether the
individual is capable of understanding norms in general. Tadros, therefore, is not asking
if the individual in question is necessarily capable of committing a particular act.364
“Capacity plays a role assessing status-responsibility, but that is capacity in the general
sense rather than capacity to do, think, feel or evaluate differently from the way in which
one does.” 365
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Logically, if one is not capable of exercising competence in general, that individual ought
to be excluded from criminal responsibility, even if the actus reus conditions of a
criminal offense were fulfilled.366
In the penal laws of most legal systems, international criminal law included, a
person is only to be held culpable and, consequently, punishable, if his or her behavior
contains two necessary requirements: a wrongful act (actus reus) and a guilty mind (mens
rea). These two requirements need to be present for the construction of the concept of
“crime” in criminal law. “To be guilty of a crime, particularly about serious offenses, it is
not enough simply to have done a particular prohibited act; there must also be the
element of a guilty mind.”367 If the element of mens rea (guilty mind) is absent, then it is
possible that the person may be excused from criminal responsibility. With children, the
lack of mens rea is mainly presumed (defense of infancy), and, children may escape
criminal liability for their acts. When a minor is brought to trial, it falls to the prosecution
“to establish by evidence or informed admission that the child defendant had sufficient
understanding of the nature of the offense.”368 So, determining whether a child meets the
requirement of mens rea is largely case-specific and context–dependent, thus better set on
a case–by–case basis.
However, the above discussion addressing the criteria for determining guilt for a
particular act is not the same as inquiring broadly about the viability and requirements of
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‘legal personality.’ The question of whether an individual can be considered a priori a
subject of the criminal system must be addressed first.
To ask about Tadro’s status-responsibility of the agent (condition to be potentially
held responsible in the criminal system) it is not only necessary to prove that the acts
constituting a crime were committed. For one to be attributed criminal responsibility, it is
essential to establish that the individual who acted or failed to act meets what Tadros
calls status-responsibility. Status responsibility is “the aspect of responsibility that an
agent requires fulfilling to be held responsible for any of his actions.” 369 As such, the
inquiry reflects the answer to the question: who is a responsible agent as far as the
criminal law is concerned?370 As such, the present reflection inquires on the agent’s place
within the criminal law system, in other words, if the agent to be considered someone
who is a viable target of the criminal laws or not?
Duff adds that criminal norms also perform a communicative function, and are
aimed at those who have the capacity to understand them: “The criminal law speaks to
those whom it claims to bind…” 371 The same opinion is shared by Tadros: “The criminal
law aims to communicate through its norms.”372 This pertains only to those who hold the
minimum standards for the law’s comprehension.
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To those who do not understand its norms, criminal law remains uncommunicative, and
consequently, they cannot be held responsible for the criminal justice system.373
Also, the criminal law presents itself not only as a set of coercive threats, but also
as a system of moral obligations, standards, and concerns, which demand citizens’
obedience. By the same token, citizens who are incapable of appreciating these norms
cannot legitimately be subjected to them.374 In other words, being able to understand the
standards of criminal law at the moment when the criminal offense was committed as
well as the time the trial is performed is essential for the attribution of criminal
responsibility.375
As established in the previous chapter, by including those starting at the age of
fifteen under its jurisdiction, the SCSL has made the case for people under the age of
eighteen to be considered viable subjects of international penal laws, therefore viable for
criminal prosecution if the criteria of mens rea and actus reus are fulfilled. According to
the brief analysis here of what it means to be a subject of a legal system, we can conclude
that the court has acknowledged (via the works of the UN Secretary General and the
Security Council) these children hold the general capacity to understand the international
laws by which all persons must abide by.
A note on duress
I have intentionally not delved into the question of whether children are de facto
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capable of understanding and abiding by the criminal laws currently in place. My
exclusive concern is how current international law acknowledges and treats children
involved in the commission of serious breaches of humanitarian law. Therefore, the
discussion of whether the element of duress – more specifically, whether children
recruited and used in military actions have genuinely chosen to do so or they were simply
responding to violence or extreme external pressure – can be considered a viable excuse
for criminal responsibility is bracketed. The lack of discussion of duress does not
necessarily reflect the position of the author finding it less fundamental for the debate on
criminal responsibility. And I can even say that in the case of children, framed as less
competent decision makers, duress is a viable central excuse of criminal responsibility.
However, duress like other possible excuses of individual responsibility such as
‘diminished mental capacity’, were addressed by the ICC and the ad hoc criminal courts
as mitigating factors in the sentencing phase of international criminal cases; therefore, it
arises only after it has been established whether the person in question is legally
competent to be considered a viable subject of the penal laws and has not excused from
criminal responsibility. 376 For the current work, the question of legal subjectivity is the
only concern.
MACR, liberty rights, and legal competence
A complementary way of assessing whether children are considered a priori
376

Reilly, “Affirmative Defenses in International Criminal Proceedings,” Defense Perspectives on
International Criminal Justice? 2017, chapter 15.

166

legally competent to bear individual criminal responsibility for serious breaches of
international law requires more elaboration, focusing on the MACR established by the
SCSL at age of fifteen which also corresponds to the liberty right given to children by
International Humanitarian Law towards early enlistment.
Here, I will simply start the conversation, indicating my intention of continuing
the work on future research projects.
Children, from a very early age, due their presumed vulnerability and incapacity
for moral reasoning, in most societies, and in international law, children are awarded
protection rights:
Protection rights are claims that other people owe some duty to protect
vital interests of the right-holder. For instance, the rights to education,
health, and physical safety are protection rights, which refer to
fundamental interests of all people. The majority viewpoint is that children
enjoy protection rights, but that they may or may not be able to exercise
liberty rights for themselves depending on the exact context and their
capacity in that context.377
As children develop and are acknowledged by their society they “progressively
acquire liberty rights by passing successive age limits, each denoting legal competency
and responsibility in different areas.”378 Liberty rights are similar to ‘adult’ rights; they
carry a prerogative that the rights holder has achieved enough maturity to be enabled to
exercise such rights, and thus, liberty rights entitles the right holder
to act with freedom in specific contexts – in the sense that there is no restriction
on them – by triggering the duty to others [and the government] not to interfere. Specific
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liberty rights include, for example, the rights to free speech, to freedom of religion, and to
vote.
In short, the law prescribes age limits to attest to children’s legal competence, and
when the child has achieved a certain age that reflects a presumed ability to exercise
certain ‘adult activities,’ such as to marry, drive, drink, it is assumed by society that he or
she has attained the maturity necessarily to exercise these activities with responsibility.
Lawmakers ultimately encapsulate in one age, at one point in time, in a particular sociopolitical-cultural context, some batch of ideas about children’s capabilities and society’s
expectations about children’s appropriate role. According to Cipriani (2009) achieving
the age of legal competence “demarcates the onset of a particular liberty right.”.
The legal age of competence in the United States, for example, which determines
the liberty right to drive is sixteen; to marry is eighteen (with a few exceptions, juveniles
age sixteen may engage in marriage with parental consent), to join the army is seventeen
with parental consent, eighteen without; to vote is eighteen; to drink is twenty-one.
The younger and (presumably) less competent the child, the more protection
rights and the fewer liberty rights are awarded. The reciprocal is also true. The older and
more mature the child becomes, legal competence in certain areas is assumed, more
liberty rights are given, and fewer protections rights are offered. It is essential to notice
that legal competence functions as the intermediary element which measures /
presupposes the exercise of liberty rights. As explained by Cipriani:
There is an inverse relationship between the protection rights and liberty…
with competency as the pivot point. With less competence, protection
rights come to the fore and liberty rights drift to the rear; yet with greater
competency, liberty rights take greater prominence. Competence [then]
adopts a central role in the predominant rights discourse; an individual
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generally must have the relevant competence to assert a given liberty right
for himself or herself.379
With regard to individual responsibility and liberty rights, Cipriani establishes a
direct correspondence between one’s attainment of a liberty right and the obligation
derived from this right: “to respect and protect a competent individual’s choices –
[which] necessarily assign responsibility for choices and actions back to the individual
who makes them.”380
Legal competence and criminal responsibility
Upon reaching the stipulated age of legal competence “children may potentially
bear criminal responsibility for their actions, and the state can first legitimately levy – in
legal terms – criminal sanctions against them.”381 Legal competence to bear criminal
responsibility is reflected in the minimum age of criminal responsibility (MACR), which
was presented previously. Discussion about an MACR is equivalent to deliberation about
the establishment of an age at which children are presumed legally capable of infringing
penal laws. Therefore, it should be noticed and properly highlighted the existence of a
direct relationship between being age-competent to infringe criminal law and being agecompetent to be held accountable by criminal law for such infringements. In fact, being
capable of violating criminal law, as a consequence, allows one to be held criminally
responsible for such a violation (unless the individual has a viable excuse that would
exempt his or her criminal responsibility).
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The right to enlist as a liberty right that entails correlative individual responsibility
Before we engage the question of how liberty rights enable individual
responsibility, it is necessary to take a step back and ask an introductory question what
rights are and how they relates to responsibility. In Cipriani’s words, rights “in the
broadest sense, are a special or justified type of claim, or a claim against someone whose
recognition as valid is called for by some set of governing rules or moral principles…
Such recognition both justifies and distinguishes rights from other types of claims.”382
Wesley Hohfeld, a Law Professor from the early twentieth century, dedicated his
career to building an analytical framework to illuminate how legal relationships between
rights and what he called ‘their correlatives’ played out. He achieved this by
deconstructing what legal scholars would attribute to the concept of a ‘right,’ and
analyzing the internal structures and relationships among different fundamental
conceptions of legal rights.383 Hohfeld identified four different building blocks (or
entitlements) composing the idea of legal rights: rights, privileges, powers, and
immunities. These four elements had four corresponding correlatives: duty, no right,
liability, and disability, respectively. Putting it in practice: “for each entitlement, there is
always a unique and distinct correlative disablement and vice versa. Thus, for every right
in A, there must be a correlative duty in B. For every privilege in A, there must be a

382

Cipriani, Children’s Rights and the Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility: A Global Perspective, 16.

383

Singer, Joseph, “Joseph William Singer, The Legal Rights Debate in Analytical Jurisprudence from
Bentham to Hohfeld,” Wisconsin Law Review, no. 975 (1982), 986-7,
http://scholar.harvard.edu/files/jsinger/files/jurisprudence.pdf.

170

correlative . . . (and so on and so forth). The rights and their correlatives form four
distinct dyads of legal relations.”384
The dyads of “rights-correlatives” “signify that these interests exist on opposing
sides of a pair of persons involved in a legal relationship.385
For the current work, the goal is not to explain all the elements and their
correlative relationships, but rather to focus on the element of “privilege” simply because
a privilege functions much like a liberty rights, entitling the holder to exercise the
referent act awarded by the right without interference, without being impeded. A
privilege is correlated with a no-right, meaning that if someone (A) hold a privilege to do
X, then nobody, besides A himself, holds the right to impede A from doing X. We can
say, for the purpose of analysis that privilege in Hohfeldian terms is equivalent to our
conception of liberty right.
How do MACR and MALR, liberty rights, legal competency and individual criminal
responsibility all tie together to answer the question of criminal responsibility of children
under International Criminal Law?
A child, after reaching a certain age, is seen by society as legally competent to
exercise a particular liberty right, for example, the right to drive. If the child has chosen
to enjoy the right in question and is at fault in a lethal car accident, he or she may have
breached criminal rules. By being considered legally capable of driving in the first place,
the child would be a priori legally capable of and obligated to answer for his or her acts
under the criminal justice system.
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Legal competence goes both ways; it enables the liberty right to be exercised (in
the presence of choice), and it qualifies the right-holder for individual responsibility if the
right in question is exercised in a way that constitutes a crime.
A similar rationale applies to the relationship between the minimum age of legal
recruitment (MALR) and the rule/principle of individual criminal responsibility under
International Criminal Law. When an individual is deemed mature enough to be granted a
liberty right and has chosen to exercise it, the very same legal regime which enables the
child to enlist by recognizing them as legally competent – International Humanitarian
Law – qualifies them as legally competent to exercise individual responsibility in case of
serious breaches of International Humanitarian Law in the course of that exercise. In
other words, the criteria for individual responsibility derive from the presumed legal
competence that also enables the attribution of a liberty right. Being considered legally
capable of being lawfully recruited and serving on the battlefield by International
Humanitarian Law also qualifies the individual to be held legally accountable for
violations of International Humanitarian Law when performing the acts that this liberty
right has enabled him or her to perform. Therefore, legal competence is a two-way street.
This argument is essential because it shows that the notions of liberty rights and legal
accountability share the same pre-requisite: the presumed legal competence of the
individual.
By authorizing juveniles starting at age fifteen to join the military, International
Humanitarian Law treats the child who has attained the minimum age of legal
recruitment as presumptively legally competent to serve in the military.
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This position is reflected in Articles 77 of Additional Protocol I; part 4 of
Additional Protocol II and Article 38 of the CRC.
The goal here is not to challenge the current law by instead arguing that a minor at
such an early age is neither psychologically nor emotionally competent to understand
what joining the armed forces entails. Rather, as stated before, the goal is simply to
highlight the fact that International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights
Law, as currently presented, understand someone as young as fifteen as fully legally
capable of exercising the act of joining the armed forces and engaging in armed conflict,
and as a consequence, it understands them to be legally competent to respond to any
criminal acts they may have committed while on the battlefield.
This chapter of the dissertation has attempted to start a second and
complementary line of reasoning for establishing children as legally competent to bear
responsibility for their violations of International Humanitarian Law. The new line of
reasoning presented in the current chapter stems from the analysis that international law –
by allowing children starting at age fifteen to legally enlist – grants them liberty rights
and thus presumes them legal competent to join the army. I cannot emphasize enough
that liberty rights as expressed by Cipriani (2009) presuppose legal competence, which
functions as a pre-condition for the attribution of individual criminal responsibility.
Having said this, the chapter provided a starting point for a subsequent research project
which complements and reinforces the conclusion arrived in the present work:
International Law recognizes persons under eighteen as legally capable of joining the
military and exercising individual criminal responsibility for serious breaches of
international law when certain conditions are met.

173

Chapter 9: Conclusion

Recapitulation of purpose and findings / relationship with previous research
This dissertation sought to provide a legal analysis on the status of children and
children who have committed serious international offenses under International Criminal
Law.
I have argued that, in general, when someone is accused of these serious acts,
framed as international crimes by international courts, International Criminal Law
possesses the capacity to hold the accused directly accountable under the law through
domestic and international mechanisms. It is quite clear that all people must abide by
International Humanitarian Law and International Human Rights Law, and that serious
breaches of these legal regimes give rise to individual criminal responsibility. However,
when the accused is someone younger than eighteen, thus considered a child under
international legal standards (International Human Rights Law), International Criminal
Law has not yet provided a clear position on their status. So the question of whether
children bear individual criminal responsibility under international law remains mostly
unanswered in nearly all published literature.
Contrary to the general understanding propagated by most published works that
there is no established law on the issue of child criminal under international criminal law,
the present work can be considered one of the few which shines a different light on the
topic, showing how the current law has initiated a legal path towards the viability of
holding juveniles accused of international crimes criminally accountable for their acts.
The research points to the UN Secretary General’s drafting of Article 7.1 of the Statute of
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the Special Court for Sierra Leone which generates evidence of international law on the
issue of child criminal responsibility. The decision of the UN Secretary General to
include juveniles under the jurisdiction of the Special Court, despite not carrying the
weight of mandatory precedent, can be used by other international courts as important
guidance as to where the law is in this specific topic. The move to include juveniles, as
set forth by the UN Secretary General and approved by the UN Security Council, should
be considered revolutionary and adequately acknowledged as an immense step towards
achieving a legal position, in International Criminal Law, on child criminal responsibility.
Revolutionary for at least two reasons: first, it changes the main legal discourse from
framing children exclusively as victims to legally contemplating them as viable
perpetrators of international crimes and subjects of the international criminal system.
The present work also suggests a relational link between first, the minimum age
of legal recruitment as established by international law, second, the presumed legal
competence attributed to minors starting at age fifteen, and finally, the individual
criminal responsibility of minors who violate international law in the course of exercising
their right to serve and fight.
Limitations of the research (anticipation of criticism)
A legal positivist analysis, like the one presented, undoubtedly has its limitations.
First, we should realize that the topic in question, the criminal accountability of children,
is very controversial, and most available inquiries are pervaded with moral interpretations
and political criticisms. The current work neither explores the moral and political sides of
the problem nor of the legal system’s composition; therefore, as an example, it
intentionally fails to addresses important questions such as why the legal system is as it is
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and whose interests does it serve? Nor does it investigate whether the existing laws
should be interpreted in a way that allows for the element of fairness, justice to be
accounted for. Also, it does not raise the question whether the current law is effective and
if so, to whom. Another limitation is the lack of analysis related to the language used,
precisely if it is embedded with notions of power, or how language is used to perform
actions. The analysis also does not delve into questions of legitimacy and how the way
law is perceived affects the functioning of legal system. These are a few of the inquiries
that, despite being fascinating and of the utmost importance, are left out of the current
legal positivist analysis.
Therefore, as mentioned previously, the exclusive interest of a legal positivist
analysis (as the one here developed) is to focus on whether there is law on a specific
issue, where the law is to be the found, and how the existing source of the law affects its
use.
Problems arising from the research
After scrutinizing the existing research on the question and finding it quite
challenging to locate the question of children potential criminal responsibility under
international criminal law within existing literature, I noticed that the discussion of
potential criminal responsibility of child soldiers in IL and IR literature takes place under
a different head; it is in fact framed as inquiry into where a universal MACR should be
set. And after reading most of the current works on child soldiers and legal
accountability, I concluded that my research question regarding the individual criminal
responsibility of children under international criminal law and the discussion of a
universal MACR were indeed equivalent inasmuch as they both aimed at constructing a
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space of responsibility for individuals under eighteen at the international level. The
primary difference between my research question and the MACR debate was how these
two problems were framed. While I framed the inquiry in more legal-theoretical terms,
addressing the structure of International Criminal Law, and focusing on the concept of
individual criminal responsibility, the discussion on MACR at the international level tend
to follow policy concerns and answers to more practical issues.
Implications of my findings/ contributions
1. This dissertation has found clear evidence of law on the issue of children’s criminal
responsibility under International Law in the Statue of the SCSL, which can be used by
other international courts, thus contributing to the creation and the development of an
emerging general rule of International Criminal Law on the issue.
2. This dissertation also suggests that the SCSL by including juveniles starting at age
fifteen under the jurisdiction of the court has understood them as viable subjects of the
international criminal system, and therefore as presumably legally capable of being
criminally responsible for their criminal acts.
3. Overall, this dissertation has extended the field of International Criminal Law by
identifying and elucidating the existence of law on the issue of children’s criminal
responsibility for grave violations of international law.
Recommendations (for research; for action/policy change)
The finding that International Law allows juveniles to answer criminally for
serious violations of international law, quite honestly, does not (and should not) come as
a surprise if one expects some level of consistency within a legal system. By allowing
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children, starting at age fifteen, to legally enlist and be used in armed conflicts – which in
my opinion is preposterous, and can only be understandable if one is looking at recruiting
children narrowly in terms of some type military gains, that is, if early enlistment does, in
fact, generate military advantage – international law has since pre-determined or strongly
influenced its later position on the issue of children’s viable criminal treatment for those
who have reached the age of legal recruitment. It is logically consistent that someone
who is perceived as legally competent to enlist, is also, as the other side of the same coin,
to be perceived as legally competent by the same legal system to answer individually for
any serious violations they commit while performing the task he or she was authorized to
do. Therefore, if one wishes to confront the issue of the presumed legal competence
given to minors starting at age fifteen, then states should strongly revise international
rules granting these children the right of early enlistment.
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